Wednesday, August 7, 2019

The Nation Faces Long Standing Challenges Related to Defending Against Biological Threats

The Nation Faces Long Standing Challenges Related to Defending Against Biological Threats

Greetings GAO et al, 

i thought i might respond a bit here if i might, please, with regards, to this topic and the tse prion aka mad cow type disease.

with regards to;

In response to several incidents involving the shipment of improperly inactivated pathogens, in August 2016 we reported on issues related to the inactivation of pathogens in high-containment laboratories and found that both the science and the federal guidance around pathogen inactivation are limited and inconsistently implemented.22 Additionally, we found that federal officials did not know how many incomplete inactivation incidents have occurred because laboratories do not have to identify them in incident reports, and are only required to report incidents involving certain pathogens. We made 11 recommendations to HHS and USDA that they improve the oversight of inactivation by revising reporting forms, improving guidance for development and validation of inactivation protocols, and developing consistent criteria for enforcement of incidents involving incomplete inactivation. To date, 6 of the 11 recommendations have been addressed and we continue to monitor the 5 that remain open.23

Safety lapses continued to occur at laboratories in the United States that conduct research on hazardous pathogens, raising concern about the efficacy of federal oversight. In October 2017, we found that the Federal Select Agent Program—jointly managed by HHS and USDA—oversees laboratories’ handling of certain hazardous pathogens known as select agents, but the program does not fully meet all key elements of effective oversight.24 For example, the Federal Select Agent Program was not independent from all laboratories it oversees, and it had not assessed risks posed by its current structure or the effectiveness of its mechanisms to reduce organizational conflicts of interest. ...

22GAO, High-Containment Laboratories: Improved Oversight of Dangerous Pathogens Needed to Mitigate Risk, GAO-16-642 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 2016) and GAO, High- Containment Laboratories: Actions Needed to Mitigate Risk of Potential Exposure and Release of Dangerous Pathogens, GAO-16-871T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2016).

23For example, HHS and USDA updated reporting forms to include incomplete inactivation as a type of incident and issued updated regulations and guidance that included clear definitions of inactivation and a validated inactivation procedure.

24GAO, High-Containment Laboratories: Coordinated Actions Needed to Enhance the Select Agent Program’s Oversight of Hazardous Pathogens, GAO-18-145 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 19, 2017).



IT would seem prudent to, do as to others, as you wish they would do unto you. 

THE BSE TSE Prion Minimal Risk Region MRR policy is a incredibly failed policy. it was designed and set up to fail from the start. 

now we have cwd tse prion saturating the USA, cwd tse prion spreading across from Europe, we have mad camel disease in Africa, and we now know that the cwd will transmit to pigs by oral routes. this is terrible. see;

Let's take a look at the facts shall we $ 

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, NORTH AMERICA TYPICAL AND ATYPICAL 

Experimental Transmission of H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to Bovinized Transgenic Mice

snip...see full text;



IBNC BSE TSE Prion mad cow disease

 ***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.

***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.

*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***

Posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT


cattle, pigs, sheep, cwd, tse, prion, oh my!

***> In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). 

Sheep and cattle may be exposed to CWD via common grazing areas with affected deer but so far, appear to be poorly susceptible to mule deer CWD (Sigurdson, 2008). In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). It is not known how susceptible humans are to CWD but given that the prion can be present in muscle, it is likely that humans have been exposed to the agent via consumption of venison (Sigurdson, 2008). Initial experimental research suggests that human susceptibility to CWD is low and there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans (Sigurdson, 2008), however the risk appetite for a public health threat may still find this level unacceptable.



cwd scrapie pigs oral routes

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <*** 

 >*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <*** 

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 5="" 6="" at="" by="" detected="" eia.="" examined="" group="" in="" intracranial="" least="" lymphoid="" month="" months="" of="" one="" pigs="" positive="" prpsc="" quic="" the="" tissues="" was="">6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 4="" and="" group="" months="" oral="">6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). 

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. 

This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. 

Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains. 




Friday, December 14, 2012

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

snip.....

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:

1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and

2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.

The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.

Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.

There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.

snip.....

36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).

The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).

Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.

snip.....

The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).

snip.....

In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.

snip.....

In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.

snip.....

Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.

snip.....


TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017 

*** EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP ***


WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2018 

CONFIDENTIAL IN CONFIDENCE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS FDA EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR RULE CHANGE USA Section 21 C.F.R. 589.2000


TUESDAY, JULY 10, 2018
CONFIDENTIAL IN CONFIDENCE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS
*** ''but feeding of other ruminant protein, including scrapie-infected sheep, can continue to pigs.''
CONFIDENTIAL SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS

***> NEW TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE (MAD CAMEL DISEASE) IN A NEW SPECIES <***

NEW OUTBREAK OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE IN A NEW SPECIES

Subject: Prion Disease in Dromedary Camels, Algeria

Our identification of this prion disease in a geographically widespread livestock species requires urgent enforcement of surveillance and assessment of the potential risks to human and animal health.



Wednesday, May 30, 2018 

Dromedary camels in northern Africa have a neurodegenerative prion disease that may have originated decades ago


***> IMPORTS AND EXPORTS <***


SEE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF BANNED ANIMAL PROTEIN AKA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA DECADES AFTER POST BAN



Thursday, August 1, 2019 

Camel prion disease detected in Tunisian camels


this is an increasingly desperate, GLOBAL, situation we are in, especially now with the latest on zoonosis from bse, scrapie, cwd, tse prion, and iatrogenic risk factors there from. 

I wrote many, many moons ago about the to a Bio-Security something, about these risk factors and the TSE Prion and passenger air traffaic and TSE Prion suitcase bombs;


FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2019 

Chronic Wasting Disease in Cervids: Implications for Prion Transmission to Humans and Other Animal Species


WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2019 

The agent of transmissible mink encephalopathy passaged in sheep is similar to BSE-L


MONDAY, MAY 09, 2016 

A comparison of classical and H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism in wild type and EK211 cattle following intracranial inoculation


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 2018 

The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge


THURSDAY, AUGUST 01, 2019 

Europe Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Update August 2019


TUESDAY, JULY 30, 2019 

Guidelines for reporting surveillance data on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) in the EU within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 APPROVED: 9 July 2019


WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2019 

The European Union Summary Report On Surveillance For The Presence Of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE): The Situation In 2017


SUNDAY, JULY 14, 2019 

Korea Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion additional cases were observed in red deer, sika deer, and their crossbred deer in 2010 and 2016, beyond that, anyone's guess


Terry Singeltary on gricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002

Docket No: 02-088-1 

RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; [TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS'] - TSS 1/27/03 (0)

Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]

Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 -0600 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: [log in to unmask] Docket No: 02-088-1

Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid=fr

Greetings,

i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA.

please be warned;

Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 -0800 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 

Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding system) MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee

Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth

[Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]

snip...

Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine, including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.

snip...

From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been in Greece is prohibited.

snip...

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid=02

========================

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the country?

Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

Sources: World Trade Atlas

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE; most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_greece0701.htm

Greetings list members,

i just cannot accept this;

23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)

The data do not provide a species of origin code for these products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

what kind of statement is this?

how stupid do they think we are?

it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Slovenia?

There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.

APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or ranch in the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_slovenia1101.htm

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights.

As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_cz0601.htm

What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from Austria?

Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat, animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified species.

Source: World Trade Atlas

snip...

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Austria?

A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria arrived in the US via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.

Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_austria1201.htm

Greetings FDA and public,

if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.

[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]

if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid me.

[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]

more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of these species are capable of carrying a TSE?

snip...

A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_israel0602.htm

Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Japan?

Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_japan0901.htm

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural interest. Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE, FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_germany1200e.htm

search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/iw_archive.htm

more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again 

References:< [log in to unmask]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean

Greetings again List Members,

let me kick a madcow around here a bit.

on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding system.

the USDA/APHIS states;

During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from Poland included non-species specific animal products used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant material.

NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially _cross-contamination_, it states;

ANNEX 1

Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001

EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND STABILITY

The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from 1987 onwards.

This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and increased over time.

The continuing very high external challenge supported this development.

Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence provided on compliance.

Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed.

BSE surveillance:

Not sufficient before 2001.

Cross-contamination:

Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.

see full text and ANNEX 1 at;

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out185_en.pdf

so in my humble opinion, the statement by the USDA/APHIS that ''these US imports _should_ not have contained ruminant materials, is a joke. a sad joke indeed.

* POLAND BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT

http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out185_en.pdf

BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$

Subject: BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$ Date: November 1, 2002 at 8:03 am PST

[Federal Register: November 1, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 212)]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Part 94

[Docket No. 02-072-2]

Change in Disease Status of Israel Because of BSE

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Affirmation of interim rule as final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are adopting as a final rule, without change, an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where bovine spongiform encephalopathy exists because the disease had been detected in a native-born animal in that region. The effect of the interim rule was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was necessary to help prevent the introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy into the United States.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The interim rule became effective on June 4, 2002.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Gary Colgrove, Chief Staff Veterinarian, Sanitary Trade Issues Team, National Center for Import and Export, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737- 1231; (301) 734-4356.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The regulations in 9 CFR parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 (referred to below as the regulations) govern the importation of certain animals, birds, poultry, meat, other animal products and byproducts, hay, and straw into the United States in order to prevent the introduction of various animal diseases, including bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). In an interim rule effective June 4, 2002, and published in the Federal Register on July 18, 2002 (67 FR 47243-47244, Docket No. 02- 072-1), we amended the regulations in Sec. 94.18 (a)(1) by adding Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists due to the detection of BSE in a native-born animal in that region. Comments on the interim rule were required to be received on or before September 16, 2002. We did not receive any comments. Therefore, for the reasons given in the interim rule, we are adopting the interim rule as a final rule. This action also affirms the information contained in the interim rule concerning Executive Orders 12866 and 12988 and the Paperwork Reduction Act. Further, for this action, the Office of Management and Budget has waived its review under Executive Order 12866.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

This action affirms an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists. The effect of the interim rule was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was necessary to help prevent the introduction of BSE into the United States. The following analysis addresses the economic effects of the interim rule on small entities, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The interim rule's restrictions on the importation of ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from Israel are not expected to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities due to the fact that the restricted items are either not imported from Israel or are imported in very small amounts. There are three categories of imports that may be affected, but Israel's share of U.S. imports is small in each case. The first category of affected imported commodities is ``Meat and edible meat offal, salted in brine, dried or smoked; edible flours and meals of meat or meat offal.'' Average total yearly imports of these products by the United States over the 3-year period 1999-2001 were valued at $24.6 million. Imports from Israel in 1999 were valued at $26,000. No imports of these products from Israel were reported for 2000 or 2001. The second category of affected commodities is ``Preparations of a kind used in animal feeding.'' Average total yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $93.5 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $76,000. The final category of affected commodities is ``Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood.'' Average yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $101.2 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $2.7 million. It is apparent that Israel is a minor supplier to the United States of the ruminant products and byproducts affected by the BSE-related restrictions resulting from the interim rule. Therefore, we do not expect that the interim rule's restrictions on ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from Israel will substantially affect any U.S. importers, large or small, of those commodities. Under these circumstances, the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has determined that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

List of Subjects in 9 CFR Part 94

Animal diseases, Imports, Livestock, Meat and meat products, Milk, Poultry and poultry products, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

PART 94--RINDERPEST, FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE, FOWL PEST (FOWL PLAGUE), EXOTIC NEWCASTLE DISEASE, AFRICAN SWINE FEVER, HOG CHOLERA, AND BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: PROHIBITED AND RESTRICTED IMPORTATIONS

Accordingly, we are adopting as a final rule, without change, the interim rule that amended 9 CFR part 94 and that was published at 67 FR 47243-47244 on July 18, 2002.

