Tuesday, July 30, 2019

Guidelines for reporting surveillance data on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) in the EU within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 APPROVED: 9 July 2019


Guidelines for reporting surveillance data on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) in the EU within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 APPROVED: 9 July 2019


zoonoses_support@efsa.europa.eu, 


APPROVED: 9 July 2019 

doi:10.2903/sp.efsa.2019.EN-1675 

Guidelines for reporting surveillance data on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) in the EU within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 

European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Mario Monguidi, Alban Shahaj and Anca-Violeta Stoicescu 

 Abstract 

These guidelines are specifically aimed at guiding the reporting of information under the framework of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001/EC. The technical aspects for the reporting of surveillance data on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in bovine animals, scrapie and genotyping in small ruminants (sheep and goats) and Chronic Wasting Disease in cervids are covered. The guidelines explain the individual data elements of the Standard Sample Description model which are relevant for the data collection on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. These guidelines are given in order to support the reporting countries in data submission using eXtensible Markup Language data file transfer through the Data Collection Framework according to the protocol described in the EFSA Guidance on Data Exchange. 

© European Food Safety Authority, 2019 

Key words: transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE), bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), chronic wasting disease (CWD), scrapie, surveillance, data collection, data model 

Requestor: EFSA 

Question number: EFSA-Q-2018-01028 

Correspondence: zoonoses_support@efsa.europa.eu 

Acknowledgements: EFSA wishes to thank the following for the support provided to this scientific output: Angel Ortiz Pelaez and Maria Francesca Iulietto. Suggested citation: EFSA (European Food Safety Authority), Monguidi M, Shahaj A and Stoicescu AV, 2019. Guidelines for reporting surveillance data on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) in the EU within the framework of Regulation (EC) No 999/2001. EFSA supporting publication 2019:EN1675. 48 pp. doi:10.2903/sp.efsa.2019.EN-1675. ISSN: 2397-8325 © European Food Safety Authority, 2019 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 

Summary 

Data collection is an important task of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and a fundamental component of risk assessment (Articles 22 and 23 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002). EFSA receives a large volume of data from Member States (MSs) and other reporting countries in support of its risk assessments and as part of their legal obligations as per the European Union legislation. 

The Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 lays down the framework for the surveillance and reporting of the data collected for Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) in ruminants (bovine animals, sheep and goats) and in animals other than bovine, ovine and caprine by the MSs. The reporting of data on TSE surveillance is mandatory according to the part I.A, Chapter B.I Annex III of Regulation (EC) 999/2001. 

These reporting guidelines cover the technical aspects for the reporting of surveillance data on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in bovine animals, scrapie and genotyping in small ruminants (sheep and goats) and Chronic Wasting Disease in cervids and TSE in other species. Specific guidelines are given in order to support the reporting countries in data submission using eXtensible Markup Language (XML) data file transfer. The objective is to explain in detail the individual data elements that are included in the EFSA Standard Sample Description version 2 data model to be used for the XML data transmission through the Data Collection Framework according to the protocol described in the EFSA Guidance on Data Exchange. 

Table of contents 

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................1

 Summary .................................................................................................................................3

 1. Introduction...................................................................................................................6

 1.1. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by EFSA ..................................................6

 1.2. Purpose of these guidelines .............................................................................................6

 1.3. General reporting guidelines ............................................................................................7

 1.3.1. TSE Data Reporting Tool .................................................................................................8

 1.3.2. Aggregated data ............................................................................................................8

 1.3.3. Individual case data........................................................................................................9

 2. Reporting surveillance data on TSE ................................................................................ 10

 2.1. Testing protocol for BSE in bovine animals and reporting criteria as described in Regulation

 (EC) No 999/2001 ........................................................................................................ 10

 2.2. Testing protocol for scrapie in small ruminants (sheep and goats) and reporting criteria as

 described in Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 ...................................................................... 13

 2.3. Genotyping in sheep ..................................................................................................... 14

 2.4. Surveillance programme for CWD testing and reporting guidelines in cervids....................... 15

 3. Data elements definition ............................................................................................... 18

 4. SSD2 sections and data elements for reporting TSE data .................................................. 19

 4.1. Section B - Sampling programme ................................................................................... 19

 4.1.1. B.01 - Sampling programme identification code (progId) .................................................. 19

 4.1.2. B.02 - Programme legal reference (progLegalRef) ............................................................ 19

 4.1.3. B.08 - Additional sampling programme information (progInfo)........................................... 19

 4.2. Section C - Sampling event............................................................................................ 21

 4.2.1. C.01 - Sampling event identification code (sampEventId).................................................. 21

 4.2.2. C.02 - Sampling unit type (sampUnitType) ...................................................................... 21

 4.2.3. C.05 - Other sampling unit identifications (sampUnitIds)................................................... 21

 4.2.4. C.06 - Additional sampling event information (sampEventInfo) .......................................... 22

 4.3. Section D - Sample taken .............................................................................................. 23

 4.3.1. D.01 - Sample taken identification code (sampId) ............................................................ 23

 4.3.2. D.02 - Reporting country (repCountry)............................................................................ 23

 4.3.3. D.03 - Country of sampling (sampCountry)...................................................................... 23

 4.3.4. D.04 - Area of sampling (sampArea)............................................................................... 23

 4.3.5. D.05 - Reporting year (repYear)..................................................................................... 23

 4.3.6. D.06 - Year of sampling (sampY) ................................................................................... 23

