Thursday, August 20, 2020

Why is USDA "only" BSE TSE Prion testing 25,000 samples a year?

Why is USDA "only" BSE TSE Prion testing 25,000 samples a year?

Why is USDA "only" testing 25,000 samples a year?

USDA's surveillance strategy is to focus on the targeted populations where we are most likely to find disease if it is present. This is the most effective way to meet both OIE and our domestic surveillance standards. After completing our enhanced surveillance in 2006 and confirming that our BSE prevalence was very low, an evaluation of the program showed that reducing the number of samples collected to 40,000 samples per year from these targeted, high risk populations would allow us to continue to exceed these standards. In fact, the sampling was ten times greater than OIE standards.  A subsequent evaluation of the program in 2016 using data collected over the past 10 years showed that the surveillance standards could still be met with a further reduction in the number of samples collected by renderers and 3D/4D establishments which have a very low OIE point value because the medical history of these animals is usually unknown. Therefore, in 2016, the number of samples to be tested was reduced to 25,000 where it remains today.''

Introduction

USDA conducts surveillance for Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), referred to as "mad cow disease", in cattle to determine if, and at what level, the disease is present in the U.S. cattle population. Our surveillance program allows us to assess any change in the BSE disease status of U.S. cattle, and identify any rise in BSE prevalence in this country. Identifying any changes in the prevalence of disease allows us to match our preventive measures - feed ban for animal health, and specified risk material removal for public health - to the level of disease in U.S. cattle.

It is the longstanding system of interlocking safeguards, including the removal of specified risk materials - or the parts of an animal that would contain BSE - at slaughter and the FDA's ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban that protect public and animal health from BSE.

Why did USDA decrease the number of samples per year in 2006?

After the first confirmation of BSE in an animal in Washington State in December 2003, USDA evaluated its BSE surveillance efforts in light of that finding. We determined that we needed to immediately conduct a major surveillance effort to help determine the prevalence of BSE in the United States. Our goal over a 12-18 month period was to obtain as many samples as possible from the segments of the cattle population where we were most likely to find BSE if it was present. This population of cattle was exhibiting some signs of disease. We conducted this enhanced surveillance effort from June 2004 - August 2006. In that time, we collected a total of 787,711 samples and estimated the prevalence of BSE in the United States to be between 4-7 infected animals in a population of 42 million adult cattle. We consequently modified our surveillance efforts based on this prevalence estimate to a level we can monitor for any potential changes, should they occur. Our statistical analysis indicated that collecting approximately 40,000 samples per year from the targeted cattle population would enable us to conduct this monitoring.

Why is USDA "only" testing 25,000 samples a year?

USDA's surveillance strategy is to focus on the targeted populations where we are most likely to find disease if it is present. This is the most effective way to meet both OIE and our domestic surveillance standards. After completing our enhanced surveillance in 2006 and confirming that our BSE prevalence was very low, an evaluation of the program showed that reducing the number of samples collected to 40,000 samples per year from these targeted, high risk populations would allow us to continue to exceed these standards. In fact, the sampling was ten times greater than OIE standards.  A subsequent evaluation of the program in 2016 using data collected over the past 10 years showed that the surveillance standards could still be met with a further reduction in the number of samples collected by renderers and 3D/4D establishments which have a very low OIE point value because the medical history of these animals is usually unknown. Therefore, in 2016, the number of samples to be tested was reduced to 25,000 where it remains today.

How can USDA find every case of BSE in the United States when you are only testing 25,000 animals?

The goal of our BSE surveillance program, even under the enhanced program, has never been to detect every case of BSE. Our goal is determine whether the disease exists at very low levels in the U.S. cattle population, and we do this by testing those animals most likely to have BSE. It is the longstanding system of interlocking safeguards, including the removal of specified risk materials - or the parts of an animal that would contain BSE - at slaughter and the FDA's ruminant-to- ruminant feed ban that protect public and animal health from BSE.

Why didn’t USDA continue to test animals at the enhanced surveillance level?

USDA's 2004-2006 enhanced surveillance program was initiated in response to the first detection of BSE in the United States and was designed to detect the overall prevalence of the disease in this country. This required a very intensive effort and it allowed us to estimate extremely low prevalence levels of disease. Once that prevalence level was determined, USDA modified its testing levels to monitor any changes in the level of disease. Our current testing of approximately 25,000 targeted animals a year allows USDA to detect BSE at the very low level of less than 1 case per million adult cattle, assess any change in the BSE status of U.S. cattle, and identify any rise in BSE prevalence in this country.

Is USDA's surveillance program a food safety or public health measure?

The primary, and most effective, food safety or public health measure is the removal of specified risk materials (SRMs) - or the parts of an animal that would contain BSE - from every animal at slaughter. USDA's BSE surveillance program is not a food safety measure; it is an animal health monitoring measure. However, it does support existing public health and food safety measures. By allowing us to monitor the level of disease in the US cattle population, we can help determine the appropriate level of public health and animal health measures required, and whether they should be increased or decreased.

Why doesn't USDA test every animal at slaughter?

There is currently no test to detect the disease in a live animal. BSE is confirmed by taking samples from the brain of an animal and testing to see if the infectious agent - the abnormal form of the prion protein - is present. The earliest point at which current tests can accurately detect BSE is 2 to 3 months before the animal begins to show symptoms, and the time between initial infection and the appearance of symptoms is about 5 years. Therefore, there is a long period of time during which current tests would not be able to detect the disease in an infected animal.

Since most cattle are slaughtered in the United States at a young age, they are in that period where tests would not be able to detect the disease if present. Testing all slaughter cattle for BSE could produce an exceedingly high rate of false negative test results and offer misleading assurances of the presence or absence of disease.

Simply put, the most effective way to detect BSE is not to test all animals, which could lead to false security, but to test those animals most likely to have the disease, which is the basis of USDA's current program.

What animals are USDA testing in the surveillance program? These are random samples at slaughter, aren't they?