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450, 7711-7714, 7751, 7754, 8303, 8306, 8308, 8310, 8311, and 8315; 21 U.S.C 136 and 136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 4331 and 4332; 7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.

Done in Washington, DC, this 28th day of October, 2002. Bobby R. Acord, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. [FR Doc. 02-27812 Filed 10-31-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3410-34-P

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid=02

greetings List members,

MORE OF THE INFAMOUS USA NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM.

as long as the exporting country and the importing country know not what they are exporting (play dumb/stupid), this non-species coding system allows potential BSE/TSE materials to be imported and exported freely and legally...

TSS

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from Israel ?

The U.S. imported no live ruminants or ruminant meat from Israel since 1999. In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE. Other imports from Israel during the period 1998-2001 included non-species specific preparations used in animal feeds and other non-food products of unspecified animals. For the category "preparations used in animal feeding, NESOI" that was imported into the U.S., it is possible that bovine meat or bovine byproducts could have been included in this category. However, the US Food and Drug Administration prohibits feeding of meat-and-bone meal to ruminants in the U.S....snip...end


snip...2019

***> Poland is Proof atypical BSE is NOT an old cow spontaneous disease...tss

we have seen the spontaneous BSE epidemic in France, what about the other HIGH INCIDENCE ATYPICAL BSE COUNTRY OF POLAND, another atypical spontaneous event of high incidence. how can this be blamed on a happenstance of nothing, i.e. old age? goes against all junk science to date on the spontaneous atypical BSE i.e.

> In 2015, the OIE determined that atypical BSE occurred spontaneously at a low rate in all cattle populations and would be excluded for BSE risk. ...

>Atypical BSE occurs in older cattle, usually 8 years of age or greater, and does not appear to be associated with contaminated feed. Like classic or sporadic CJD in humans, it seems to arise rarely and spontaneously. 

 POLAND ATYPICAL BSE AND SPORADIC CJD


we have seen the spontaneous BSE epidemic in France, what about the other HIGH INCIDENCE ATYPICAL BSE COUNTRY OF POLAND, another atypical spontaneous event of high incidence. how can this be blamed on a happenstance of nothing, i.e. old age? goes against all junk science to date on the spontaneous atypical BSE i.e.

> In 2015, the OIE determined that atypical BSE occurred spontaneously at a low rate in all cattle populations and would be excluded for BSE risk. ...

>Atypical BSE occurs in older cattle, usually 8 years of age or greater, and does not appear to be associated with contaminated feed. Like classic or sporadic CJD in humans, it seems to arise rarely and spontaneously. 

 POLAND ATYPICAL BSE AND SPORADIC CJD


Atypical status of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Poland: a molecular typing study

Summary

The aim of this study was to analyze molecular features of protease-resistant prion protein (PrPres) in Western blots of BSE cases diagnosed in Poland with respect to a possible atypical status. Confirmed cases were analyzed by Western blotting with several monoclonal antibodies directed at N-terminal and core epitopes of prion protein (PrP). Most cases showed the classical glycoprofile characterized by the dominance of the di- over the monoglycosylated PrPres band, yielding di-/mono- ratios well above 2 and by reactivity with antibodies having their epitopes in bovine PrP region 110–242 (C-type cases). Surprisingly, seven cases of BSE were atypical. Six were classified as L-type based on a slightly lower molecular mass (Mr) of the non- glycosylated band with respect to C-types and a conspicuously low di-/mono- ratio of glycosylated PrPres bands approaching unity. One case was classified as H-type because of a higher Mr of PrPres bands on the blot when compared with C-type cases. A characteristic epitope of H-type PrPres occurred in the 101–110 region of PrP for which only antibody 12B2 had a sufficient affinity. The occurrence of atypical cases only in animals 9 years of age and older raises questions about the mechanisms of prion diseases and the origin of BSE.


Atypical status of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Poland: a molecular typing study

M. P. Polak1, J. F. Zmudzinski1, J. G. Jacobs2, J. P. M. Langeveld2

1 National Veterinary Research Institute, Pulawy, Poland

2 Central Institute for Animal Disease Control (CIDC-Lelystad), Lelystad, The Netherlands Received 24 April 2007; Accepted 27 August 2007; Published online 26 September 2007 # Springer-Verlag 2007 

snip...

Clarification of whether these atypical cases represent genuine strains of BSE would be accomplished by transmission studies in mice. Such studies have already been performed in France, Germany and Italy [3, 5, 14, 15]. For H-type cases in France, successful transmission was achieved in both wild-type, and transgenic mice expressing bovine and ovine PrPC. In Germany, successful transmission of both an L-type and an H-type case to transgenic mice overexpressing bovine PrPC has been described. PrPres from those mice was identical to the inoculum used in the study, proving the existence of distinct strains of BSE. All atypical features of those isolates were maintained in the inoculated mice, indicating the existence of several prion strains in cattle, or alternatively a possible evolution to a single BSE strain, as suggested from data obtained by Capobianco et al. with wild-type inbred mice [15]. This second hypothesis could fit with data from the United Kingdom, where over 180,000 cases of BSE were diagnosed by passive surveillance. British and European experience based on tissue analysis from clinically affected animals showed consistent characteristics of BSE agent not only on histological sections from cattle brains but also when inoculating mice, pointing to the existence of one uniform strain of BSE. Therefore, it is possible that a sporadic form of BSE present in the cattle population at a very low rate in the past could have spread to naive animals via contaminated meatand-bone meals. Spontaneous BSE, if it occurs, must be a very rare phenomenon. However, data for Poland, where 14% of all cases comprised an atypical form of BSE, seems to be in contradiction to this hypothesis. But when the average age of all positive cases in Poland is taken into account, BSE is generally found in older animals (mean age of 7.7). Analysis of the age structure of cattle in Poland in the period of 2002–2006 shows that 56–60% of all animals were 7 years old and above. A much larger number of cattle should be tested to get better insight into the real prevalence of atypical BSE. However, current tendencies based on economic analysis point to a decrease in the number of tests performed rather than expanding this scheme any further. It would be sensible to maintain a certain level of testing focused on the older age group to distinguish between a stable, thus sporadic-based, situation of BSE, or alternatively a fade-out, thus epidemic-based, situation. Exploring the subject of spontaneous BSE in the cattle population may be ceased for economic reasons, and it may never be known while this answer is in our reach thanks to great financial efforts in recent years. 


Poland is Proof atypical BSE is NOT an old cow spontaneous disease...tss

Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom) Country/Year 

Poland 

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4f 5 11 19 10 9 5 4 2 1m 3 1 0 0 0


2019

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 04, 2019 

POLAND DETECTS BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION 

Poland is Proof atypical BSE is NOT an old cow spontaneous disease...tss 


FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 01, 2019 

Poland Exported 5,500 Pounds of Meat From Sick Cows to EU, what about mad cow disease? 

Poland is Proof atypical BSE is NOT an old cow spontaneous disease...tss 


SATURDAY, JUNE 01, 2019 

Brazil reports another cases of mad cow disease atypical BSE TSE Prion


PLEASE BE ADVISED THERE IS NO SCIENTIFIC PROOF THAT ANY ATYPICAL BSE TSE PRION IS OF A SPONTANEOUS OLD AGE DISEASE, NOT CAUSED BY FEED, THIS IS FALSE AND UNPROVEN, IN FACT, ATYPICAL BSE OF THE L AND H TYPE ARE TRANSMISSIBLE BY ORAL ROUTE. THIS STATEMENT THAT ATYPICAL BSE IS A SPONTANEOUS EVENT CAUSED BY OLD AGE, CAUSED BY NOTHING, IS ABSOLUTELY A LIE, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL, AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT PRODUCE SUCH STATEMENTS, KNOWS THIS IS AN UNPROVEN STATEMENT...TERRY SINGELTARY SR.


TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 

Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump USA and President Jair Bolsonaro Brazil FOREIGN POLICY BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow disease


TUESDAY, JULY 16, 2019 

Spain Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion July 5 2019



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 2018 

The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge




WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2019 
USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection Aug 29, 2018 A Review of Science 2019

SUNDAY, APRIL 14, 2019 
Estimation of prion infectivity in tissues of cattle infected with atypical BSE by real time-quaking induced conversion assay


WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2019 
Estimating the impact on food and edible materials of changing scrapie control measures: The scrapie control model

TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 
USDA ARS 2018 USAHA RESOLUTIONS TWO PRONGED APPROACH NEEDED FOR ADVANCING CATTLE TRACEABILITY

THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2019 
USDA APHIS CDC FDA BSE TSE PRION UPDATE 2019

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019 
MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2019 
BSE infectivity survives burial for five years with only limited spread

MONDAY, JUNE 24, 2019 

APHIS, FSIS, USDA, FDA, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE, BSE, CWD, Scrapie, Camel TSE Prion Disease, CJD Humans


WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2019

''CWD has also been diagnosed in several free-ranging white-tailed deer harvested on ranches in close proximity to the remaining CWD positive breeding facilities within Medina County in central Texas. Genetic tests performed on those hunter-harvested deer found that the genetic composition of the subject animals were more closely related to deer in nearby captive facilities, as opposed to those in the surrounding free-range population.''