 4.3.7. D.07 - Month of sampling (sampM) ................................................................................ 23

 4.3.8. D.08 - Day of sampling (sampD) .................................................................................... 23

 4.3.9. D.11 - Additional Sample taken information (sampInfo) .................................................... 24

 4.4. Section E - Sampled Matrix............................................................................................ 24

 4.4.1. E.01 - Type of matrix (sampMatType)............................................................................. 24

 4.4.2. E.02 - Coded description of the matrix of the sample taken (sampMatCode) ....................... 24

 4.4.3. E.10 - Additional information on the matrix sampled (sampMatInfo)................................... 27

 4.5. Section F - Analysed Sample.......................................................................................... 27

 4.5.1. F.01 - Sample analysed identification code (sampAnId) .................................................... 27

 4.5.2. F.03 - Year of analysis (analysisY) .................................................................................. 27

 4.6. Section H - Sample Analysed portion .............................................................................. 27

 4.6.1. H.01 - Sample analysed portion sequence (anPortSeq) ..................................................... 27

 4.7. Section K - Parameter ................................................................................................... 27

 4.7.1. K.01 - Type of parameter (paramType)........................................................................... 27

 4.7.2. K.02 - Coded description of parameter code (paramCode)................................................. 27

 4.8. Section L - Analytical method......................................................................................... 29

 4.8.1. L.01 Analytical method reference id (anMethRefId) .......................................................... 29

 4.8.2. L.03 - Analytical method type (anMethType) ................................................................... 29

 4.8.3. L.04 - Analytical method code (anMethCode)................................................................... 29

 4.9. Section M - Result ........................................................................................................ 31

 www.efsa.europa.eu/publications 4 EFSA Supporting publication 2019:EN-1675 

Reporting guidelines for 2019 TSE data 

4.9.1. M.01 - Result identification code (resId).......................................................................... 31

 4.9.2. M.15 - Result qualitative value (resQualValue) ................................................................. 31

 4.9.3. M.16 - Type of result (resType)...................................................................................... 32

 4.10. Section N - Evaluation................................................................................................... 32

 4.10.1. N.06 - Additional information on the evaluation (evalInfo)................................................. 32

 4.11. Amendment operations ................................................................................................. 33

 4.11.1. Amendment type (amType)........................................................................................... 33

 5. Summary of relevant data elements ............................................................................... 34

 5.1. EFSA business rules applied for data reported on TSE....................................................... 38

 References ............................................................................................................................. 46

 Abbreviations.......................................................................................................................... 47

 


NOW, let's access the USDA APHIS FSIS FDA BSE, CWD, Scrapie testing methods, shall we...

"REDACTED is alleged to have provided possibly inaccurate test results involving diseased sheep. However, because the results were determined to be inconclusive, no actual violation was actually committed.'' 

snip... 

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed. 

snip... 

I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June 2005). The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to human or animal health from this animal. 

snip... 

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program 

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007. 

snip... 

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half 


 full text ; 


 USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used 

WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd. 

In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow. 

The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press. 

Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17. 

"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that." 

Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said. 

These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC. 

In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected. 

Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours. 

The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago. 

Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003. 

"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either." 

Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials. 

Date: 8/25/05 


 ""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC." 

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON! 

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS 

USDA 2003 

We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS. 

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area. 

snip............. 

Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. 

Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS . 

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area. 

snip... 

FULL TEXT; 

Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE 

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado 

2005 

============================= 

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006 

The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade. 

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen. 

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that." 

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive. 

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general. 

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end 


WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2016 

RANCHO He did not know that they were placing healthy cow heads next to suspect carcasses BSE TSE Prion 

Subject: RANCHO “He did not know that they were placing healthy cow heads next to suspect carcasses,” Singleton’s defense team wrote.

 

LMAO!

 

Yardman only one not paid in Rancho diseased cow scheme

 
By Dan Flynn | March 1, 2016

 
Sentencing continues tomorrow in the criminal prosecution of the four men whose scheme to circumvent USDA inspection in 2013 caused diseased cattle to end up as human food.

 
The owner of Rancho Veal, Robert “Bob” Singleton, and Rancho Feeding Corp. yardman Eugene Corda will appear for sentencing on Wednesday in U.S. District Court for Northern California in San Francisco. Felix Sandoval Cabrera, foreman at the Petaluma, CA, slaughterhouse, will be the last to be sentenced on March 9.

 
Rancho owner Jesse “Babe” Amaral was the first to be sentenced. On Feb. 10 Amaral was sentenced to a year and day in federal prison to be followed by two years of supervised released including one year at a half-way house.

 
four men agreed to plead guilty to a single count of conspiracy to distribute adulterated, misbranded, and un-inspected meat. In exchange, the government agreed to drop multiple charges brought in an August 2014 indictment, including fraud and conspiracy.

 
Their scheme to process diseased cattle, mostly with eye cancers, caused a massive 8.7-million-pound meat recall in February 2014. The slaughterhouse was closed and eventually sold. Recall expenses and other damages cost Rancho’s business associates millions.

 
The need for a trial went away when the defendants all pleaded guilty. Sentencing documents, however, are beginning to fill in some of the details that would have come out at trial.

 
Singleton and Amaral met at cattle auctions in the early 1970s and decided to become business partners.

 
The real property of the Petaluma slaughterhouse was owned by Singleton Investments Inc., and was managed by both the Rancho Veal Corp., also owned by Singleton, and the Rancho Feeding Corp,, owned by Amaral.