No. USDA's BSE surveillance program is specifically targeted to the population most likely to have the disease, if it is present. This population is NOT clinically healthy animals that would be presented for slaughter. Rather, it includes animals that have some type of abnormality, such as central nervous system signs; non-ambulatory, or a "downer"; emaciated; or died for unknown reasons. Because these animals would not pass the required ante-mortem inspection requirements at slaughter for human consumption, we collect the majority of our samples at facilities other than slaughter facilities - at rendering or salvage facilities, on-farm, at veterinary clinics or veterinary diagnostic laboratories. With this targeted approach, we can monitor the presence of disease in the US cattle population in a much more efficient and meaningful way. The key to surveillance is to look where the disease is going to occur.

Key Points: BSE Ongoing Surveillance Plan

Note: This Fact Sheet is based on the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Ongoing Surveillance Plan, July 20, 2006. To learn more, read the complete BSE Ongoing Surveillance Plan (PDF, 187 KB).

KEY POINTS

In addition to a stringent feed ban imposed by the Food and Drug Administration in 1997 as well as the removal of all specified risk material which could harbor BSE, USDA has a strong surveillance program in place to detect signs of BSE in cattle in the United States. In fact, we test for BSE at levels greater than World Animal Health Organization standards. The program samples approximately 25,000 animals each year and targets cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be found. The targeted population for ongoing surveillance focuses on cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous disorders or any other signs that may be associated with BSE, including emaciation or injury, and dead cattle, as well as non-ambulatory animals. Samples from the targeted population are taken at farms, veterinary diagnostic laboratories, public health laboratories, slaughter facilities, veterinary clinics, and livestock markets.
USDA's National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, IA, along with contracted veterinary diagnostic laboratories, use rapid screening tests as the initial screening method on all samples. Any inconclusive samples undergo further testing and analysis at NVSL.

NOT A FOOD SAFETY TEST

BSE tests are not conducted on cuts of meat, but involve taking samples from the brain of a dead animal to see if the infectious agent is present. We know that the earliest point at which current tests can accurately detect BSE is 2-to-3 months before the animal begins to show symptoms. The time between initial infection and the appearance of symptoms is about 5 years. Since most cattle that go to slaughter in the United States are both young and clinically normal, testing all slaughter cattle for BSE might offer misleading assurances of safety to the public.

The BSE surveillance program is not for the purposes of determining food safety. Rather, it is an animal health surveillance program. USDA's BSE surveillance program allows USDA to detect the disease if it exists at very low levels in the U.S. cattle population and provides assurances to consumers and our international trading partners that the interlocking system of safeguards in place to prevent BSE are working.

The safety of the U.S. food supply from BSE is assured by the removal of specified risk materials - those tissues known to be infective in an affected animal - from all human food. These requirements have been in place since 2004.

ONGOING BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM SUMMARY

USDA's BSE surveillance program samples approximately 25,000 animals each year and targets cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be found. The statistically valid surveillance level of 25,000 is consistent with science-based internationally accepted standards. This level allows USDA to detect BSE at the very low level of less than 1 case per million adult cattle, assess any change in the BSE status of U.S. cattle, and identify any rise in BSE prevalence in this country.

The targeted population for ongoing surveillance focuses on cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous disorders or any other signs that may be associated with BSE, including emaciation or injury, and dead cattle, as well as nonambulatory animals. Samples from the targeted population are taken at farms, veterinary diagnostic laboratories, public health laboratories, slaughter facilities, veterinary clinics, and livestock markets.

USDA's National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, IA, along with contracted veterinary diagnostic laboratories, will continue to use rapid screening tests as the initial screening method on all samples. Any inconclusive samples will be sent to NVSL for further testing and analysis. USDA's surveillance program uses OIE's weighted surveillance points system, which was adopted in May 2005 and reflects international scientific consensus that the best BSE surveillance programs focus on obtaining quality samples from targeted subpopulations rather than looking at the entire adult cattle population.

The number of points a sample receives correlates directly to an animal's clinical presentation at the time of sampling. The highest point values are assigned to those samples from animals with classic clinical signs of the disease. The lowest point values correspond to clinically normal animals tested at routine slaughter.

The goal of this weighted approach is to ensure that countries sample those cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be found. This system is not different from USDA's previous BSE surveillance approach, it is simply a different method for evaluating surveillance programs. Both approaches target those cattle populations where BSE is most likely to be found. The OIE is simply assigning point values to different categories of animals.

USDA has been targeting these subpopulations since BSE surveillance was initiated in 1990, and will continue to do so under the OIE weighted approach. Under the OIE guidelines, points compiled over a period of 7 consecutive years are used as evidence of adequate surveillance. At the current ongoing level of surveillance, the United States will far exceed OIE guidelines under the point system.

Current Monthly Test Results

APHIS reports ongoing surveillance test totals monthly.
Collection Month
FY2020
Number of Valid Samples
OIE Points
October20191,15223,238
November20191,56936,255
December20191,53119,100
January20202,34029,204
February20203,29347,333
March20203,11527,953
April20202,19413,334
May20201,66021,163
June20201,29425,063
July20201285,966
Total as of July 1, 2020
18,276248,609
Beginning in Fiscal Year 2016, the BSE ongoing surveillance program will sample approximately 25,000 animals each year. Under the program, USDA will continue to collect samples from a variety of sites and from the cattle populations where the disease is most likely to be detected.
***> P.108: Successful oral challenge of adult cattle with classical BSE

Sandor Dudas1,*, Kristina Santiago-Mateo1, Tammy Pickles1, Catherine Graham2, and Stefanie Czub1 1Canadian Food Inspection Agency; NCAD Lethbridge; Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada; 2Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture; Pathology Laboratory; Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada

Classical Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-type BSE) is a feed- and food-borne fatal neurological disease which can be orally transmitted to cattle and humans. Due to the presence of contaminated milk replacer, it is generally assumed that cattle become infected early in life as calves and then succumb to disease as adults. Here we challenged three 14 months old cattle per-orally with 100 grams of C-type BSE brain to investigate age-related susceptibility or resistance. During incubation, the animals were sampled monthly for blood and feces and subjected to standardized testing to identify changes related to neurological disease. At 53 months post exposure, progressive signs of central nervous system disease were observed in these 3 animals, and they were euthanized. Two of the C-BSE animals tested strongly positive using standard BSE rapid tests, however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE. Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only. 

***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. 

We are further examining explanations for the unusual disease presentation in the third challenged animal.


P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge 

Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States. 

In 2006, a case of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was reported in a cow with a previously unreported prion protein polymorphism (E211K). 