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS TESTIMONY TEXAS TPWD



WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2019 

Subcommittee Hearing: Chronic Wasting Disease: The Threats to Wildlife, Public Lands, Hunting, and Health

video


CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CONGRESS Serial No. 107-117 May 16, 2002

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE

JOINT OVERSIGHT HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORESTS AND FOREST HEALTH JOINT WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS OF THE COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

May 16, 2002

Serial No. 107-117

snip...

Mr. MCINNIS. Today, this joint Subcommittee hearing will explore an issue of immeasurable importance to the growing number of communities in wide-ranging parts of this country, the growing incidence of Chronic Wasting Disease in North America’s wild and captive deer and elk populations. In a matter of just a few months, this once parochial concern has grown into something much larger and much more insidious than anyone could have imagined or predicted.

As each day passes, this problem grows in its size, scope, and consequence. One thing becomes clear. Chronic Wasting Disease is not a Colorado problem. It is a Wisconsin problem or a Nebraska or Wyoming problem. It is a national problem and anything short of a fully integrated, systematic national assault on this simply will not do, which is precisely why we brought our group together here today.

snip...

So this is a disease that is spreading throughout the continent and it is going to require a national response as well as the efforts that are currently taking place in States like Wisconsin, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, the interest they now have down in Texas and some of the neighboring States that have large white-tailed deer population and also elk.

This is a huge issue for us, Mr. Chairman, in the State of Wisconsin. I want to commend Governor McCallum and your staff and the various agencies for the rapid response that you have shown, given the early detection of CWD after the last deer hunting season. The problem that we have, though, is just a lack of information, good science in regards to what is the best response, how dangerous is this disease. We cannot close the door, quite frankly, with the paucity of scientific research that is out there right now in regards to how the disease spreads, the exposure of other livestock herds—given the importance of our dairy industry in the State, that is a big issue—and also the human health effects.



WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2019 

Experts urge immediate action to contain the epidemic Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion


TUESDAY, JULY 23, 2019 

APHIS USDA Administrator Announces Several Senior Leadership Changes As Trump Prepares Apparently To Fire 100's of Scientists That Don't Agree With Him, what about mad cow type disease tse prion?


2018 - 2019

***> This is very likely to have parallels with control efforts for CWD in cervids.

Rapid recontamination of a farm building occurs after attempted prion removal


Kevin Christopher Gough, BSc (Hons), PhD1, Claire Alison Baker, BSc (Hons)2, Steve Hawkins, MIBiol3, Hugh Simmons, BVSc, MRCVS, MBA, MA3, Timm Konold, DrMedVet, PhD, MRCVS3 and Ben Charles Maddison, BSc (Hons), PhD2

Abstract

The transmissible spongiform encephalopathy scrapie of sheep/goats and chronic wasting disease of cervids are associated with environmental reservoirs of infectivity. 

Preventing environmental prions acting as a source of infectivity to healthy animals is of major concern to farms that have had outbreaks of scrapie and also to the health management of wild and farmed cervids. 

Here, an efficient scrapie decontamination protocol was applied to a farm with high levels of environmental contamination with the scrapie agent. 

Post-decontamination, no prion material was detected within samples taken from the farm buildings as determined using a sensitive in vitro replication assay (sPMCA). 

A bioassay consisting of 25 newborn lambs of highly susceptible prion protein genotype VRQ/VRQ introduced into this decontaminated barn was carried out in addition to sampling and analysis of dust samples that were collected during the bioassay. 

Twenty-four of the animals examined by immunohistochemical analysis of lymphatic tissues were scrapie-positive during the bioassay, samples of dust collected within the barn were positive by month 3. 

The data illustrates the difficulty in decontaminating farm buildings from scrapie, and demonstrates the likely contribution of farm dust to the recontamination of these environments to levels that are capable of causing disease.

snip...

As in the authors' previous study,12 the decontamination of this sheep barn was not effective at removing scrapie infectivity, and despite the extra measures brought into this study (more effective chemical treatment and removal of sources of dust) the overall rates of disease transmission mirror previous results on this farm. With such apparently effective decontamination (assuming that at least some sPMCA seeding ability is coincident with infectivity), how was infectivity able to persist within the environment and where does infectivity reside? Dust samples were collected in both the bioassay barn and also a barn subject to the same decontamination regime within the same farm (but remaining unoccupied). Within both of these barns dust had accumulated for three months that was able to seed sPMCA, indicating the accumulation of scrapie-containing material that was independent of the presence of sheep that may have been incubating and possibly shedding low amounts of infectivity.

This study clearly demonstrates the difficulty in removing scrapie infectivity from the farm environment. Practical and effective prion decontamination methods are still urgently required for decontamination of scrapie infectivity from farms that have had cases of scrapie and this is particularly relevant for scrapiepositive goatherds, which currently have limited genetic resistance to scrapie within commercial breeds.24 This is very likely to have parallels with control efforts for CWD in cervids.

Acknowledgements The authors thank the APHA farm staff, Tony Duarte, Olly Roberts and Margaret Newlands for preparation of the sheep pens and animal husbandry during the study. The authors also thank the APHA pathology team for RAMALT and postmortem examination.

Funding This study was funded by DEFRA within project SE1865. 

Competing interests None declared. 


Saturday, January 5, 2019 

Rapid recontamination of a farm building occurs after attempted prion removal 


THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2019 

BSE infectivity survives burial for five years with only limited spread



***> CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS PRION CONFERENCE 2018

P69 Experimental transmission of CWD from white-tailed deer to co-housed reindeer 

Mitchell G (1), Walther I (1), Staskevicius A (1), Soutyrine A (1), Balachandran A (1) 

(1) National & OIE Reference Laboratory for Scrapie and CWD, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. 

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) continues to be detected in wild and farmed cervid populations of North America, affecting predominantly white-tailed deer, mule deer and elk. Extensive herds of wild caribou exist in northern regions of Canada, although surveillance has not detected the presence of CWD in this population. Oral experimental transmission has demonstrated that reindeer, a species closely related to caribou, are susceptible to CWD. Recently, CWD was detected for the first time in Europe, in wild Norwegian reindeer, advancing the possibility that caribou in North America could also become infected. Given the potential overlap in habitat between wild CWD-infected cervids and wild caribou herds in Canada, we sought to investigate the horizontal transmissibility of CWD from white-tailed deer to reindeer. 

Two white-tailed deer were orally inoculated with a brain homogenate prepared from a farmed Canadian white-tailed deer previously diagnosed with CWD. Two reindeer, with no history of exposure to CWD, were housed in the same enclosure as the white-tailed deer, 3.5 months after the deer were orally inoculated. The white-tailed deer developed clinical signs consistent with CWD beginning at 15.2 and 21 months post-inoculation (mpi), and were euthanized at 18.7 and 23.1 mpi, respectively. Confirmatory testing by immunohistochemistry (IHC) and western blot demonstrated widespread aggregates of pathological prion protein (PrPCWD) in the central nervous system and lymphoid tissues of both inoculated white-tailed deer. Both reindeer were subjected to recto-anal mucosal associated lymphoid tissue (RAMALT) biopsy at 20 months post-exposure (mpe) to the white-tailed deer. The biopsy from one reindeer contained PrPCWD confirmed by IHC. This reindeer displayed only subtle clinical evidence of disease prior to a rapid decline in condition requiring euthanasia at 22.5 mpe. Analysis of tissues from this reindeer by IHC revealed widespread PrPCWD deposition, predominantly in central nervous system and lymphoreticular tissues. Western blot molecular profiles were similar between both orally inoculated white-tailed deer and the CWD positive reindeer. Despite sharing the same enclosure, the other reindeer was RAMALT negative at 20 mpe, and PrPCWD was not detected in brainstem and lymphoid tissues following necropsy at 35 mpe. Sequencing of the prion protein gene from both reindeer revealed differences at several codons, which may have influenced susceptibility to infection. 

Natural transmission of CWD occurs relatively efficiently amongst cervids, supporting the expanding geographic distribution of disease and the potential for transmission to previously naive populations. The efficient horizontal transmission of CWD from white-tailed deer to reindeer observed here highlights the potential for reindeer to become infected if exposed to other cervids or environments infected with CWD. 



***> Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years


***> Nine of these recurrences occurred 14–21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded. 


Gudmundur Georgsson,1 Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3

Correspondence

Gudmundur Georgsson ggeorgs@hi.is

1 Institute for Experimental Pathology, University of Iceland, Keldur v/vesturlandsveg, IS-112 Reykjavı´k, Iceland

2 Laboratory of the Chief Veterinary Officer, Keldur, Iceland

3 Bethesda, Maryland, USA

Received 7 March 2006 Accepted 6 August 2006

In 1978, a rigorous programme was implemented to stop the spread of, and subsequently eradicate, sheep scrapie in Iceland. Affected flocks were culled, premises were disinfected and, after 2–3 years, restocked with lambs from scrapie-free areas. Between 1978 and 2004, scrapie recurred on 33 farms. Nine of these recurrences occurred 14–21 years after culling, apparently as the result of environmental contamination, but outside entry could not always be absolutely excluded. Of special interest was one farm with a small, completely self-contained flock where scrapie recurred 18 years after culling, 2 years after some lambs had been housed in an old sheephouse that had never been disinfected. Epidemiological investigation established with near certitude that the disease had not been introduced from the outside and it is concluded that the agent may have persisted in the old sheep-house for at least 16 years.

TITLE: PATHOLOGICAL FEATURES OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE IN REINDEER AND DEMONSTRATION OF HORIZONTAL TRANSMISSION 


 *** DECEMBER 2016 CDC EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE JOURNAL CWD HORIZONTAL TRANSMISSION 


SEE;

Back around 2000, 2001, or so, I was corresponding with officials abroad during the bse inquiry, passing info back and forth, and some officials from here inside USDA aphis FSIS et al. In fact helped me get into the USA 50 state emergency BSE conference call way back. That one was a doozy. But I always remember what “deep throat” I never knew who they were, but I never forgot;

Some unofficial information from a source on the inside looking out -

Confidential!!!!

As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland. Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that TSE contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!! A very frightening revelation!!!