 
Singleton was the cattle buyer at auctions, and also sold processed meat to vendors though his Rancho Veal Corp. Amara’s Rancho Feeding Corp. was the “USDA establishment,” permitted to slaughter and process cattle for human consumption.

 
Rancho Feeding had “custom slaughter agreements” with Rancho Veal, contracts where it agreed to manage the slaughterhouse and comply with all USDA regulations.

 
Cabrera, Rancho’s foreman who’d studied to be a USDA inspector, worked for Amaral for more than 30 years.

 
The 79-year old Singleton claims to have heard about the scheme from the 78-year old Amaral sometime in early 2013. Shortly thereafter, Singleton learned from Amaral that he’d directed Cabrera to bypass ante mortem (before death) inspection procedures if the foreman believed a cow was likely to be marked by an inspector as a “suspect” for condemnation.

 
Singleton claims not to have known that Amaral and Cabrera had employees carving the “USDA Condemned” stamps out of cattle that had been condemned. Nor did he know that, at Amaral’s direction, Corda was swapping un-inspected cattle showing symptoms of eye cancer for cattle that had already passed ante mortem inspection.

 
He did not know that they were placing healthy cow heads next to suspect carcasses,” Singleton’s defense team wrote.

 
However, there was much Singleton did know.

 
He “knew Amaral, Cabrera, and Corda were somehow effectively circumventing inspection, and (Singleton) failed to ask questions or take responsibility for putting a stop to the unlawful scheme,” according to court documents. Amaral instructed Singleton to pay Cabrera $50 for every cow he “slipped” past USDA inspection.

 
“The evidence shows that Corda did not know his codefendants were also processing condemned cattle, or that Ranch’s owners were defrauding farmers in a separate scheme, and he was not charged with those counts in the indictment,” according to the sentencing memorandum filed by Assistant U.S. Attorney Hartley M.K. West.

 
“Corda also did not profit from his role beyond his regular paycheck, whereas Rancho’s owners and the kill floor foreman, Cabrera, did.”

 
West says Amaral and Singleton profited from the sale of the “eye cows” and condemned cattle and Amaral from a separate false invoicing scheme.

 
“Corda was not paid and did not seek compensation.” West wrote. “He was simply trying to keep his job by doing what Amaral told him.”

 
The government is recommending that the 65-year old Corda be sentenced to three years probation including six months of home confinement, which will apparently allow him to work and take his wife to chemotherapy for treatment of a re-occurrent breast cancer.

 
Corda worked for Amaral for 30 years, a man he described as “strong-minded” and “dominant and forceful.” Singleton became another of his boss’s in 1997, and like Amaral was known for his lifetime in the cattle business.

 
“At no time did I ever believe the two men would involve me in a scheme that would threaten the food supply,” Corda said in his pre-sentencing letter to the judge. He eventually realized Amaral and Cabrera had come up with a way to get cattle through without inspection.

 
Singleton admits he trusted Amaral and Cabrera. Amaral had run the kill floor of the small slaughterhouse for 45 years and Singleton believed his business partner could “distinguish between safe and unsafe conduct,”according to Singleton’s lawyers. They said Singleton especially trusted Cabrera’s expertise in meat inspection.

 
“Quite frankly, Bob did not trust the federal inspectors working at Rancho at the time, and believed that Cabrera had a better idea of what was a passable cow than those inspectors.” His attorneys said they offered that perspective “to illustrate the Bob at the time never believed that dangerous meat would ever be passed through to consumers.”

 
“Today Bob deeply regrets his conduct and the significant harm it caused,” wrote the attorneys from Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP in San Francisco.

 
Due largely due to his being the first to fully cooperate in the investigation, the government is recommending Singleton be sentenced to three months in prison and three months of home detention followed by two years of supervised release with 50 hours of community service.

 
Singleton wants a “non-custodial sentence of probation.”

 
Whether he stays out of jail may depend upon whether the judge accepts Singleton’s view of the “loss calculation.” The recall of 8.7 million pounds of meat included the production of an estimated 15,600 head of cattle processed by Rancho over the course of a year.

 
That resulted in a loss of more than $2.5 million.

 
However, Singleton’s defense argues that the government’s investigation found 180 cows were affected by the criminal conduct and from that number, they could have “profited no more than $90,000.” There is a ten-fold increase in the impact on the sentencing calculation between the two numbers ($90,000 versus $2.5 million)

 
Singleton has also reached settlement agreements with all but one of companies that were financial harmed by Rancho’s scheme and resulting recall. The payments he has agreed to include: •RBR Meats/Riteway, $1.5 million; •BN Ranch, $450,000; •Tillamook Country Smoker, $7,720; and •Argus, $3,000.

 
Singleton’s attorneys have been unable to get a response from Advance Pierre Foods, the only remaining “victim entity.”

 
“Quite simply, Bob has no more money left, and no ability to pay a fine or further restitution,” his attorneys wrote. “After he pays agreed-to restitution and legal fees, Bob will be in debt.”

 
The government wants a separate restitution hearing scheduled after tomorrow if any unresolved issues remain after sentencing.

 
© Food Safety News

 

 
UPDATED ...SEE VERDICT ; 


Three month sentence imposed on Rancho’s other owner

 
By Dan Flynn | March 3, 2016

 
Ranchocow_406x250U.S. District Court Judge Charles R. Breyer has sentenced 79-year old Robert W. Singleton to a “custodial term” of three months to be followed by one year of supervised probation for his role in a scheme to process cattle condemned by USDA, usually for cancerous eyes.