The E211K polymorphism is heritable and homologous to the E200K mutation in humans that is the most frequent PRNP mutation associated with familial Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. 

Although the prevalence of the E211K polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele develop H-type BSE with a rapid onset after experimental inoculation by the intracranial route. 

The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the agents of H-type BSE or H-type BSE associated with the E211K polymorphism transmit to wild type cattle or cattle with the K211 allele after oronasal exposure. 

Wild type (EE211) or heterozygous (EK211) cattle were oronasally inoculated with either H-type BSE from the 2004 US Htype BSE case (n=3) or from the 2006 US H-type case associated with the E211K polymorphism (n=4) using 10% w/v brain homogenates. 

Cattle were observed daily throughout the course of the experiment for the development of clinical signs. 

At approximately 50 months post-inoculation, one steer (EK211 inoculated with E211K associated H-BSE) developed clinical signs including inattentiveness, loss of body condition, weakness, ataxia, and muscle fasciculations and was euthanized. 

Enzyme immunoassay confirmed that abundant misfolded protein was present in the brainstem, and immunohistochemistry demonstrated PrPSc throughout the brain. 

Western blot analysis of brain tissue from the clinically affected steer was consistent with the E211K H-type BSE inoculum. 

With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 

These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains. 

PRION 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 15, 2018 

***> The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge


MONDAY, JANUARY 09, 2017 

Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle 

CDC Volume 23, Number 2—February 2017 

*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.

*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.


Detection of PrPBSE and prion infectivity in the ileal Peyer’s patch of young calves as early as 2 months after oral challenge with classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy 

Ivett Ackermann1 , Anne Balkema‑Buschmann1 , Reiner Ulrich2 , Kerstin Tauscher2 , James C. Shawulu1 , Markus Keller1 , Olanrewaju I. Fatola1 , Paul Brown3 and Martin H. Groschup1* 

Abstract 

In classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-BSE), an orally acquired prion disease of cattle, the ileal Peyer’s patch (IPP) represents the main entry port for the BSE agent. In earlier C-BSE pathogenesis studies, cattle at 4–6 months of age were orally challenged, while there are strong indications that the risk of infection is highest in young animals. In the present study, unweaned calves aged 4–6 weeks were orally challenged to determine the earli‑ est time point at which newly formed PrPBSE and BSE infectivity are detectable in the IPP. For this purpose, calves were culled 1 week as well as 2, 4, 6 and 8 months post-infection (mpi) and IPPs were examined for BSE infectivity using a bovine PrP transgenic mouse bioassay, and for PrPBSE by immunohistochemistry (IHC) and protein misfolding cyclic amplifcation (PMCA) assays. For the frst time, BSE prions were detected in the IPP as early as 2 mpi by transgenic mouse bioassay and PMCA and 4 mpi by IHC in the follicular dendritic cells (FDCs) of the IPP follicles. These data indi‑ cate that BSE prions propagate in the IPP of unweaned calves within 2 months of oral uptake of the agent.

In summary, our study demonstrates for the frst time PrPBSE (by PMCA) and prion infectivity (by mouse bioassay) in the ileal Peyer’s patch (IPP) of young calves as early as 2 months after infection. From 4 mpi nearly all calves showed PrPBSE positive IPP follicles (by IHC), even with PrPBSE accumulation detectable in FDCs in some animals. Finally, our results confrm the IPP as the early port of entry for the BSE agent and a site of initial propagation of PrPBSE and infectivity during the early pathogenesis of the disease. Terefore, our study supports the recommendation to remove the last four metres of the small intestine (distal ileum) at slaughter, as designated by current legal requirements for countries with a controlled BSE risk status, as an essential measure for consumer and public health protection.


PLOS ONE Journal 

IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT

***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.

***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.

*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=86610

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
 

P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge 

Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States. 

reading up on this study from Prion 2018 Conference, very important findings ;

***> This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 

***> These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.

PRION 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT


WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2018 

Experimental Infection of Cattle With a Novel Prion Derived From Atypical H-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy


let's take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow.

This new prionopathy in humans? the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation.



her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008).

This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine–human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks.

Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail: maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA

NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009


> Epidemiological investigations conducted by USDA personnel failed to reveal any evidence of a feed source contaminated with TSE material fed to this animal


LMAO!

BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA 

 Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT

a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;

b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;

c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;

d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.

CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL

______________________________


PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,

Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;

b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;

c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;

d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;

e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;

f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;

g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons

DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###


MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE

a) Bulk

b) None

c) Bulk

d) Bulk

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###


10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007


Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)


2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006


***> Wednesday, January 23, 2019 

***> CFIA SFCR Guidance on Specified risk material (SRM) came into force on January 15, 2019 <***


In the USA, USDA et al sometimes serves SRM’s up as appetizers or horderves.

Thursday, November 28, 2013

Department of Justice Former Suppliers of Beef to National School Lunch Program Settle Allegations of Improper Practices and Mistreating Cows


seems USDA NSLP et al thought that it would be alright, to feed our children all across the USA, via the NSLP, DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, the most high risk cattle for mad cow type disease, and other dangerous pathogens, and they did this for 4 years, that was documented, then hid what they did by having a recall, one of the largest recalls ever, and they made this recall and masked the reason for the recall due to animal abuse (I do not condone animal abuse), not for the reason of the potential for these animals to have mad cow BSE type disease (or other dangerous and deadly pathogens). these TSE prion disease can lay dormant for 5, 10, 20 years, or longer, WHO WILL WATCH OUR CHILDREN FOR THE NEXT 5 DECADES FOR CJD ???