---end personal email---end...tss



Infectivity surviving ashing to 600*C is (in my opinion) degradable but infective. based on Bown & Gajdusek, (1991), landfill and burial may be assumed to have a reduction factor of 98% (i.e. a factor of 50) over 3 years. CJD-infected brain-tissue remained infectious after storing at room-temperature for 22 months (Tateishi et al, 1988). Scrapie agent is known to remain viable after at least 30 months of desiccation (Wilson et al, 1950). and pastures that had been grazed by scrapie-infected sheep still appeared to be contaminated with scrapie agent three years after they were last occupied by sheep (Palsson, 1979).



Dr. Paul Brown Scrapie Soil Test BSE Inquiry Document



Using in vitro Prion replication for high sensitive detection of prions and prionlike proteins and for understanding mechanisms of transmission. 

Claudio Soto Mitchell Center for Alzheimer's diseases and related Brain disorders, Department of Neurology, University of Texas Medical School at Houston. 

Prion and prion-like proteins are misfolded protein aggregates with the ability to selfpropagate to spread disease between cells, organs and in some cases across individuals. I n T r a n s m i s s i b l e s p o n g i f o r m encephalopathies (TSEs), prions are mostly composed by a misfolded form of the prion protein (PrPSc), which propagates by transmitting its misfolding to the normal prion protein (PrPC). The availability of a procedure to replicate prions in the laboratory may be important to study the mechanism of prion and prion-like spreading and to develop high sensitive detection of small quantities of misfolded proteins in biological fluids, tissues and environmental samples. Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA) is a simple, fast and efficient methodology to mimic prion replication in the test tube. PMCA is a platform technology that may enable amplification of any prion-like misfolded protein aggregating through a seeding/nucleation process. In TSEs, PMCA is able to detect the equivalent of one single molecule of infectious PrPSc and propagate prions that maintain high infectivity, strain properties and species specificity. Using PMCA we have been able to detect PrPSc in blood and urine of experimentally infected animals and humans affected by vCJD with high sensitivity and specificity. Recently, we have expanded the principles of PMCA to amplify amyloid-beta (Aβ) and alphasynuclein (α-syn) aggregates implicated in Alzheimer's and Parkinson's diseases, respectively. Experiments are ongoing to study the utility of this technology to detect Aβ and α-syn aggregates in samples of CSF and blood from patients affected by these diseases.

=========================

***>>> Recently, we have been using PMCA to study the role of environmental prion contamination on the horizontal spreading of TSEs. These experiments have focused on the study of the interaction of prions with plants and environmentally relevant surfaces. Our results show that plants (both leaves and roots) bind tightly to prions present in brain extracts and excreta (urine and feces) and retain even small quantities of PrPSc for long periods of time. Strikingly, ingestion of prioncontaminated leaves and roots produced disease with a 100% attack rate and an incubation period not substantially longer than feeding animals directly with scrapie brain homogenate. Furthermore, plants can uptake prions from contaminated soil and transport them to different parts of the plant tissue (stem and leaves). Similarly, prions bind tightly to a variety of environmentally relevant surfaces, including stones, wood, metals, plastic, glass, cement, etc. Prion contaminated surfaces efficiently transmit prion disease when these materials were directly injected into the brain of animals and strikingly when the contaminated surfaces were just placed in the animal cage. These findings demonstrate that environmental materials can efficiently bind infectious prions and act as carriers of infectivity, suggesting that they may play an important role in the horizontal transmission of the disease.

========================

Since its invention 13 years ago, PMCA has helped to answer fundamental questions of prion propagation and has broad applications in research areas including the food industry, blood bank safety and human and veterinary disease diagnosis. 



New studies on the heat resistance of hamster-adapted scrapie agent: Threshold survival after ashing at 600°C suggests an inorganic template of replication 



Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production 



Detection of protease-resistant cervid prion protein in water from a CWD-endemic area 



A Quantitative Assessment of the Amount of Prion Diverted to Category 1 Materials and Wastewater During Processing 



Rapid assessment of bovine spongiform encephalopathy prion inactivation by heat treatment in yellow grease produced in the industrial manufacturing process of meat and bone meals 



PPo4-4: 

Survival and Limited Spread of TSE Infectivity after Burial 




Discussion Classical scrapie is an environmentally transmissible disease because it has been reported in naïve, supposedly previously unexposed sheep placed in pastures formerly occupied by scrapie-infected sheep (4, 19, 20). 

Although the vector for disease transmission is not known, soil is likely to be an important reservoir for prions (2) where – based on studies in rodents – prions can adhere to minerals as a biologically active form (21) and remain infectious for more than 2 years (22). 

Similarly, chronic wasting disease (CWD) has re-occurred in mule deer housed in paddocks used by infected deer 2 years earlier, which was assumed to be through foraging and soil consumption (23). 

Our study suggested that the risk of acquiring scrapie infection was greater through exposure to contaminated wooden, plastic, and metal surfaces via water or food troughs, fencing, and hurdles than through grazing. 

Drinking from a water trough used by the scrapie flock was sufficient to cause infection in sheep in a clean building. 

Exposure to fences and other objects used for rubbing also led to infection, which supported the hypothesis that skin may be a vector for disease transmission (9). 

The risk of these objects to cause infection was further demonstrated when 87% of 23 sheep presented with PrPSc in lymphoid tissue after grazing on one of the paddocks, which contained metal hurdles, a metal lamb creep and a water trough in contact with the scrapie flock up to 8 weeks earlier, whereas no infection had been demonstrated previously in sheep grazing on this paddock, when equipped with new fencing and field furniture. 

When the contaminated furniture and fencing were removed, the infection rate dropped significantly to 8% of 12 sheep, with soil of the paddock as the most likely source of infection caused by shedding of prions from the scrapie-infected sheep in this paddock up to a week earlier. 

This study also indicated that the level of contamination of field furniture sufficient to cause infection was dependent on two factors: stage of incubation period and time of last use by scrapie-infected sheep. 

Drinking from a water trough that had been used by scrapie sheep in the predominantly pre-clinical phase did not appear to cause infection, whereas infection was shown in sheep drinking from the water trough used by scrapie sheep in the later stage of the disease. 

It is possible that contamination occurred through shedding of prions in saliva, which may have contaminated the surface of the water trough and subsequently the water when it was refilled. 

Contamination appeared to be sufficient to cause infection only if the trough was in contact with sheep that included clinical cases. 

Indeed, there is an increased risk of bodily fluid infectivity with disease progression in scrapie (24) and CWD (25) based on PrPSc detection by sPMCA. 

Although ultraviolet light and heat under natural conditions do not inactivate prions (26), furniture in contact with the scrapie flock, which was assumed to be sufficiently contaminated to cause infection, did not act as vector for disease if not used for 18 months, which suggest that the weathering process alone was sufficient to inactivate prions. 

PrPSc detection by sPMCA is increasingly used as a surrogate for infectivity measurements by bioassay in sheep or mice. 

In this reported study, however, the levels of PrPSc present in the environment were below the limit of detection of the sPMCA method, yet were still sufficient to cause infection of in-contact animals. 

In the present study, the outdoor objects were removed from the infected flock 8 weeks prior to sampling and were positive by sPMCA at very low levels (2 out of 37 reactions). 

As this sPMCA assay also yielded 2 positive reactions out of 139 in samples from the scrapie-free farm, the sPMCA assay could not detect PrPSc on any of the objects above the background of the assay. 

False positive reactions with sPMCA at a low frequency associated with de novo formation of infectious prions have been reported (27, 28). 

This is in contrast to our previous study where we demonstrated that outdoor objects that had been in contact with the scrapie-infected flock up to 20 days prior to sampling harbored PrPSc that was detectable by sPMCA analysis [4 out of 15 reactions (12)] and was significantly more positive by the assay compared to analogous samples from the scrapie-free farm. 

This discrepancy could be due to the use of a different sPMCA substrate between the studies that may alter the efficiency of amplification of the environmental PrPSc. 

In addition, the present study had a longer timeframe between the objects being in contact with the infected flock and sampling, which may affect the levels of extractable PrPSc. 

Alternatively, there may be potentially patchy contamination of this furniture with PrPSc, which may have been missed by swabbing. 

The failure of sPMCA to detect CWD-associated PrP in saliva from clinically affected deer despite confirmation of infectivity in saliva-inoculated transgenic mice was associated with as yet unidentified inhibitors in saliva (29), and it is possible that the sensitivity of sPMCA is affected by other substances in the tested material. 

In addition, sampling of amplifiable PrPSc and subsequent detection by sPMCA may be more difficult from furniture exposed to weather, which is supported by the observation that PrPSc was detected by sPMCA more frequently in indoor than outdoor furniture (12). 

A recent experimental study has demonstrated that repeated cycles of drying and wetting of prion-contaminated soil, equivalent to what is expected under natural weathering conditions, could reduce PMCA amplification efficiency and extend the incubation period in hamsters inoculated with soil samples (30). 

This seems to apply also to this study even though the reduction in infectivity was more dramatic in the sPMCA assays than in the sheep model. 

Sheep were not kept until clinical end-point, which would have enabled us to compare incubation periods, but the lack of infection in sheep exposed to furniture that had not been in contact with scrapie sheep for a longer time period supports the hypothesis that prion degradation and subsequent loss of infectivity occurs even under natural conditions. 

In conclusion, the results in the current study indicate that removal of furniture that had been in contact with scrapie-infected animals should be recommended, particularly since cleaning and decontamination may not effectively remove scrapie infectivity (31), even though infectivity declines considerably if the pasture and the field furniture have not been in contact with scrapie-infected sheep for several months. As sPMCA failed to detect PrPSc in furniture that was subjected to weathering, even though exposure led to infection in sheep, this method may not always be reliable in predicting the risk of scrapie infection through environmental contamination. 

These results suggest that the VRQ/VRQ sheep model may be more sensitive than sPMCA for the detection of environmentally associated scrapie, and suggest that extremely low levels of scrapie contamination are able to cause infection in susceptible sheep genotypes. 