 
In a 15-minute sentencing hearing, Singleton was also ordered to pay a $100 court assessment. The judge did not impose any fine, and put restitution off to May 31.

 
Breyer ordered Singleton to self-surrender to the U.S. Marshals on or before May 31, but granted him permission to attend a family reunion in Reno, NV, before reporting. Singleton has been under instructions not to leave the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for Northern California.

 
Singleton was the first to cooperate with the government investigation of infractions at the Petaluma slaughterhouse. His business partner of more than 30 years, Jesse “Babe” Amaral operated the slaughterhouse as the Rancho Feeding Corp., while Singleton’s Rancho Veal Corp. purchased cattle at auctions and sale barns. Amaral came up with the idea of moving condemned animals past USDA inspectors and pocketing the money.

 
Breyer also sentenced a Rancho yardman, 65-year old Eugene D. Corda, to three months probation with a $100 assessment. Corda moved cattle into place as directed by a foreman, but eventually figured out what was going on. The judge granted Corda permission to continue feeding cattle for Amaral.

 
Amaral was sentenced last month to a year and day in federal prison. After that he will be on supervised probation for two years with the first year spent in a re-entry or half way house.

 
Only Rancho foreman Felix Cabrera remains to be sentenced. He will appear before Judge Breyer next week.

 
In lieu of a trial, all four defendants negotiated agreements with the government to plead guilty to distributing adulterated, misbranded, and un-inspected meat. All were also required to cooperate with investigators.

 
Rancho recalled 8.7 million pounds of meat in early February 2014, covering more than 13 months production back to Jan. 1, 2013.

 

 
>>> *** “He did not know that they were placing healthy cow heads next to suspect carcasses,” Singleton’s defense team wrote. ***<<<

 
where have I heard this before ???

 
THE NEVER ENDING SAGA OF USDA MAD COW INC.

 
Thursday, November 18, 2010

 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS

 
Galen Niehues, an inspector for the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, (NDA), was convicted of mail fraud for submitting falsified reports to his employer concerning inspections he was supposed to perform at Nebraska cattle operations. Niehues was tasked with performing inspections of Nebraska ranches, cattle and feed for the presence of neurological diseases in cattle including Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), also known as “Mad Cow Disease”. Niehues was to identify cattle producers, perform on-site inspections of the farm sites and cattle operations, ask producers specific questions about feed, and take samples of the feed. Niehues was to then submit feed samples for laboratory analysis, and complete reports of his inspections and submit them to the NDA and to the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). An investigation by the FDA and NDA revealed Niehues had fabricated approximately 100 BSE inspections and inspection reports. When confronted, Niehues admitted his reports were fraudulent, and that had fabricated the reports and feed samples he submitted to the NDA. Niehues received a sentence of 5 years probation, a 3-year term of supervised release, and was required to pay $42,812.10 in restitution.
 
 


Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Washington, D.C. 20250 January 25, 2006 REPLY TO ATTN OF: 50601-10-KC TO: W. Ron DeHaven Administrator Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Barbara Masters Administrator Food Safety and Inspection Service ATTN: William J. Hudnall Deputy Administrator Marketing Regulatory Program Business Services William C. Smith Assistant Administrator Office of Program Evaluation, Enforcement, and Review FROM: Robert W. Young /s/ Assistant Inspector General for Audit SUBJECT: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III This report presents the results of our audit of the enhanced BSE surveillance program and controls over specified risk materials and advanced meat recovery products. Your written response to the official draft report, dated January 20, 2006, is included as exhibit G with excerpts of the response and the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) position incorporated into the Findings and Recommendations section of the report, where applicable. We accept the management decisions for all recommendations. Please follow your agency’s internal procedures in forwarding documentation for final action to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). We are providing a separate memorandum to the agencies and OCFO that provides specific information on the actions to be completed to achieve final action. We appreciate your timely response and the cooperation and assistance provided to our staff during the audit USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC/ Page i 

Executive Summary 

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service - Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III 

Results in Brief This report evaluates elements of the interlocking safeguards in place to protect United States (U.S.) beef from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, widely known as BSE or "mad cow disease." Since 1990, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), has led a multi-agency effort to monitor and prevent BSE from entering the food supply. After discovering a BSE-positive cow in December 2003, APHIS expanded its BSE surveillance program. To further protect the food supply, USDA banned materials identified as being at risk of carrying BSE (specified risk materials (SRM)), such as central nervous system tissue. As part of this effort, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) required beef slaughter and processing facilities to incorporate controls for handling such materials into their operational plans. Onsite FSIS inspectors also inspect cattle for clinical signs in order to prevent diseased animals from being slaughtered for human consumption. To evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguards, we assessed APHIS’ implementation of the expanded surveillance program, as well as FSIS’ controls to prevent banned SRMs from entering the food supply. 

In June 2004, APHIS implemented its expanded surveillance program; participation by industry in this surveillance program is voluntary. As of May 2005, over 350,000 animals were sampled and tested for BSE. To date, two animals tested positive for BSE; one tested positive after implementation of the expanded surveillance program. 

USDA made significant efforts to implement the expanded BSE surveillance program. Much needed to be done in a short period of time to establish the necessary processes, controls, infrastructure, and networks to assist in this effort. In addition, extensive outreach and coordination was undertaken with other Federal, State, and local entities, private industry, and laboratory and veterinary networks. This report provides an assessment as to the progress USDA made in expanding its surveillance effort and the effectiveness of its controls and processes. This report also discusses the limitations of its program and data in assessing the prevalence of BSE in the U.S. herd. 

snip... 