Saturday, September 21, 2013

Westland/Hallmark: 2008 Beef Recall A Case Study by The Food Industry Center January 2010 THE FLIM-FLAM REPORT


DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???

this recall was not for the welfare of the animals. ...tss you can check and see here ; (link now dead, does not work...tss)


try this link ;


Sunday, November 13, 2011
 
*** California BSE mad cow beef recall, QFC, CJD, and dead stock downer livestock
 
 
Wednesday, March 2, 2016
 
RANCHO He did not know that they were placing healthy cow heads next to suspect carcasses BSE TSE Prion
 
 
Sunday, June 14, 2015
 
Larry’s Custom Meats Inc. Recalls Beef Tongue Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials BSE TSE Prion
 
 
Thursday, June 12, 2014
 
Missouri Firm Recalls Ribeye and Carcass Products That May Contain Specified Risk Materials 4,012 pounds of fresh beef products because the dorsal root ganglia may not have been completely removed
 
 
Saturday, November 10, 2012
 
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That May Contain Specified Risk Materials Nov 9, 2012 WI Firm Recalls Beef Tongues
 
 
Saturday, July 23, 2011
 
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
 
 
Sunday, October 18, 2009
 
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
 
 
Thursday, October 15, 2009
 
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
 
 
Thursday, June 26, 2008
 
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
 
 
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
 
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
 
 
Friday, August 8, 2008
 
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
 
 
Saturday, April 5, 2008
 
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
 
 
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
 
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
 
 
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
 
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
 
 
Friday, October 15, 2010
 
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
 
 
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs
 
 
USDA BSE TSE PRION SURVEILLANCE, FEED, TESTING, SRM FIREWALLS...LMAO!
 
THE USDA FDA TRIPLE MAD COW DISEASE FIREWALL, WERE NOTHING MORE THAN INK ON PAPER !
 
infamous august 4, 1997 BSE TSE prion mad cow feed ban, part of usda fda et al TRIPLE MAD COW FIREWALL, 10 YEARS AFTER ;
 
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
 
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II PRODUCT Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
 
Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
 
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
 
___________________________________
 
PRODUCT Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007 CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified. RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007.
 
Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
 
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
 
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
 
 
16 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997
 
2013
 
Sunday, December 15, 2013
 
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE
 
 
17 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997
 
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
 
FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION
 
 
*** Monday, October 26, 2015 ***
 
*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE October 2015 ***
 
 
Thursday, July 24, 2014
 
*** Protocol for further laboratory investigations into the distribution of infectivity of Atypical BSE SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF EFSA New protocol for Atypical BSE investigations
 

SEE MORE;

Tuesday, September 10, 2019

FSIS [Docket No. FSIS–2019–0021] Notice of Request To Renew an Approved Information Collection: Specified Risk Materials Singeltary Submission



THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2017 

USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE animal feeds for ruminants rule, 21 CFR 589.200


WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2019 

***> USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection Aug 29, 2018 A Review of Science 2019 <***


MONDAY, JANUARY 09, 2017 

Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle 

CDC Volume 23, Number 2—February 2017 

*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.

*** Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.


TUESDAY, AUGUST 28, 2018 

USDA finds BSE infection in Florida cow 08/28/18 6:43 PM


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018 

USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection USDA 08/29/2018 10:00 AM EDT


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29, 2018 

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Atypical BSE Confirmed Florida Update USA August 28, 2018



H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism: 


clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle following intracranial inoculation


H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism: clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle following intracranial inoculation
 
Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES
 
Title: H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism: clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle following intracranial inoculation
 
Authors
 
item Moore, Sarah - item West Greenlee, Mary - item Smith, Jodi item Nicholson, Eric item Vrentas, Catherine item Greenlee, Justin
 
Submitted to: Prion
 
Publication Type: Abstract Only
 
Publication Acceptance Date: August 12, 2015
 
Publication Date: May 25, 2015
 
Citation: Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H., Smith, J., Nicholson, E., Vrentas, C., Greenlee, J. 2015. H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism: clinical and pathologic features in wild-type and E211K cattle following intracranial inoculation. Prion 2015. p. S5.
 
Technical Abstract: In 2006 an H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) case was reported in an animal with an unusual polymorphism (E211K) in the prion protein gene. Although the prevalence of this polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele are predisposed to rapid onset of H-type BSE when exposed. The purpose of this study was to investigate the phenotype of this BSE strain in wild-type (E211E) and E211K heterozygous cattle. One calf carrying the wild-type allele and one E211K calf were inoculated intracranially with H-type BSE brain homogenate from the US 2006 case that also carried one K211 allelle. In addition, one wild-type calf and one E211K calf were inoculated intracranially with brain homogenate from a US 2003 classical BSE case. All animals succumbed to clinical disease. Survival times for E211K H-type BSE inoculated catttle (10 and 18 months) were shorter than the classical BSE inoculated cattle (both 26 months). Significant changes in retinal function were observed in H-type BSE challenged cattle only. Animals challenged with the same inoculum showed similar severity and neuroanatomical distribution of vacuolation and disease-associated prion protein deposition in the brain, though differences in neuropathology were observed between E211K H-type BSE and classical BSE inoculated animals. Western blot results for brain tissue from challenged animals were consistent with the inoculum strains. This study demonstrates that the phenotype of E211K H-type BSE remains stable when transmitted to cattle without the E211K polymorphism, and exhibits a number of features that differ from classical BSE in both wild-type and E211K cattle.
 
 
*** All animals succumbed to clinical disease. Survival times for E211K H-type BSE inoculated catttle (10 and 18 months) were shorter than the classical BSE inoculated cattle (both 26 months). ***
 
-------- Original Message --------
 
Subject: re-BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD
 
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2002 10:23:43 -0000
 
From: "Asante, Emmanuel A" e.asante@ic.ac.uk
 
 
Dear Terry,
 
I have been asked by Professor Collinge to respond to your request. I am a Senior Scientist in the MRC Prion Unit and the lead author on the paper. I have attached a pdf copy of the paper for your attention.
 
Thank you for your interest in the paper.
 
In respect of your first question, the simple answer is, ***yes. As you will find in the paper, we have managed to associate the alternate phenotype to type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. It is too early to be able to claim any further sub-classification in respect of Heidenhain variant CJD or Vicky Rimmer's version. It will take further studies, which are on-going, to establish if there are sub-types to our initial finding which we are now reporting. The main point of the paper is that, as well as leading to the expected new variant CJD phenotype, BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype which is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc.
 
I hope reading the paper will enlighten you more on the subject. If I can be of any further assistance please to not hesitate to ask. Best wishes.
 