Keywords: classical scrapie, prion, transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, sheep, field furniture, reservoir, serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification 


Wednesday, December 16, 2015 

*** Objects in contact with classical scrapie sheep act as a reservoir for scrapie transmission *** 


WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2019 

CWD, TSE, PRION, MATERNAL mother to offspring, testes, epididymis, seminal fluid, and blood


Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program Standards Singeltary Submission March 30, 2018 Singeltary Submission
Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr. The is a Comment on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program Standards
For related information, Open Docket Folder
Comment Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program Standards Singeltary Submission March 30, 2018
Greetings APHIS, USDA, Dr. Tracy Nichols, et al, 
I wish to kindly submit my comments on the Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program Standards please. i have submitted online and sent a hard copy to Dr. Nichols via email. i know that my concern may not be the same concern as others, but ramifications from cwd tse prion can be long lasting, and science is still emerging. however, the science today warrants immediate and further actions be taken, especially about zoonosis potential for cwd tse prion, if it has not happened already. my comments, with reference materials, are as follows, and will be formatted in such a way, i will address issues by numbers 1-10, and under each one of my comments by each number, i will reference my comments with science to back up what i am stating/asking...thank you kindly, terry
1. I believe that immediately, there should be a 'DECLARATION OF EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY FOR FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE OF THE United States of America USA' due to Chronic Wasting Disease CWD Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease. All Intercontinental, International, Interstate movements of cervid should be banned immediately from the USA, and documented CWD TSE Prion Countries. ...
snip...
see full text Singeltary Submission for references.
2. Voluntary Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program should be made MANDATORY immediately, OR NO PERMIT TO FARM DEER OR ELK, PERIOD! you don't want to join, then fine, you don't farm cervid and or any product there from...see full text Singeltary Submission for references.
3. INDEMNITY, NO MORE Federal indemnity program, or what i call, ENTITLEMENT PROGRAM for game farm industry. NO MORE BAIL OUTS FROM TAX PAYERS. if the captive industry can't buy insurance to protect not only themselves, but also their customers, and especially the STATE, from Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion or what some call mad deer disease and harm therefrom, IF they can't afford to buy that insurance that will cover all of it, then they DO NOT GET A PERMIT to have a game farm for anything. This CWD TSE Prion can/could/has caused property values to fall from some reports in some places. roll the dice, how much is a state willing to lose?...see full text Singeltary Submission for references.
4. QUARANTINE OF ALL CAPTIVE, BREEDERS, URINE, ANTLER, VELVET, SPERM, OR ANY FACILITY that has been confirmed to have Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion, the QUARANTINE should be for 21 years due to science showing what scrapie can do. 5 years is NOT enough. see; Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years...
snip...see full text Singeltary Submission for references.
PLEASE SEE Singeltary full text file DOWNLOAD ON GOVERNMENT SITE, OR GO TO THIS URL LINK FOR FULL TEXT OF SINGELTARY SUBMISSION TO Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program Standards Singeltary Submission March 30, 2018, PLEASE SEE;
FRIDAY, MARCH 30, 2018 
Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program Standards Singeltary Submission March 30, 2018
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net Attachments (1) Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program Standards Singeltary
MONDAY, MAY 20, 2019 
APHIS, USDA, Announces the Finalized Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification Program Standards Singeltary Submissions
 Comment from Terry Singeltary

The is a Comment on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Notice: Concurrence with the World Organization for Animal Health's Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

For related information, Open Docket Folder

Comment

APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission

Greetings APHIS et al, 

I would kindly like to comment on APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], and my comments are as follows, with the latest peer review and transmission studies as references of evidence.

THE OIE/USDA BSE Minimal Risk Region MRR is nothing more than free pass to import and export the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease. December 2003, when the USDA et al lost it's supposedly 'GOLD CARD' ie BSE FREE STATUS (that was based on nothing more than not looking and not finding BSE), once the USA lost it's gold card BSE Free status, the USDA OIE et al worked hard and fast to change the BSE Geographical Risk Statuses i.e. the BSE GBR's, and replaced it with the BSE MRR policy, the legal tool to trade mad cow type disease TSE Prion Globally. The USA is doing just what the UK did, when they shipped mad cow disease around the world, except with the BSE MRR policy, it's now legal. 

Also, the whole concept of the BSE MRR policy is based on a false pretense, that atypical BSE is not transmissible, and that only typical c-BSE is transmissible via feed. This notion that atypical BSE TSE Prion is an old age cow disease that is not infectious is absolutely false, there is NO science to show this, and on the contrary, we now know that atypical BSE will transmit by ORAL ROUTES, but even much more concerning now, recent science has shown that Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion in deer and elk which is rampant with no stopping is sight in the USA, and Scrapie TSE Prion in sheep and goat, will transmit to PIGS by oral routes, this is our worst nightmare, showing even more risk factors for the USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban. 

The FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban has failed terribly bad, and is still failing, since August 1997. there is tonnage and tonnage of banned potential mad cow feed that went into commerce, and still is, with one decade, 10 YEARS, post August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban, 2007, with 10,000,000 POUNDS, with REASON, Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. you can see all these feed ban warning letters and tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce, year after year, that is not accessible on the internet anymore like it use to be, you can see history of the FDA failure August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban here, but remember this, we have a new outbreak of TSE Prion disease in a new livestock species, the camel, and this too is very worrisome.

WITH the OIE and the USDA et al weakening the global TSE prion surveillance, by not classifying the atypical Scrapie as TSE Prion disease, and the notion that they want to do the same thing with typical scrapie and atypical BSE, it's just not scientific.

WE MUST abolish the BSE MRR policy, go back to the BSE GBR risk assessments by country, and enhance them to include all strains of TSE Prion disease in all species. With Chronic Wasting CWD TSE Prion disease spreading in Europe, now including, Norway, Finland, Sweden, also in Korea, Canada and the USA, and the TSE Prion in Camels, the fact the the USA is feeding potentially CWD, Scrapie, BSE, typical and atypical, to other animals, and shipping both this feed and or live animals or even grains around the globe, potentially exposed or infected with the TSE Prion. this APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], under it's present definition, does NOT show the true risk of the TSE Prion in any country. as i said, it's nothing more than a legal tool to trade the TSE Prion around the globe, nothing but ink on paper.

AS long as the BSE MRR policy stays in effect, TSE Prion disease will continued to be bought and sold as food for both humans and animals around the globe, and the future ramifications from friendly fire there from, i.e. iatrogenic exposure and transmission there from from all of the above, should not be underestimated. ...


Attachments (1) APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary... 


O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France 
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. 
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health. 
=============== 
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases*** 
=============== 
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals. 
============== 
 ***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 
PRION 2016 TOKYO
Saturday, April 23, 2016
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
Taylor & Francis
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, J uan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,
Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a
"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France
Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion. Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.
To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.
These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.
Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 
Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 
These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

***> Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility. <***

Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period 

Emmanuel E. Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Sophie Luccantoni-Freire, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Valérie Durand, Capucine Dehen, Olivier Andreoletti, Cristina Casalone, Juergen A. Richt, Justin J. Greenlee, Thierry Baron, Sylvie L. Benestad, Paul Brown & Jean-Philippe Deslys Scientific Reports volume 5, Article number: 11573 (2015) | Download Citation

Abstract 

Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (c-BSE) is the only animal prion disease reputed to be zoonotic, causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans and having guided protective measures for animal and human health against animal prion diseases. Recently, partial transmissions to humanized mice showed that the zoonotic potential of scrapie might be similar to c-BSE. We here report the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to cynomolgus macaque, a highly relevant model for human prion diseases, after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to those reported for human cases of sporadic CJD. Scrapie is thus actually transmissible to primates with incubation periods compatible with their life expectancy, although fourfold longer than BSE. Long-term experimental transmission studies are necessary to better assess the zoonotic potential of other prion diseases with high prevalence, notably Chronic Wasting Disease of deer and elk and atypical/Nor98 scrapie.

SNIP...


Discussion We describe the transmission of spongiform encephalopathy in a non-human primate inoculated 10 years earlier with a strain of sheep c-scrapie. Because of this extended incubation period in a facility in which other prion diseases are under study, we are obliged to consider two alternative possibilities that might explain its occurrence. We first considered the possibility of a sporadic origin (like CJD in humans). Such an event is extremely improbable because the inoculated animal was 14 years old when the clinical signs appeared, i.e. about 40% through the expected natural lifetime of this species, compared to a peak age incidence of 60–65 years in human sporadic CJD, or about 80% through their expected lifetimes. Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.

The second possibility is a laboratory cross-contamination. Three facts make this possibility equally unlikely. First, handling of specimens in our laboratory is performed with fastidious attention to the avoidance of any such cross-contamination. Second, no laboratory cross-contamination has ever been documented in other primate laboratories, including the NIH, even between infected and uninfected animals housed in the same or adjacent cages with daily intimate contact (P. Brown, personal communication). Third, the cerebral lesion profile is different from all the other prion diseases we have studied in this model19, with a correlation between cerebellar lesions (massive spongiform change of Purkinje cells, intense PrPres staining and reactive gliosis26) and ataxia. The iron deposits present in the globus pallidus are a non specific finding that have been reported previously in neurodegenerative diseases and aging27. Conversely, the thalamic lesion was reminiscent of a metabolic disease due to thiamine deficiency28 but blood thiamine levels were within normal limits (data not shown). The preferential distribution of spongiform change in cortex associated with a limited distribution in the brainstem is reminiscent of the lesion profile in MM2c and VV1 sCJD patients29, but interspecies comparison of lesion profiles should be interpreted with caution. It is of note that the same classical scrapie isolate induced TSE in C57Bl/6 mice with similar incubation periods and lesional profiles as a sample derived from a MM1 sCJD patient30.

We are therefore confident that the illness in this cynomolgus macaque represents a true transmission of a sheep c-scrapie isolate directly to an old-world monkey, which taxonomically resides in the primate subdivision (parvorder of catarrhini) that includes humans. With an homology of its PrP protein with humans of 96.4%31, cynomolgus macaque constitutes a highly relevant model for assessing zoonotic risk of prion diseases. Since our initial aim was to show the absence of transmission of scrapie to macaques in the worst-case scenario, we obtained materials from a flock of naturally-infected sheep, affecting animals with different genotypes32. This c-scrapie isolate exhibited complete transmission in ARQ/ARQ sheep (332 ± 56 days) and Tg338 transgenic mice expressing ovine VRQ/VRQ prion protein (220 ± 5 days) (O. Andreoletti, personal communication). From the standpoint of zoonotic risk, it is important to note that sheep with c-scrapie (including the isolate used in our study) have demonstrable infectivity throughout their lymphoreticular system early in the incubation period of the disease (3 months-old for all the lymphoid organs, and as early as 2 months-old in gut-associated lymph nodes)33. In addition, scrapie infectivity has been identified in blood34, milk35 and skeletal muscle36 from asymptomatic but scrapie infected small ruminants which implies a potential dietary exposure for consumers.