40 ELISA test procedures require two additional (duplicate) tests if the initial test is reactive, before final interpretation. If either of the duplicate tests is reactive, the test is deemed inconclusive. 

41 Protocol for BSE Contract Laboratories to Receive and Test Bovine Brain Samples and Report Results for BSE Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), dated October 26, 2004. 

42 The NVSL conducted an ELISA test on the original material tested at the contract laboratory and on two new cuts from the sample tissue. 

43 A visual examination of brain tissue by a microscope. 

44 A localized pathological change in a bodily organ or tissue. 

SNIP... 

PLEASE SEE FLAMING EVIDENCE THAT THE USDA ET AL COVERED UP MAD COW DISEASE IN TEXAS ; 

PAGE 43; 

Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls 

snip... 

FULL TEXT 130 PAGES 


MEANWHILE, back at the ranch, with larry, curly, and mo at usda, in the real world, you will find that Johanns cannot open his mouth without lying about BSE. check out the SRM violation he claims are "while our interlocking safeguards, including the removal of specified risk materials and the feed ban, protect animal and human health.", espeically his BSe claim of 1 bse case per million head of cattle, in his dreams. ...TSS 

 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005 

snip.... 

CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X X On 10/11/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. 

EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 2/22/05 X X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05. 

00245L M LEXINGTON, NE 3/12/04 3/18/04 X 5/4/05 X X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. 

9/16/05 9/29/05 X X TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. 

TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. X X 00245D M EMPORIA, KS On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. 

DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 7/20/05 8/1/05 X X 12/29/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 9/1/05 9/20/05 X X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action 21562 M concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

ALTA VISTA LOCKER 10/5/05 10/26/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a 31931 M basis, failure of the establishment toALTA VISTA, KS comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 8/8/05 8/16/05 X X X 11/16/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

CHAMPLAIN BEEF INC 2/28/05 3/4/05 3/8/05 X X X 08547 M WHITEHALL, NY 10/17/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

FIVE STAR PACK INC. 9/1/05 9/9/05 X X 12/29/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action 08725 M08725 P concerning failure to meet regulatory GOLDEN CITY, MO requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. FRESH FARMS BEEF 12/16/05 12/28/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a 18579 M basis, failure of the establishment toRUTLAND, VT comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

GOETZ AND SONS WESTERN 11/15/05 11/23/05 12/1/05 X X MEATS INC 06245 M06245 P EVERETT, WA 12/17/05 12/28/05 X X X On 12/17/05, firm violated a regulatory control action by selling U.S.D.A retained product. 

H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 7/28/05 8/8/05 8/17/05 8/19/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 7/28/05 8/1/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 7/26/05 7/29/05 X X 11/15/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 9/21/05 10/7/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31762 M31762 P WAUKON, IA 9/6/05 9/12/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

S & S MEAT COMPANY 01046 M01046 P KANSAS CITY, MO 8/4/05 8/19/05 X X 11/16/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

STEAK MASTER 21159 M21159 P ELWOOD, NE 11/4/05 11/17/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

THE MEAT SHOP 31561 M BENSON, VT 8/18/05 9/6/05 9/9/05 X X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/27/05 7/29/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 20594 M20594 P GRANTSVILLE, UT 7/25/05 8/1/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

WALNUT VALLEY PACKING LLC 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

YODER BROTHERS MEAT PROCESSING 17301 M PARIS, TN 10/3/05 10/12/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. 

full text 54 pages ; 


 
---- Original Message ----- From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: Sent: Monday, March 20, 2006 4:26 PM Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005 

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy ##################### 

Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005 Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005 

snip... 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

 snip... 

DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 07/27/05 08/01/05 X X On 7/27/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. 

 snip... 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

 snip... 

MONTEBELLO MEAT PROCESSING, INC 19075 M19075 P MANATI, PR 08/01/05 08/18/05 X X X 09/26/05 On 8/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4. 

 snip... 

Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (7/01/05 to 9/30/05) 

snip... 

A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 09/01/05 09/20/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action 

21562 M 

concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli X X X Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4. 

snip... 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

 snip... 

BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 08/08/05 08/16/05 X X X On 8/8/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4. 

 snip... 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

 snip... 

FIVE STAR PACK INC. 08725 M08725 P GOLDEN CITY, MO 09/01/05 09/09/05 X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4. 

snip... 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

 snip... 

H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 07/28/05 08/08/05 08/17/05 08/19/05 X X On 8/17/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. 

snip... 

HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 07/28/05 08/01/05 X X On 7/28/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. 

 snip... 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

 snip... 

NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 07/26/05 07/29/05 X X On 7/26/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. 

snip... 

PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 09/21/05 X X On 9/21/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4. 

PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31792 M31792 P WAUKON, IA 09/06/05 09/12/05 X X X On 9/6/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4. 

 snip... 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

 snip... 

RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 07/01/05 07/28/05 X X X On 7/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4. 

 snip... 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

snip... 

08/04/05 

08/19/05 

On 8/4/05, 

an enforcement action 01046 M01046 P concerning Bovine SpongiformKANSAS CITY, MO X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4. 

Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters] 

snip... 