Emmanuel Asante
 
< >
 
____________________________________
 
Dr. Emmanuel A Asante MRC Prion Unit & Neurogenetics Dept. Imperial College School of Medicine (St. Mary's) Norfolk Place, LONDON W2 1PG Tel: +44 (0)20 7594 3794 Fax: +44 (0)20 7706 3272 email: e.asante@ic.ac.uk (until 9/12/02) New e-mail: e.asante@prion.ucl.ac.uk (active from now)
 
_________end...TSS___________________
 
 
***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. ***
 
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. ***
 
P.86: Estimating the risk of transmission of BSE and scrapie to ruminants and humans by protein misfolding cyclic amplification
 
Morikazu Imamura, Naoko Tabeta, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, and Yuichi Murayama National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba, Japan
 
To assess the risk of the transmission of ruminant prions to ruminants and humans at the molecular level, we investigated the ability of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) of typical and atypical BSEs (L-type and H-type) and typical scrapie to convert normal prion protein (PrPC) from bovine, ovine, and human to proteinase K-resistant PrPSc-like form (PrPres) using serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA).
 
Six rounds of serial PMCA was performed using 10% brain homogenates from transgenic mice expressing bovine, ovine or human PrPC in combination with PrPSc seed from typical and atypical BSE- or typical scrapie-infected brain homogenates from native host species. In the conventional PMCA, the conversion of PrPC to PrPres was observed only when the species of PrPC source and PrPSc seed matched. However, in the PMCA with supplements (digitonin, synthetic polyA and heparin), both bovine and ovine PrPC were converted by PrPSc from all tested prion strains. On the other hand, human PrPC was converted by PrPSc from typical and H-type BSE in this PMCA condition.
 
Although these results were not compatible with the previous reports describing the lack of transmissibility of H-type BSE to ovine and human transgenic mice, ***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
 
================
 
 


THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2017 

USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE animal feeds for ruminants rule, 21 CFR 589.200


LET'S take a closer look at this new prionpathy or prionopathy, and then let's look at the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow. 

This new prionopathy in humans? 

the genetic makeup is IDENTICAL to the g-h-BSEalabama mad cow, the only _documented_ mad cow in the world to date like this, ......

wait, it get's better. this new prionpathy is killing young and old humans, with LONG DURATION from onset of symptoms to death, and the symptoms are very similar to nvCJD victims, OH, and the plaques are very similar in some cases too, bbbut, it's not related to the g-h-BSEalabama cow, 

WAIT NOW, it gets even better, the new human prionpathy that they claim is a genetic TSE, has no relation to any gene mutation in that family. daaa, ya think it could be related to that mad cow with the same genetic make-up ??? 

there were literally tons and tons of banned mad cow protein in Alabama in commerce, and none of it transmitted to cows, and the cows to humans there from ??? r i g h t $$$ 

ALABAMA MAD COW g-h-BSEalabama 

In this study, we identified a novel mutation in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp), called E211K, of a confirmed BSE positive cow from Alabama, United States of America. 

This mutation is identical to the E200K pathogenic mutation found in humans with a genetic form of CJD. 

This finding represents the first report of a confirmed case of BSE with a potential pathogenic mutation within the bovine Prnp gene. 

We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in "the approximately 10-year-old cow" carrying the E221K mutation. 



Saturday, August 14, 2010 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS) 


her healthy calf also carried the mutation (J. A. Richt and S. M. Hall PLoS Pathog. 4, e1000156; 2008). 

This raises the possibility that the disease could occasionally be genetic in origin. Indeed, the report of the UK BSE Inquiry in 2000 suggested that the UK epidemic had most likely originated from such a mutation and argued against the scrapierelated assumption. Such rare potential pathogenic PRNP mutations could occur in countries at present considered to be free of BSE, such as Australia and New Zealand. So it is important to maintain strict surveillance for BSE in cattle, with rigorous enforcement of the ruminant feed ban (many countries still feed ruminant proteins to pigs). Removal of specified risk material, such as brain and spinal cord, from cattle at slaughter prevents infected material from entering the human food chain. Routine genetic screening of cattle for PRNP mutations, which is now available, could provide additional data on the risk to the public. Because the point mutation identified in the Alabama animals is identical to that responsible for the commonest type of familial (genetic) CJD in humans, it is possible that the resulting infective prion protein might cross the bovine-human species barrier more easily. Patients with vCJD continue to be identified. The fact that this is happening less often should not lead to relaxation of the controls necessary to prevent future outbreaks. Malcolm A. Ferguson-Smith Cambridge University Department of Veterinary Medicine, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ES, UK e-mail:maf12@cam.ac.uk Jürgen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University, K224B Mosier Hall, Manhattan, Kansas 66506-5601, USA NATURE|Vol 457|26 February 2009


Saturday, August 14, 2010 

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY 

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS) 


2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006 





ZOONOSIS OF SCRAPIE TSE PRION

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 

Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). 

Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 

We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health. 

=============== 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases*** 

=============== 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals. 

============== 


***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 

***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

 
PRION 2016 TOKYO

Saturday, April 23, 2016

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

Taylor & Francis

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, J uan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,

Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a

"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France

Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion... Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.

To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.

These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.

Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 

Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

 
***> why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. 

***> I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. 

***> Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

snip...

R. BRADLEY



Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period) 

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS. 

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated. 

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains. 


***> Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility. <***

Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period 

Emmanuel E. Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Sophie Luccantoni-Freire, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Valérie Durand, Capucine Dehen, Olivier Andreoletti, Cristina Casalone, Juergen A. Richt, Justin J. Greenlee, Thierry Baron, Sylvie L. Benestad, Paul Brown & Jean-Philippe Deslys Scientific Reports volume 5, Article number: 11573 (2015) | Download Citation

Abstract 

Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (c-BSE) is the only animal prion disease reputed to be zoonotic, causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans and having guided protective measures for animal and human health against animal prion diseases. Recently, partial transmissions to humanized mice showed that the zoonotic potential of scrapie might be similar to c-BSE. We here report the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to cynomolgus macaque, a highly relevant model for human prion diseases, after a 10-year silent incubation period, with features similar to those reported for human cases of sporadic CJD. Scrapie is thus actually transmissible to primates with incubation periods compatible with their life expectancy, although fourfold longer than BSE. Long-term experimental transmission studies are necessary to better assess the zoonotic potential of other prion diseases with high prevalence, notably Chronic Wasting Disease of deer and elk and atypical/Nor98 scrapie.

SNIP...