Two earlier studies have reported the occurrence of clinical TSE in cynomolgus macaques after exposures to scrapie isolates. In the first study, the “Compton” scrapie isolate (derived from an English sheep) and serially propagated for 9 passages in goats did not transmit TSE in cynomolgus macaque, rhesus macaque or chimpanzee within 7 years following intracerebral challenge1; conversely, after 8 supplementary passages in conventional mice, this “Compton” isolate induced TSE in a cynomolgus macaque 5 years after intracerebral challenge, but rhesus macaques and chimpanzee remained asymptomatic 8.5 years post-exposure8. However, multiple successive passages that are classically used to select laboratory-adapted prion strains can significantly modify the initial properties of a scrapie isolate, thus questioning the relevance of zoonotic potential for the initial sheep-derived isolate. The same isolate had also induced disease into squirrel monkeys (new-world monkey)9. A second historical observation reported that a cynomolgus macaque developed TSE 6 years post-inoculation with brain homogenate from a scrapie-infected Suffolk ewe (derived from USA), whereas a rhesus macaque and a chimpanzee exposed to the same inoculum remained healthy 9 years post-exposure1. This inoculum also induced TSE in squirrel monkeys after 4 passages in mice. Other scrapie transmission attempts in macaque failed but had more shorter periods of observation in comparison to the current study. Further, it is possible that there are differences in the zoonotic potential of different scrapie strains.

The most striking observation in our study is the extended incubation period of scrapie in the macaque model, which has several implications. Firstly, our observations constitute experimental evidence in favor of the zoonotic potential of c-scrapie, at least for this isolate that has been extensively studied32,33,34,35,36. The cross-species zoonotic ability of this isolate should be confirmed by performing duplicate intracerebral exposures and assessing the transmissibility by the oral route (a successful transmission of prion strains through the intracerebral route may not necessarily indicate the potential for oral transmission37). However, such confirmatory experiments may require more than one decade, which is hardly compatible with current general management and support of scientific projects; thus this study should be rather considered as a case report.

Secondly, transmission of c-BSE to primates occurred within 8 years post exposure for the lowest doses able to transmit the disease (the survival period after inoculation is inversely proportional to the initial amount of infectious inoculum). The occurrence of scrapie 10 years after exposure to a high dose (25 mg) of scrapie-infected sheep brain suggests that the macaque has a higher species barrier for sheep c-scrapie than c-BSE, although it is notable that previous studies based on in vitro conversion of PrP suggested that BSE and scrapie prions would have a similar conversion potential for human PrP38.

Thirdly, prion diseases typically have longer incubation periods after oral exposure than after intracerebral inoculations: since humans can develop Kuru 47 years after oral exposure39, an incubation time of several decades after oral exposure to scrapie would therefore be expected, leading the disease to occur in older adults, i.e. the peak age for cases considered to be sporadic disease, and making a distinction between scrapie-associated and truly sporadic disease extremely difficult to appreciate.

Fourthly, epidemiologic evidence is necessary to confirm the zoonotic potential of an animal disease suggested by experimental studies. A relatively short incubation period and a peculiar epidemiological situation (e.g., all the first vCJD cases occurring in the country with the most important ongoing c-BSE epizootic) led to a high degree of suspicion that c-BSE was the cause of vCJD. Sporadic CJD are considered spontaneous diseases with an almost stable and constant worldwide prevalence (0.5–2 cases per million inhabitants per year), and previous epidemiological studies were unable to draw a link between sCJD and classical scrapie6,7,40,41, even though external causes were hypothesized to explain the occurrence of some sCJD clusters42,43,44. However, extended incubation periods exceeding several decades would impair the predictive values of epidemiological surveillance for prion diseases, already weakened by a limited prevalence of prion diseases and the multiplicity of isolates gathered under the phenotypes of “scrapie” and “sporadic CJD”.

Fifthly, considering this 10 year-long incubation period, together with both laboratory and epidemiological evidence of decade or longer intervals between infection and clinical onset of disease, no premature conclusions should be drawn from negative transmission studies in cynomolgus macaques with less than a decade of observation, as in the aforementioned historical transmission studies of scrapie to primates1,8,9. Our observations and those of others45,46 to date are unable to provide definitive evidence regarding the zoonotic potential of CWD, atypical/Nor98 scrapie or H-type BSE. The extended incubation period of the scrapie-affected macaque in the current study also underscores the limitations of rodent models expressing human PrP for assessing the zoonotic potential of some prion diseases since their lifespan remains limited to approximately two years21,47,48. This point is illustrated by the fact that the recently reported transmission of scrapie to humanized mice was not associated with clinical signs for up to 750 days and occurred in an extreme minority of mice with only a marginal increase in attack rate upon second passage13. The low attack rate in these studies is certainly linked to the limited lifespan of mice compared to the very long periods of observation necessary to demonstrate the development of scrapie. Alternatively, one could estimate that a successful second passage is the result of strain adaptation to the species barrier, thus poorly relevant of the real zoonotic potential of the original scrapie isolate of sheep origin49. The development of scrapie in this primate after an incubation period compatible with its lifespan complements the study conducted in transgenic (humanized) mice; taken together these studies suggest that some isolates of sheep scrapie can promote misfolding of the human prion protein and that scrapie can develop within the lifespan of some primate species.

In addition to previous studies on scrapie transmission to primate1,8,9 and the recently published study on transgenic humanized mice13, our results constitute new evidence for recommending that the potential risk of scrapie for human health should not be dismissed. Indeed, human PrP transgenic mice and primates are the most relevant models for investigating the human transmission barrier. To what extent such models are informative for measuring the zoonotic potential of an animal TSE under field exposure conditions is unknown. During the past decades, many protective measures have been successfully implemented to protect cattle from the spread of c-BSE, and some of these measures have been extended to sheep and goats to protect from scrapie according to the principle of precaution. Since cases of c-BSE have greatly reduced in number, those protective measures are currently being challenged and relaxed in the absence of other known zoonotic animal prion disease. We recommend that risk managers should be aware of the long term potential risk to human health of at least certain scrapie isolates, notably for lymphotropic strains like the classical scrapie strain used in the current study. Relatively high amounts of infectivity in peripheral lymphoid organs in animals infected with these strains could lead to contamination of food products produced for human consumption. Efforts should also be maintained to further assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains in long-term studies, notably lymphotropic strains with high prevalence like CWD, which is spreading across North America, and atypical/Nor98 scrapie (Nor98)50 that was first detected in the past two decades and now represents approximately half of all reported cases of prion diseases in small ruminants worldwide, including territories previously considered as scrapie free... Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.



> However, to date, no CWD infections have been reported in people.
key word here is ‘reported’. science has shown that CWD in humans will look like sporadic CJD. SO, how can one assume that CWD has not already transmitted to humans? they can’t, and it’s as simple as that. from all recorded science to date, CWD has already transmitted to humans, and it’s being misdiagnosed as sporadic CJD. …terry
*** LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$ ***
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion aka mad deer disease zoonosis
We hypothesize that:
(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues;
(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence;
(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans; and
(4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches.
ZOONOTIC CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UPDATE
here is the latest;
PRION 2018 CONFERENCE
Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice
Hermann M. Schatzl, Samia Hannaoui, Yo-Ching Cheng, Sabine Gilch (Calgary Prion Research Unit, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada) Michael Beekes (RKI Berlin), Walter Schulz-Schaeffer (University of Homburg/Saar, Germany), Christiane Stahl-Hennig (German Primate Center) & Stefanie Czub (CFIA Lethbridge).
To date, BSE is the only example of interspecies transmission of an animal prion disease into humans. The potential zoonotic transmission of CWD is an alarming issue and was addressed by many groups using a variety of in vitro and in vivo experimental systems. Evidence from these studies indicated a substantial, if not absolute, species barrier, aligning with the absence of epidemiological evidence suggesting transmission into humans. Studies in non-human primates were not conclusive so far, with oral transmission into new-world monkeys and no transmission into old-world monkeys. Our consortium has challenged 18 Cynomolgus macaques with characterized CWD material, focusing on oral transmission with muscle tissue. Some macaques have orally received a total of 5 kg of muscle material over a period of 2 years.
After 5-7 years of incubation time some animals showed clinical symptoms indicative of prion disease, and prion neuropathology and PrPSc deposition were detected in spinal cord and brain of some euthanized animals. PrPSc in immunoblot was weakly detected in some spinal cord materials and various tissues tested positive in RT-QuIC, including lymph node and spleen homogenates. To prove prion infectivity in the macaque tissues, we have intracerebrally inoculated 2 lines of transgenic mice, expressing either elk or human PrP. At least 3 TgElk mice, receiving tissues from 2 different macaques, showed clinical signs of a progressive prion disease and brains were positive in immunoblot and RT-QuIC. Tissues (brain, spinal cord and spleen) from these and pre-clinical mice are currently tested using various read-outs and by second passage in mice. Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were so far negative for clear clinical prion disease (some mice >300 days p.i.). In parallel, the same macaque materials are inoculated into bank voles.
Taken together, there is strong evidence of transmissibility of CWD orally into macaques and from macaque tissues into transgenic mouse models, although with an incomplete attack rate.
The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.
Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP.
The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD..
***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***
READING OVER THE PRION 2018 ABSTRACT BOOK, LOOKS LIKE THEY FOUND THAT from this study ;
P190 Human prion disease mortality rates by occurrence of chronic wasting disease in freeranging cervids, United States
Abrams JY (1), Maddox RA (1), Schonberger LB (1), Person MK (1), Appleby BS (2), Belay ED (1) (1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA..
SEEMS THAT THEY FOUND Highly endemic states had a higher rate of prion disease mortality compared to non-CWD
states.
AND ANOTHER STUDY;
P172 Peripheral Neuropathy in Patients with Prion Disease
Wang H(1), Cohen M(1), Appleby BS(1,2) (1) University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland, Ohio (2) National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, Cleveland, Ohio..
IN THIS STUDY, THERE WERE autopsy-proven prion cases from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center that were diagnosed between September 2016 to March 2017,
AND
included 104 patients. SEEMS THEY FOUND THAT The most common sCJD subtype was MV1-2 (30%), followed by MM1-2 (20%),
AND
THAT The Majority of cases were male (60%), AND half of them had exposure to wild game.
snip…
see more on Prion 2017 Macaque study from Prion 2017 Conference and other updated science on cwd tse prion zoonosis below…terry
2019 CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION, THE KILLER AMONG US, REVISITED

PRION 2019 ABSTRACTS 

1. Interspecies transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent

Justin Greenlee

Virus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, USDA Agriculture Research Service

ABSTRACT

The presentation will summarize the results of various studies conducted at our research center that assess the transmissibility of the chronic wasting disease (CWD) agent to cattle, pigs, raccoons, goats, and sheep. This will include specifics of the relative attack rates, clinical signs, and microscopic lesions with emphasis on how to differentiate cross-species transmission of the CWD agent from the prion diseases that naturally occur in hosts such as cattle or sheep. Briefly, the relative difficulty of transmitting the CWD agent to sheep and goats will be contrasted with the relative ease of transmitting the scrapie agent to white-tailed deer.