THE MEAT SHOP 08/18/05 09/06/05 

09/09/05 

On 9/6/05, a suspension action 31561 M concerning Bovine SpongiformBENSON, VT Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. XX X X X 

THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, 07/27/05 07/29/05 

On 7/27/05, a suspension action INC concerning Bovine Spongiform31647 M31647 P Encephalopathy and Specified Risk X X 

LEWISTON, UT Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. 

TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 07/25/05 08/01/05 

On 7/25/05, a suspension action 20594 M20594 Pconcerning Bovine Spongiform 

GRANTSVILLE, UT X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. 

snip... 

52 pages 

 


Under questioning from Agriculture Appropriations ranking member Rosa DeLauro, D-Conn., Fong acknowledged it was APHIS Administrator Ron DeHaven who made the decision not to conduct further tests on a Texas cow whose initial test for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or mad cow disease, was inconclusive. Further tests ordered by the inspector general several months later showed that the cow had the disease. 

DeLauro noted that when Japan stopped importing U.S. beef in December, USDA moved faster to deal with that issue than it had when the Texas cow was tested, a sign, she said, that USDA was more concerned about trade than human health. 

"We are taking years to deal with public health," DeLauro said. "If APHIS is in charge of avian influenza and we have the kinds of problems existing here, it doesn't bode well for public safety." 



 FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT 

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle. 

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds. 

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated. ... 



we know now, we knew then, 5.5 grams was enough to kill 100 cows. 


don't forget about the usda school lunch program, where for 4 years, dead stock downer cows were on the menu, the most highest risk cow for mad cow type disease, and they were fed to our children across the USA;


at one time usda et al had a link to all the schools that fed our children dead stock down cows, but they have since removed this from the www, but fear not, i saved it and posted here, see if your child was chosen by usda school lunch program for this live human tse prion experiment on your child



SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2009 

REPORT ON TESTING RUMINANTS FOR TSE's in the EU 2007 (2009)


United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued May 9, 2008 Decided August 29, 2008 No. 07-5173 CREEKSTONE FARMS PREMIUM BEEF, L.L.C., APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND EDWARD T. SCHAFER, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES Consolidated with NO. 07-5199 Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 06cv00544) Eric Fleisig-Greene, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for the appellants/cross-appellees. Jeffrey S. Bucholtz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey A. Taylor, United States Attorney, and Mark B. Stern and Michael S. Raab, Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, were on brief. James J. Gilligan, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United States Attorney, entered appearances.


IN SHORT, NO WAY, NO HOW, LET MAD COW SPREAD SAYS BUSH. ...TSS

see older mad cow history here;


STANLEY PRUSINER NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON THE PRION

US AG SEC AND LAYCRAFT

“nothing matters, except beef from Canada under 30 months bone in beef product, that’s ALL THAT MATTERS!”

US SENATOR AND STAN THE MAN SLAM USDA ”DAMNING TESTIMONY”

Senator Michael Machado from California

”USDA does not know what’s going on”. ”USDA is protecting the industry”. ” SHOULD the state of California step in”

Stanley Prusiner

”nobody has ever ask us to comment”

”they don’t want us to comment”

”they never ask”

i tried to see Venemon, after Canadian cow was discovered with BSE. went to see lyle. after talking with him…

absolute ignorance…

then thought i should see Venemon…

it was clear his entire policy was to get cattle boneless beef prods across the border…

nothing else mattered…

his aids confirmed this…

5 times i tried to see Venemon, never worked…

eventually met with carl rove the political…

he is the one that arranged meeting with Venemon…

just trying to give you a sense of the distance…

threat to health public safety…

was never contacted…

yes i believe that prions are bad to eat and you can die from them…END

Dr. Stan bashing Ann Veneman - 3 minutes - Damning testimony

http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/08snip.ram

WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;

Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04

Finally spoke with ;

Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email: ******************

at approx. 14:00 hours 12/28/04, I had a very pleasant phone conversation with ***X ***XX about the USDA and the inconclusive BSE testing problems they seem to keep having. X was very very cautious as to speak directly about USDA and it's policy of not using WB. X was very concerned as a Bio-Rad official of retaliation of some sort. X would only speak of what other countries do, and that i should take that as an answer. I told X I understood that it was a very loaded question and X agreed several times over and even said a political one.

my question;

Does Bio-Rad believe USDA's final determination of False positive, without WB, and considering the new atypical TSEs not showing positive with -IHC and -HP ???

ask if i was a reporter. i said no, i was with CJD Watch and that i had lost my mother to hvCJD. X did not want any of this recorded or repeated.

again, very nervous, will not answer directly about USDA for fear of retaliation, but again said X tell me what other countries are doing and finding, and that i should take it from there. "very difficult to answer"

"very political"

"very loaded question"

outside USA and Canada, they use many different confirmatory tech. in house WB, SAF, along with IHC, HP, several times etc. you should see at several talks meetings (TSE) of late Paris Dec 2, that IHC- DOES NOT MEAN IT IS NEGATIVE. again, look what the rest of the world is doing. said something about Dr. Houston stating; any screening assay, always a chance for human error. but with so many errors (i am assuming X meant inconclusive), why are there no investigations, just false positives? said something about ''just look at the sheep that tested IHC- but were positive''. ...