Discussion We describe the transmission of spongiform encephalopathy in a non-human primate inoculated 10 years earlier with a strain of sheep c-scrapie. Because of this extended incubation period in a facility in which other prion diseases are under study, we are obliged to consider two alternative possibilities that might explain its occurrence. We first considered the possibility of a sporadic origin (like CJD in humans). Such an event is extremely improbable because the inoculated animal was 14 years old when the clinical signs appeared, i.e. about 40% through the expected natural lifetime of this species, compared to a peak age incidence of 60–65 years in human sporadic CJD, or about 80% through their expected lifetimes. Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.

The second possibility is a laboratory cross-contamination. Three facts make this possibility equally unlikely. First, handling of specimens in our laboratory is performed with fastidious attention to the avoidance of any such cross-contamination. Second, no laboratory cross-contamination has ever been documented in other primate laboratories, including the NIH, even between infected and uninfected animals housed in the same or adjacent cages with daily intimate contact (P. Brown, personal communication). Third, the cerebral lesion profile is different from all the other prion diseases we have studied in this model19, with a correlation between cerebellar lesions (massive spongiform change of Purkinje cells, intense PrPres staining and reactive gliosis26) and ataxia. The iron deposits present in the globus pallidus are a non specific finding that have been reported previously in neurodegenerative diseases and aging27. Conversely, the thalamic lesion was reminiscent of a metabolic disease due to thiamine deficiency28 but blood thiamine levels were within normal limits (data not shown). The preferential distribution of spongiform change in cortex associated with a limited distribution in the brainstem is reminiscent of the lesion profile in MM2c and VV1 sCJD patients29, but interspecies comparison of lesion profiles should be interpreted with caution. It is of note that the same classical scrapie isolate induced TSE in C57Bl/6 mice with similar incubation periods and lesional profiles as a sample derived from a MM1 sCJD patient30.

We are therefore confident that the illness in this cynomolgus macaque represents a true transmission of a sheep c-scrapie isolate directly to an old-world monkey, which taxonomically resides in the primate subdivision (parvorder of catarrhini) that includes humans. With an homology of its PrP protein with humans of 96.4%31, cynomolgus macaque constitutes a highly relevant model for assessing zoonotic risk of prion diseases. Since our initial aim was to show the absence of transmission of scrapie to macaques in the worst-case scenario, we obtained materials from a flock of naturally-infected sheep, affecting animals with different genotypes32. This c-scrapie isolate exhibited complete transmission in ARQ/ARQ sheep (332 ± 56 days) and Tg338 transgenic mice expressing ovine VRQ/VRQ prion protein (220 ± 5 days) (O. Andreoletti, personal communication). From the standpoint of zoonotic risk, it is important to note that sheep with c-scrapie (including the isolate used in our study) have demonstrable infectivity throughout their lymphoreticular system early in the incubation period of the disease (3 months-old for all the lymphoid organs, and as early as 2 months-old in gut-associated lymph nodes)33. In addition, scrapie infectivity has been identified in blood34, milk35 and skeletal muscle36 from asymptomatic but scrapie infected small ruminants which implies a potential dietary exposure for consumers.

Two earlier studies have reported the occurrence of clinical TSE in cynomolgus macaques after exposures to scrapie isolates. In the first study, the “Compton” scrapie isolate (derived from an English sheep) and serially propagated for 9 passages in goats did not transmit TSE in cynomolgus macaque, rhesus macaque or chimpanzee within 7 years following intracerebral challenge1; conversely, after 8 supplementary passages in conventional mice, this “Compton” isolate induced TSE in a cynomolgus macaque 5 years after intracerebral challenge, but rhesus macaques and chimpanzee remained asymptomatic 8.5 years post-exposure8. However, multiple successive passages that are classically used to select laboratory-adapted prion strains can significantly modify the initial properties of a scrapie isolate, thus questioning the relevance of zoonotic potential for the initial sheep-derived isolate. The same isolate had also induced disease into squirrel monkeys (new-world monkey)9. A second historical observation reported that a cynomolgus macaque developed TSE 6 years post-inoculation with brain homogenate from a scrapie-infected Suffolk ewe (derived from USA), whereas a rhesus macaque and a chimpanzee exposed to the same inoculum remained healthy 9 years post-exposure1. This inoculum also induced TSE in squirrel monkeys after 4 passages in mice. Other scrapie transmission attempts in macaque failed but had more shorter periods of observation in comparison to the current study. Further, it is possible that there are differences in the zoonotic potential of different scrapie strains.

The most striking observation in our study is the extended incubation period of scrapie in the macaque model, which has several implications. Firstly, our observations constitute experimental evidence in favor of the zoonotic potential of c-scrapie, at least for this isolate that has been extensively studied32,33,34,35,36. The cross-species zoonotic ability of this isolate should be confirmed by performing duplicate intracerebral exposures and assessing the transmissibility by the oral route (a successful transmission of prion strains through the intracerebral route may not necessarily indicate the potential for oral transmission37). However, such confirmatory experiments may require more than one decade, which is hardly compatible with current general management and support of scientific projects; thus this study should be rather considered as a case report.

Secondly, transmission of c-BSE to primates occurred within 8 years post exposure for the lowest doses able to transmit the disease (the survival period after inoculation is inversely proportional to the initial amount of infectious inoculum). The occurrence of scrapie 10 years after exposure to a high dose (25 mg) of scrapie-infected sheep brain suggests that the macaque has a higher species barrier for sheep c-scrapie than c-BSE, although it is notable that previous studies based on in vitro conversion of PrP suggested that BSE and scrapie prions would have a similar conversion potential for human PrP38.

Thirdly, prion diseases typically have longer incubation periods after oral exposure than after intracerebral inoculations: since humans can develop Kuru 47 years after oral exposure39, an incubation time of several decades after oral exposure to scrapie would therefore be expected, leading the disease to occur in older adults, i.e. the peak age for cases considered to be sporadic disease, and making a distinction between scrapie-associated and truly sporadic disease extremely difficult to appreciate.