53. Evaluation of the inter-species transmission potential of different CWD isolates

Rodrigo Moralesa, Carlos Kramma,b, Paulina Sotoa, Adam Lyona, Sandra Pritzkowa, Claudio Sotoa

aMitchell Center for Alzheimer’s disease and Related Brain Disorders, Dept. of Neurology, McGovern School of Medicine University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, TX, USA; bFacultad de Medicina, Universidad de los Andes, Santiago, Chile

ABSTRACT

Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) has reached epidemic proportions in North America and has been identified in South Korea and Northern Europe. CWD-susceptible cervid species are known to share habitats with humans and other animals entering the human food chain. At present, the potential of CWD to infect humans and other animal species is not completely clear. The exploration of this issue acquires further complexity considering the differences in the prion protein sequence due to species-specific variations and polymorphic changes within species. While several species of cervids are naturally affected by CWD, white-tailed deer (WTD) is perhaps the most relevant due to its extensive use in hunting and as a source of food. Evaluation of inter-species prion infections using animals or mouse models is costly and time consuming. We and others have shown that the Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA) technology reproduces, in an accelerated and inexpensive manner, the inter-species transmission of prions while preserving the strain features of the input PrPSc. In this work, we tested the potential of different WTD-derived CWD isolates to transmit to humans and other animal species relevant for human consumption using PMCA. For these experiments, CWD isolates homozygous for the most common WTD-PrP polymorphic changes (G96S) were used (96SS variant obtained from a pre-symptomatic prion infected WTD). Briefly, 96GG and 96SS CWD prions were adapted in homologous or heterologous substrate by PMCA through several (15) rounds. End products, as well as intermediates across the process, were tested for their inter-species transmission potentials. A similar process was followed to assess seed-templated misfolding of ovine, porcine, and bovine PrPC. Our results show differences on the inter-species transmission potentials of the four adapted materials generated (PrPC/PrPSc polymorphic combinations), being the homologous combinations of seed/substrate the ones with the greater apparent zoonotic potential. Surprisingly, 96SS prions adapted in homologous substrate were the ones showing the easiest potential to template PrPC misfolding from other animal species. In summary, our results show that a plethora of different CWD isolates, each comprising different potentials for inter-species transmission, may exist in the environment. These experiments may help to clarify an uncertain and potentially worrisome public health issue. Additional research in this area may be useful to advise on the design of regulations intended to stop the spread of CWD and predict unwanted zoonotic events.

56. Understanding chronic wasting disease spread potential for at-risk species

Catherine I. Cullingham, Anh Dao, Debbie McKenzie and David W. Coltman

Department of Biological Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton AB, Canada

CONTACT Catherine I. Cullingham cathy.cullingham@ualberta.ca

ABSTRACT

Genetic variation can be linked to susceptibility or resistance to a disease, and this information can help to better understand spread-risk in a population. Wildlife disease incidence is increasing, and this is resulting in negative impacts on the economy, biodiversity, and in some instances, human health. If we can find genetic variation that helps to inform which individuals are susceptible, then we can use this information on at-risk populations to better manage negative consequences. Chronic wasting disease, a fatal, transmissible spongiform encephalopathy of cervids (both wild and captive), continues to spread geographically, which has resulted in an increasing host-range. The disease agent (PrPCWD) is a misfolded conformer of native cellular protein (PrPC). In Canada, the disease is endemic in Alberta and Saskatchewan, infecting primarily mule deer and white-tail deer, with a smaller impact on elk and moose populations. As the extent of the endemic area continues to expand, additional species will be exposed to this disease, including bison, bighorn sheep, mountain goat, and pronghorn antelope. To better understand the potential spread-risk among these species, we reviewed the current literature on species that have been orally exposed to CWD to identify susceptible and resistant species. We then compared the amino acid polymorphisms of PrPC among these species to determine whether any sites were linked to susceptibility or resistance to CWD infection. We sequenced the entire PrP coding region in 578 individuals across at-risk populations to evaluate their potential susceptibility. Three amino acid sites (97, 170, and 174; human numbering) were significantly associated with susceptibility, but these were not fully discriminating. All but one species among the resistant group shared the same haplotype, and the same for the susceptible species. For the at-risk species, bison had the resistant haplotype, while bighorn sheep and mountain goats were closely associated with the resistant type. Pronghorn antelope and a newly identified haplotype in moose differed from the susceptible haplotype, but were still closely associated with it. These data suggest pronghorn antelope will be susceptible to CWD while bison are likely to be resistant. Based on this data, recommendations can be made regarding species to be monitored for possible CWD infection.

KEYWORDS: Chronic wasting disease; Prnp; wildlife disease; population genetics; ungulates

75. Mortality surveillance of individuals potentially exposed to chronic wasting disease

Ryan A. Maddoxa, Rachel F. Klosb, Suzanne N. Gibbons-Burgenerb, Bobbi L. Bryanta, Joseph Y. Abramsa, Brian S. Applebyc, Lawrence B. Schonbergera and Ermias D. Belaya

aNational Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA, USA; bWisconsin Department of Health Services, Division of Public Health, Madison, WI, USA; cNational Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA

CONTACT Ryan A. Maddox rmaddox@cdc.gov

ABSTRACT

Introduction: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a prion disease of cervids. It is unknown whether CWD prions can infect people; if so, transmission would most likely occur through consumption of meat from infected animals. Since 2003, Wisconsin Department of Health Services, Division of Public Health (WDHS) personnel have maintained a database consisting of information collected from hunters who reported eating, or an intention to eat, venison from cervids positive for CWD. This data source makes it possible to evaluate causes of mortality in individuals potentially exposed to CWD.

Methods: The WDHS database contains the name, date of birth, when available, year of CWD-positive deer harvest, and city and state of residence for each potentially exposed individual. The database also includes information on how the deer was processed (self-processed or by a commercial operator) and when applicable, names of others with whom the venison was shared. Duplicate entries (i.e. those who consumed venison from CWD-positive deer in multiple hunt years) are determined by first name, last name, and date of birth. All names in the database are cross-checked with the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC) neuropathology database. Vital status of individuals with date of birth available will be tracked through the identification of possible matches in the National Death Index (NDI) and the evaluation of corresponding cause of death codes.

Results: The database consists of 1561 records for hunt years 2003–2017. Of these, 613 records had accompanying date of birth; 14 entries were removed as duplicates, 1 of whom had consumed venison from a CWD-positive deer during three different hunt years, leaving 599 unique individuals for pending submission to NDI. Of these individuals, 265 of 399 (66%) who ate venison from a CWD-positive deer and provided processing information reported self-processing. No matches were found among persons in the database cross-checked with NPDPSC data.

Conclusion: Because of the robust data link between person and CWD-positive animal, reviewing the cause of mortality in potentially exposed persons is possible; those individuals who self-processed and consumed the meat are likely the best source of information about the potential for zoonotic transmission. The expected long incubation period, should transmission to humans occur, necessitates many years of vital status tracking.

77. Assessing chronic wasting disease strain differences in free-ranging cervids across the United States 

Kaitlyn M. Wagnera, Caitlin Ott-Connb, Kelly Strakab, Bob Dittmarc, Jasmine Battend, Robyn Piercea, Mercedes Hennessya, Elizabeth Gordona, Brett Israela, Jenn Ballarde and Mark D Zabela

aPrion Research Center at Colorado State University; bMichigan Department of Natural Resources; cTexas Parks and Wildlife Department; dMissouri Department of Conservation, 5. Arkansas Game and Fish Commission

CONTACT Kaitlyn M. Wagner miedkait@rams.colostate.edu

ABSTRACT

Background/Introduction: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is an invariably fatal prion disease affecting captive and free-ranging cervids, including white-tailed deer, mule deer, moose, elk, and reindeer. Since the initial description of the disease in the 1960’s, CWD has spread to 23 states, 3 Canadian Provinces, South Korea, Norway and, most recently, Finland. While some outbreaks of CWD were caused by transport of infected animals from endemic regions, the origin of CWD in other epizootics is unclear and has not been characterized. Previous studies have shown that there are two distinct strains of CWD. However, the continuous spread and the unclear origin of several outbreaks warrant continued surveillance and further characterization of strain diversity.

Materials and Methods: To address these knowledge gaps, we used biochemical tests to assess strain differences between CWD outbreaks in Michigan, Texas, Missouri, and Colorado, USA. Brain or lymph node samples were homogenized and digested in 50 µg/mL proteinase K (PK). These samples were then run on a Western blot to assess glycoform ratio and electrophoretic mobility. Texas samples were digested in 100 µg/mL PK. To assess conformational stability, brain or lymph node homogenates were incubated in increasing concentrations of guanidine hydrochloride from 0 M to 4 M in 0.5 M increments. Samples were then precipitated in methanol overnight, washed and PK digested in 50 µg/mL PK before slot blotting.

Results: Our results have found significant differences in glycoform ratio between CWD from Michigan and Colorado, but no differences were observed in conformational stability assays. Interestingly, when testing our CWD isolates from Texas to analyse electrophoretic mobility and glycoform ratio, we found that these samples did not exhibit the characteristic band shift when treated with PK, but PK resistant material remained. Additionally, results from our conformational stability assay demonstrate a unique profile of these Texas isolates. Testing of samples from Missouri is currently underway.

Conclusions: Thus far, our data indicate that there are strain differences between CWD circulating in Michigan and CWD in Colorado and provide important insight into CWD strain differences between two non-contiguous outbreaks. We have also identified a unique strain of CWD in Texas with biochemical strain properties not seen in any of our other CWD isolates. These results highlight the importance of continued surveillance to better understand this devastating disease. These results have important implications for CWD emergence, evolution and our understanding of prion strain heterogeneity on the landscape.