TSS

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Your questions Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:58:11 -0800 From: To: flounder@wt.net

Hi Terry:

............................................snip Let me know your phone number so I can talk to you about the Bio-Rad BSE test. Thank you

Regards

Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email: =================================

END...TSS

######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/

Executive Summary

In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues...ogy_report.pdf

i hope i have not lost you. i know how some don't like to get political, but cwd, mad cow disease (all strains), TME, Scrapie, and cjd i.e. human and animal TSE, that's all they are are political. bush has failed us terribly, clinton before him failed us terribly, and whomever gets in office next will do the same damn thing, in terms of human and animal TSE. it was said long ago ;

In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells

3. Prof. A Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. BSE was not reported in the USA.

https://web.archive.org/web/20090506002237/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf

There is NO proof that the atypical TSE are spontaneous. 

please show me these transmission studies ? 

on the other hand, we now know that the L-type atypical BSE is much more virulent than the typical C-BSE, and we now know that the 
H-type atypical BSE will transmit to humans. 

WHY can it not be that these atypical cases are simply from feed that had different strains of TSE ? WHY is it that no one will comment on the studies that was suppose to show infectivity of tissues from atypical BSE ? 

WHY is it I had to file a FOIA on that issue? 

L-type atypical BSE (BASE) is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. 

BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. 

SEE Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 et al 2009 ;

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

snip...

I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM

Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....

Professor Kong reply ;

.....snip

As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.

Best regards, 

Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA 

P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models 

Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA

Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were argely undefined.

Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice.

Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.

Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.

Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.

Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.


see full text ;


snip...

full test Singeltary et al PLOS


THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2017 

USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE animal feeds for ruminants rule, 21 CFR 589.200


LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow. 

This new prionopathy in humans? 

the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......

wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, 

WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? 

there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$ 

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama 

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. 

This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. 

This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. 

We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation. 



Saturday, August 14, 2010 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS) 


her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008). This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks. Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail:maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009


Thursday, July 24, 2014 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations 


Thursday, July 24, 2014 

*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations 


THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2013 

Unique Properties of the Classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Strain and Its Emergence From H-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Substantiated by VM Transmission Studies


Saturday, August 14, 2010 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY 

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS) 


2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006 



and the rest is history. ...TSS

2019


49. The agent of transmissible mink encephalopathy passaged in sheep is similar to BSE-L

E. D. Cassmanna,b, S. J. Moorea,b, R. D. Kokemullera, A. Balkema-Buschmannc, M. H. Groschupcand J. J. Greenleea

aVirus and Prion Research Unit, National Animal Disease Center, ARS, United States Department of Agriculture, Ames, IA, USA (EDC, SJM, RDK, JJG); bOak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) through an interagency agreement between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). ORISE is managed by ORAU under DOE contract number DE-SC0014664. (EDC, SJM), Department of Veterinary Pathology, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, USA (JDS); cInstitute of Novel and Emerging Infectious Diseases, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Federal Research Institute for Animal Health, Greifswald – Isle of Riems, Germany (ABB, MHG)

CONTACT E. D. Cassmann eric.cassmann@usda.gov

ABSTRACT

Introduction: Transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) is a fatal neurologic prion disease of farmed mink. Epidemiologic and experimental evidence following a Wisconsin outbreak in 1985 has linked TME to low-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE-L). Evidence suggests that farmed mink were likely exposed through feeding of BSE-L infected downer cattle. The interspecies transmission of TME to cattle has been documented. Recently, we demonstrated the susceptibility of sheep to cattle passaged TME by intracranial inoculation. The aim of the present study was to compare ovine passaged cattle TME to other prion diseases of food-producing animals. Using a bovine transgenic mouse model, we compared the disease phenotype of sheep TME to BSE-C and BSE-L.

Materials and Methods: Separate inoculants of sheep passaged TME were derived from animals with the VRQ/VRQ (VV136) and ARQ/VRQ (AV136) prion protein genotype. Transgenic bovinized mice (TgBovXV) were intracranially inoculated with 20 µl of 1% w/v brain homogenate. The disease phenotypes were characterized by comparing the attack rates, incubation periods, and vacuolation profiles in TgBovXV mice.

Results: The attack rate for BSE-C (13/13), BSE-L (18/18), and TMEVV (21/21) was 100%; whereas, the TMEAV group (15/19) had an incomplete attack rate. The average incubation periods were 299, 280, 310, and 541 days, respectively. The vacuolation profiles of BSE-L and TMEVV were most similar with mild differences observed in the thalamus and medulla. Vacuolation profiles from the BSE-C and TMEAV experimental groups were different than TMEVVand BSE-L.

Conclusion: Overall the phenotype of disease in TME inoculated transgenic mice was dependent on the sheep donor genotype (VV vs AV). The results of the present study indicate that TME isolated from VRQ/VRQ sheep is similar to BSE-L with regards to incubation period, attack rate, and vacuolation profile. Our findings are in agreement with previous research that found phenotypic similarities between BSE-L and cattle passaged TME in an ovine transgenic rodent model. In this study, the similarities between ovine TME and BSE-L are maintained after multiple interspecies passages.

Prion2019 Conference


2007


August 1988

Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results From Feeding Infected Cattle


Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. snip... The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle... 