Fourthly, epidemiologic evidence is necessary to confirm the zoonotic potential of an animal disease suggested by experimental studies. A relatively short incubation period and a peculiar epidemiological situation (e.g., all the first vCJD cases occurring in the country with the most important ongoing c-BSE epizootic) led to a high degree of suspicion that c-BSE was the cause of vCJD. Sporadic CJD are considered spontaneous diseases with an almost stable and constant worldwide prevalence (0.5–2 cases per million inhabitants per year), and previous epidemiological studies were unable to draw a link between sCJD and classical scrapie6,7,40,41, even though external causes were hypothesized to explain the occurrence of some sCJD clusters42,43,44. However, extended incubation periods exceeding several decades would impair the predictive values of epidemiological surveillance for prion diseases, already weakened by a limited prevalence of prion diseases and the multiplicity of isolates gathered under the phenotypes of “scrapie” and “sporadic CJD”.

Fifthly, considering this 10 year-long incubation period, together with both laboratory and epidemiological evidence of decade or longer intervals between infection and clinical onset of disease, no premature conclusions should be drawn from negative transmission studies in cynomolgus macaques with less than a decade of observation, as in the aforementioned historical transmission studies of scrapie to primates1,8,9. Our observations and those of others45,46 to date are unable to provide definitive evidence regarding the zoonotic potential of CWD, atypical/Nor98 scrapie or H-type BSE. The extended incubation period of the scrapie-affected macaque in the current study also underscores the limitations of rodent models expressing human PrP for assessing the zoonotic potential of some prion diseases since their lifespan remains limited to approximately two years21,47,48. This point is illustrated by the fact that the recently reported transmission of scrapie to humanized mice was not associated with clinical signs for up to 750 days and occurred in an extreme minority of mice with only a marginal increase in attack rate upon second passage13. The low attack rate in these studies is certainly linked to the limited lifespan of mice compared to the very long periods of observation necessary to demonstrate the development of scrapie. Alternatively, one could estimate that a successful second passage is the result of strain adaptation to the species barrier, thus poorly relevant of the real zoonotic potential of the original scrapie isolate of sheep origin49. The development of scrapie in this primate after an incubation period compatible with its lifespan complements the study conducted in transgenic (humanized) mice; taken together these studies suggest that some isolates of sheep scrapie can promote misfolding of the human prion protein and that scrapie can develop within the lifespan of some primate species.

In addition to previous studies on scrapie transmission to primate1,8,9 and the recently published study on transgenic humanized mice13, our results constitute new evidence for recommending that the potential risk of scrapie for human health should not be dismissed. Indeed, human PrP transgenic mice and primates are the most relevant models for investigating the human transmission barrier. To what extent such models are informative for measuring the zoonotic potential of an animal TSE under field exposure conditions is unknown. During the past decades, many protective measures have been successfully implemented to protect cattle from the spread of c-BSE, and some of these measures have been extended to sheep and goats to protect from scrapie according to the principle of precaution. Since cases of c-BSE have greatly reduced in number, those protective measures are currently being challenged and relaxed in the absence of other known zoonotic animal prion disease. We recommend that risk managers should be aware of the long term potential risk to human health of at least certain scrapie isolates, notably for lymphotropic strains like the classical scrapie strain used in the current study. Relatively high amounts of infectivity in peripheral lymphoid organs in animals infected with these strains could lead to contamination of food products produced for human consumption. Efforts should also be maintained to further assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains in long-term studies, notably lymphotropic strains with high prevalence like CWD, which is spreading across North America, and atypical/Nor98 scrapie (Nor98)50 that was first detected in the past two decades and now represents approximately half of all reported cases of prion diseases in small ruminants worldwide, including territories previously considered as scrapie free... Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.


Friday, December 14, 2012

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

snip.....

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:

1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and

2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.

The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.

Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.

There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.

snip.....

36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).

The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).

Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.

snip.....

The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).

snip.....

In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.

snip.....

In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.

snip.....

Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.

snip.....


TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2019 

America BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, BSE SURVEILLANCE, BSE TESTING, and CJD TSE Prion 


the feds just released this statement and you should read this very carefully about the mad cow feed ban that never was, and still isn't, and why this is so important, since USDA APHIS ARS Scientist recent transmitted Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion, BY ORAL ROUTES, to PIGS AND SHEEP. this is terrible news, and proves the mad cow feed ban never worked, especially since it really never existed;

ponder this; ***> Adriano Aguzzi...''We even showed that a prion AEROSOL will infect 100% of mice within 10 seconds of exposure''

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2019 

FDA Reports on VFD Compliance

Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary.


***> cattle, pigs, sheep, cwd, tse, prion, oh my!

***> In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). 

Sheep and cattle may be exposed to CWD via common grazing areas with affected deer but so far, appear to be poorly susceptible to mule deer CWD (Sigurdson, 2008). In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). It is not known how susceptible humans are to CWD but given that the prion can be present in muscle, it is likely that humans have been exposed to the agent via consumption of venison (Sigurdson, 2008). Initial experimental research suggests that human susceptibility to CWD is low and there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans (Sigurdson, 2008), however the risk appetite for a public health threat may still find this level unacceptable.



cwd scrapie pigs oral routes

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <*** 

 >*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <*** 

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 5="" 6="" at="" by="" detected="" eia.="" examined="" group="" in="" intracranial="" least="" lymphoid="" month="" months="" of="" one="" pigs="" positive="" prpsc="" quic="" the="" tissues="" was="">6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 4="" and="" group="" months="" oral="">6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). 

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. 

This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. 

Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains. 




TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017 

*** EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP ***



Subject: Re: DEER SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY SURVEY & HOUND STUDY 

Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 23:12:22 +0100 

From: Steve Dealler 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Organization: Netscape Online member 

To: BSE-L@ References: <3daf5023 .4080804="" wt.net="">

Dear Terry,

An excellent piece of review as this literature is desparately difficult to get back from Government sites.

What happened with the deer was that an association between deer meat eating and sporadic CJD was found in about 1993. The evidence was not great but did not disappear after several years of asking CJD cases what they had eaten. I think that the work into deer disease largely stopped because it was not helpful to the UK industry...and no specific cases were reported. Well, if you dont look adequately like they are in USA currenly then you wont find any!