Thursday, May 23, 2019 

Prion 2019 Emerging Concepts CWD, BSE, SCRAPIE, CJD, SCIENTIFIC PROGRAM Schedule and Abstracts


see full Prion 2019 Conference Abstracts

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 04, 2018
Cervid to human prion transmission 5R01NS088604-04 Update
snip…full text;
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 09, 2019
Experts: Yes, chronic wasting disease in deer is a public health issue — for people
Date: May 4, 2018 at 12:39:00 PM EDT 

Mineral licks as environmental reservoirs of chronic wasting disease prions 

Ian H. Plummer, Chad J. Johnson, Alexandra R. Chesney, Joel A. Pedersen, Michael D. Samuel 

CONCLUSIONS

We used mb-PMCA to detect CWD in soil and water from mineral licks naturally contaminated with prions and used by free-ranging deer, livestock, and non-cervid wildlife species. Detection of prions in environmental reservoirs represents an important first step in understanding the contribution of environmental transmission to CWD epizootics and potential for cross-species transmission. The present study characterized an environmental prion reservoir by (1) identifying an apparent “hot spot” of deposition and potential exposure to both cervid and non-cervid species; (2) indicating CWD prions shed by free-ranging cervids are present in areas of frequent use leading to environmental contamination and potentially plant uptake; and (3) motivating investigation of the exposure and susceptibility of non-cervid species to CWD contaminated soil, water, and plant materials. Future research should be directed at quantifying CWD prion concentrations at mineral licks and other areas where cervids congregate, determining the persistence of prion infectivity at these sites, delineating spatial-temporal patterns of environmental prion deposition and accumulation, and assessing consumption by susceptible animals. Identifying additional environmental reservoirs of CWD prions and determining the contributions of direct and indirect transmission over the course of CWD outbreaks represent key aims in advancing understanding of long-term CWD infection dynamics.




SUNDAY, DECEMBER 29, 2013 

Impacts of wildlife baiting and supplemental feeding on infectious disease transmission risk: A synthesis of knowledge


Friday, October 26, 2012 

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD PENNSYLVANIA GAME FARMS, URINE ATTRACTANT PRODUCTS, BAITING, AND MINERAL LICKS 


CWD, GAME FARMS, BAITING, AND POLITICS 



cattle, pigs, sheep, cwd, tse, prion, oh my!

***> In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). 

Sheep and cattle may be exposed to CWD via common grazing areas with affected deer but so far, appear to be poorly susceptible to mule deer CWD (Sigurdson, 2008). In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). It is not known how susceptible humans are to CWD but given that the prion can be present in muscle, it is likely that humans have been exposed to the agent via consumption of venison (Sigurdson, 2008). Initial experimental research suggests that human susceptibility to CWD is low and there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans (Sigurdson, 2008), however the risk appetite for a public health threat may still find this level unacceptable.



Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 

Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 

To the Editor: 

In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.. 

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex 

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. 


doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(03)00715-1 Copyright © 2003 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Newsdesk

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

Xavier Bosch

Available online 29 July 2003. 

Volume 3, Issue 8, August 2003, Page 463 

“My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem..” ............................ 



January 28, 2003; 60 (2) VIEWS & REVIEWS

Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States

Ermias D. Belay, Ryan A. Maddox, Pierluigi Gambetti, Lawrence B. Schonberger

First published January 28, 2003, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1212/01.WNL.0000036913.87823.D6

Abstract

Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) attracted increased attention in the mid-1980s because of the emergence among UK cattle of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which has been shown to be transmitted to humans, causing a variant form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). The BSE outbreak has been reported in 19 European countries, Israel, and Japan, and human cases have so far been identified in four European countries, and more recently in a Canadian resident and a US resident who each lived in Britain during the BSE outbreak. To monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD, such as vCJD, in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has been conducting surveillance for human TSEs through several mechanisms, including the establishment of the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center. Physicians are encouraged to maintain a high index of suspicion for vCJD and use the free services of the pathology center to assess the neuropathology of clinically diagnosed and suspected cases of CJD or other TSEs.

Received May 7, 2002. Accepted August 28, 2002.

http://n.neurology.org/content/60/2/176.long 

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 

Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically) 

Published March 26, 2003

26 March 2003

Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically) CJD WATCH

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?


Reply to Singletary Ryan A. Maddox, MPH Other Contributors: Published March 26, 2003 

Mr. Singletary raises several issues related to current Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease (CJD) surveillance activities. Although CJD is not a notifiable disease in most states, its unique characteristics, particularly its invariably fatal outcome within usually a year of onset, make routine mortality surveillance a useful surrogate for ongoing CJD surveillance.[1] In addition, because CJD is least accurately diagnosed early in the course of illness, notifiable-disease surveillance could be less accurate than, if not duplicative of, current mortality surveillance.[1] However, in states where making CJD officially notifiable would meaningfully facilitate the collection of data to monitor for variant CJD (vCJD) or other emerging prion diseases, CDC encourages the designation of CJD as a notifiable disease.[1] Moreover, CDC encourages physicians to report any diagnosed or suspected CJD cases that may be of special public health importance (e.g...., vCJD, iatrogenic CJD, unusual CJD clusters).

As noted in our article, strong evidence is lacking for a causal link between chronic wasting disease (CWD) of deer and elk and human disease,[2] but only limited data seeking such evidence exist. Overall, the previously published case-control studies that have evaluated environmental sources of infection for sporadic CJD have not consistently identified strong evidence for a common risk factor.[3] However, the power of a case-control study to detect a rare cause of CJD is limited, particularly given the relatively small number of subjects generally involved and its long incubation period, which may last for decades. Because only a very small proportion of the US population has been exposed to CWD, a targeted surveillance and investigation of unusual cases or case clusters of prion diseases among persons at increased risk of exposure to CWD is a more efficient approach to detecting the possible transmission of CWD to humans. In collaboration with appropriate local and state health departments and the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, CDC is facilitating or conducting such surveillance and case- investigations, including related laboratory studies to characterize CJD and CWD prions.

Mr. Singletary also expresses concern over a recent publication by Asante and colleagues indicating the possibility that some sporadic CJD cases may be attributable to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).[4] The authors reported that transgenic mice expressing human prion protein homozygous for methionine at codon 129, when inoculated with BSE prions, developed a molecular phenotype consistent with a subtype of sporadic CJD. Although the authors implied that BSE might cause a sporadic CJD-like illness among persons homozygous for methionine, the results of their research with mice do not necessarily directly apply to the transmission of BSE to humans. If BSE causes a sporadic CJD-like illness in humans, an increase in sporadic CJD cases would be expected to first occur in the United Kingdom, where the vast majority of vCJD cases have been reported. In the United Kingdom during 1997 through 2002, however, the overall average annual mortality rate for sporadic CJD was not elevated; it was about 1 case per million population per year. In addition, during this most recent 6-year period following the first published description of vCJD in 1996, there was no increasing trend in the reported annual number of UK sporadic CJD deaths.[3, 5] Furthermore, surveillance in the UK has shown no increase in the proportion of sporadic CJD cases that are homozygous for methionine (Will RG, National CJD Surveillance Unit, United Kingdom, 2003; personal communication)..

References

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Diagnosis and reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. JAMA 2001;285:733-734.

2. Belay ED, Maddox RA, Gambetti P, Schonberger LB. Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States. Neurology 2003;60:176-181.

3. Belay ED. Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in humans. Annu Rev Microbiol 1999;53:283-314.

4. Asante EA, Linehan JM, Desbruslais M, et al. BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD-like prion strains in transgenic mice expressing human prion protein. EMBO J 2002;21:6358-6366.

5. The UK Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit. CJD statistics. Available at: http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/figures.htm. Accessed February 18, 2003.

Competing Interests: None declared.

http://n.neurology.org/content/reply-singletary 

Volume 2: Science 

4. The link between BSE and vCJD 

Summary 4.29 The evidence discussed above that vCJD is caused by BSE seems overwhelming. Uncertainties exist about the cause of CJD in farmers, their wives and in several abattoir workers. It seems that farmers at least might be at higher risk than others in the general population. 1 Increased ascertainment (ie, increased identification of cases as a result of greater awareness of the condition) seems unlikely, as other groups exposed to risk, such as butchers and veterinarians, do not appear to have been affected. The CJD in farmers seems to be similar to other sporadic CJD in age of onset, in respect to glycosylation patterns, and in strain-typing in experimental mice. Some farmers are heterozygous for the methionine/valine variant at codon 129, and their lymphoreticular system (LRS) does not contain the high levels of PrPSc found in vCJD. 

***>It remains a remote possibility that when older people contract CJD from BSE the resulting phenotype is like sporadic CJD and is distinct from the vCJD phenotype in younger people...end

BSE INQUIRY


SATURDAY, JUNE 23, 2018

CDC 

***> Diagnosis of Methionine/Valine Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease by Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification 

Volume 24, Number 7—July 2018 Dispatch 



Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S. 

Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well 


15 November 1999 British Medical Journal hvCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S. 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


2019

FRIDAY, JUNE 21, 2019 

CJD TSE Prion cases update USA, Texas, Canada, and UK


SUNDAY, MARCH 10, 2019 

National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined¹ Updated Feb 1, 2019 Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy VPSPr


2018

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2018 

***> USA CJD TSE Tables of Cases Examined National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined May 1, 2018 <***


2017

THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 2017 

*** Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States revisited 2017

Singeltary et al

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2017/08/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html


2019

friendly fire, pass it forward, they call it iatrogenic cjd, or what i call 'tse prion poker', are you all in $$$

SATURDAY, MARCH 16, 2019 

Medical Devices Containing Materials Derived from Animal Sources (Except for In Vitro Diagnostic Devices) Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff Document issued on March 15, 2019 Singeltary Submission


TUESDAY, APRIL 09, 2019 

Horizon Health Network Moncton Hospital notified more than 700 patients after two cases of CJD were diagnosed both patients had undergone cataracts surgery before being diagnosed


2019

SUNDAY, MAY 26, 2019 

Arguments for Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases caused by prions Stanley B. Prusiner 

''From a large array of bioassays, we conclude that AD, PD, MSA, and the frontotemporal dementias, including PSP and CBD, are all prion diseases''


Terry S. Singeltary Sr.