MONDAY, MAY 20, 2019 

Tracking and clarifying differential traits of classical- and atypical L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy prions after transmission from cattle to cynomolgus monkeys


SUNDAY, APRIL 14, 2019 

Estimation of prion infectivity in tissues of cattle infected with atypical BSE by real time-quaking induced conversion assay


WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2019 

USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection Aug 29, 2018 A Review of Science 2019


TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 

Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump USA and President Jair Bolsonaro Brazil FOREIGN POLICY BSE TSE Prion aka mad cow disease


SATURDAY, JUNE 01, 2019 

Brazil reports another cases of mad cow disease atypical BSE TSE Prion

PLEASE BE ADVISED THERE IS NO SCIENTIFIC PROOF THAT ANY ATYPICAL BSE TSE PRION IS OF A SPONTANEOUS OLD AGE DISEASE, NOT CAUSED BY FEED, THIS IS FALSE AND UNPROVEN, IN FACT, ATYPICAL BSE OF THE L AND H TYPE ARE TRANSMISSIBLE BY ORAL ROUTE. THIS STATEMENT THAT ATYPICAL BSE IS A SPONTANEOUS EVENT CAUSED BY OLD AGE, CAUSED BY NOTHING, IS ABSOLUTELY A LIE, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL, AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT PRODUCE SUCH STATEMENTS, KNOWS THIS IS AN UNPROVEN STATEMENT...TERRY SINGELTARY SR.


TUESDAY, JULY 16, 2019 

Spain Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion July 5 2019


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 2018 

The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge


WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2019 

Estimating the impact on food and edible materials of changing scrapie control measures: The scrapie control model 


TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 2019 USDA ARS 2018 

USAHA RESOLUTIONS TWO PRONGED APPROACH NEEDED FOR ADVANCING CATTLE TRACEABILITY 


THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2019 

USDA APHIS CDC FDA BSE TSE PRION UPDATE 2019 


THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2019 

BSE infectivity survives burial for five years with only limited spread 


MONDAY, JUNE 24, 2019 

APHIS, FSIS, USDA, FDA, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE, BSE, CWD, Scrapie, Camel TSE Prion Disease, CJD Humans


WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2019

''CWD has also been diagnosed in several free-ranging white-tailed deer harvested on ranches in close proximity to the remaining CWD positive breeding facilities within Medina County in central Texas. Genetic tests performed on those hunter-harvested deer found that the genetic composition of the subject animals were more closely related to deer in nearby captive facilities, as opposed to those in the surrounding free-range population.''

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS TESTIMONY TEXAS TPWD


WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, 2019 

Subcommittee Hearing: Chronic Wasting Disease: The Threats to Wildlife, Public Lands, Hunting, and Health

video


CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CONGRESS Serial No. 107-117 May 16, 2002

CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE

JOINT OVERSIGHT HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORESTS AND FOREST HEALTH JOINT WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES CONSERVATION, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS OF THE COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

May 16, 2002

Serial No. 107-117

snip...

Mr. MCINNIS. Today, this joint Subcommittee hearing will explore an issue of immeasurable importance to the growing number of communities in wide-ranging parts of this country, the growing incidence of Chronic Wasting Disease in North America’s wild and captive deer and elk populations. In a matter of just a few months, this once parochial concern has grown into something much larger and much more insidious than anyone could have imagined or predicted.

As each day passes, this problem grows in its size, scope, and consequence. One thing becomes clear. Chronic Wasting Disease is not a Colorado problem. It is a Wisconsin problem or a Nebraska or Wyoming problem. It is a national problem and anything short of a fully integrated, systematic national assault on this simply will not do, which is precisely why we brought our group together here today.

snip...

So this is a disease that is spreading throughout the continent and it is going to require a national response as well as the efforts that are currently taking place in States like Wisconsin, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, the interest they now have down in Texas and some of the neighboring States that have large white-tailed deer population and also elk.

This is a huge issue for us, Mr. Chairman, in the State of Wisconsin. I want to commend Governor McCallum and your staff and the various agencies for the rapid response that you have shown, given the early detection of CWD after the last deer hunting season. The problem that we have, though, is just a lack of information, good science in regards to what is the best response, how dangerous is this disease. We cannot close the door, quite frankly, with the paucity of scientific research that is out there right now in regards to how the disease spreads, the exposure of other livestock herds—given the importance of our dairy industry in the State, that is a big issue—and also the human health effects.


WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2019 

Experts urge immediate action to contain the epidemic Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion


THURSDAY, JULY 25, 2019 

A team of national and state experts in public health, wildlife diseases, prion research and laboratory diagnosis is urgently calling for a comprehensive national strategy to reduce the risk for human exposure to Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) and to limit the risk of transmission of CWD among wildlife, particularly cervids, and domestic animals



FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2019 

Chronic Wasting Disease in Cervids: Implications for Prion Transmission to Humans and Other Animal Species



2019

friendly fire, pass it forward, they call it iatrogenic cjd, or what i call 'tse prion poker', are you all in $$$

SATURDAY, MARCH 16, 2019 

Medical Devices Containing Materials Derived from Animal Sources (Except for In Vitro Diagnostic Devices) Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff Document issued on March 15, 2019 Singeltary Submission


TUESDAY, APRIL 09, 2019 

Horizon Health Network Moncton Hospital notified more than 700 patients after two cases of CJD were diagnosed both patients had undergone cataracts surgery before being diagnosed


THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 2017 

*** Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States revisited 2017

Singeltary et al


FRIDAY, JUNE 21, 2019 

CJD TSE Prion cases update USA, Texas, Canada, and UK


MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019 

MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019 


TUESDAY, JULY 23, 2019 

APHIS USDA Administrator Announces Several Senior Leadership Changes As Trump Prepares Apparently To Fire 100's of Scientists That Don't Agree With Him, what about mad cow type disease tse prion?



terry


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