Steve Dealler =============== 


Stephen Dealler is a consultant medical microbiologist  deal@airtime.co.uk 

BSE Inquiry Steve Dealler

Management In Confidence

BSE: Private Submission of Bovine Brain Dealler

snip...see full text;

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019

***> MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019


SATURDAY, AUGUST 08, 2020 

TAHC Chapter 40, Chronic Wasting Disease Singeltary Comment Submission August 8, 2020


TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, 2020 

Sheep Scrapie, Bovine BSE, Cervid CWD, ZOONOSIS, TSE Prion Roundup August 18, 2020


CDC

New Outbreak of TSE Prion in NEW LIVESTOCK SPECIES

Mad Camel Disease

Volume 24, Number 6—June 2018 Research 

Prion Disease in Dromedary Camels, Algeria Abstract

Prions cause fatal and transmissible neurodegenerative diseases, including Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans, scrapie in small ruminants, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). After the BSE epidemic, and the associated human infections, began in 1996 in the United Kingdom, general concerns have been raised about animal prions. We detected a prion disease in dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) in Algeria. Symptoms suggesting prion disease occurred in 3.1% of dromedaries brought for slaughter to the Ouargla abattoir in 2015–2016. We confirmed diagnosis by detecting pathognomonic neurodegeneration and disease-specific prion protein (PrPSc) in brain tissues from 3 symptomatic animals. Prion detection in lymphoid tissues is suggestive of the infectious nature of the disease. PrPSc biochemical characterization showed differences with BSE and scrapie. Our identification of this prion disease in a geographically widespread livestock species requires urgent enforcement of surveillance and assessment of the potential risks to human and animal health.

SNIP...

The possibility that dromedaries acquired the disease from eating prion-contaminated waste needs to be considered.

Tracing the origin of prion diseases is challenging. In the case of CPD, the traditional extensive and nomadic herding practices of dromedaries represent a formidable factor for accelerating the spread of the disease at long distances, making the path of its diffusion difficult to determine. Finally, the major import flows of live animals to Algeria from Niger, Mali, and Mauritania (27) should be investigated to trace the possible origin of CPD from other countries.

Camels are a vital animal species for millions of persons globally. The world camel population has a yearly growth rate of 2.1% (28). In 2014, the population was estimated at ≈28 million animals, but this number is probably underestimated.. Approximately 88% of camels are found in Africa, especially eastern Africa, and 12% are found in Asia. Official data reported 350,000 dromedaries in Algeria in 2014 (28).

On the basis of phenotypic traits and sociogeographic criteria, several dromedary populations have been suggested to exist in Algeria (29). However, recent genetic studies in Algeria and Egypt point to a weak differentiation of the dromedary population as a consequence of historical use as a cross-continental beast of burden along trans-Saharan caravan routes, coupled with traditional extensive/nomadic herding practices (30).

Such genetic homogeneity also might be reflected in PRNP. Studies on PRNP variability in camels are therefore warranted to explore the existence of genotypes resistant to CPD, which could represent an important tool for CPD management as it was for breeding programs for scrapie eradication in sheep. In the past 10 years, the camel farming system has changed rapidly, with increasing setup of periurban dairy farms and dairy plants and diversification of camel products and market penetration (13). This evolution requires improved health standards for infectious diseases and, in light of CPD, for prion diseases.

The emergence of another prion disease in an animal species of crucial importance for millions of persons worldwide makes it necessary to assess the risk for humans and develop evidence-based policies to control and limit the spread of the disease in animals and minimize human exposure. The implementation of a surveillance system for prion diseases would be a first step to enable disease control and minimize human and animal exposure. Finally, the diagnostic capacity of prion diseases needs to be improved in all countries in Africa where dromedaries are part of the domestic livestock.


***> IMPORTS AND EXPORTS <***

***SEE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF BANNED ANIMAL PROTEIN AKA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA DECADES AFTER POST BAN ***


 WEDNESDAY, JUNE 10, 2020 

Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice

Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice

Atypical BSE prions showed a modification in their zoonotic ability after adaptation to sheep-PrP producing agents able to infect TgMet129 and TgVal129, bearing features that make them indistinguishable of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease prions.

our results clearly indicate that atypical BSE adaptation to an ovine-PrP sequence could modify the prion agent to potentially infect humans, showing strain features indistinguishable from those of classic sCJD prions, even though they might or might not be different agents.

However, the expanding range of TSE agents displaying the capacity to transmit in human-PrP–expressing hosts warrants the continuation of the ban on meat and bone meal recycling and underscores the ongoing need for active surveillance


A REVIEW of facts and science on scrapie zoonosis potential/likelihood and the USA incredible failure of the BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS (another colossal failure, and proven to be a sham) 

1st up BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS 


SATURDAY, JUNE 6, 2020 

Dangerous Infectious Disease, Politicians, Scientist, and Industry, don't mix, BSE mad cow disease TSE Prion proved that


SATURDAY, JUNE 23, 2018

CDC 

***> Diagnosis of Methionine/Valine Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease by Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification 

Volume 24, Number 7—July 2018 Dispatch 



Saturday, February 2, 2019 

CWD GSS TSE PRION SPINAL CORD, Confucius Ponders, What if?

snip... 

 ***> In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids.'' Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II) <*** 

REVIEW 

***> In conclusion, sensory symptoms and loss of reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome can be explained by neuropathological changes in the spinal cord. We conclude that the sensory symptoms and loss of lower limb reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome is due to pathology in the caudal spinal cord. <***

***> The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.<*** 

***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***

***> All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals.<*** 

***> In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids.'' Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II) <***

Thursday, March 8, 2018 

Familial human prion diseases associated with prion protein mutations Y226X and G131V are transmissible to transgenic mice expressing human prion protein


snip...see full text;

MONDAY, JANUARY 20, 2020
sporadic CJD one in a million, FAKE NEWS PEOPLE!
this myth has been incorrect for decades, and had been stated as such by a few, but again, the media is too lazy to do it's job and print the facts.

Updated April 3, 2020

Year Total Referrals² Prion Disease Sporadic Familial Iatrogenic vCJD

1999 & earlier 381 230 200 27 3 0

2000 145 102 90 12 0 0

2001 209 118 110 8 0 0

2002 241 144 124 18 2 0

2003 259 160 137 21 2 0

2004 316 181 164 16 0 1³

2005 327 178 156 21 1 0

2006 365 179 159 17 1 2⁴

2007 374 210 191 19 0 0

2008 384 221 205 16 0 0

2009 397 231 210 20 1 0

2010 401 246 218 28 0 0

2011 392 238 214 24 0 0

2012 413 244 221 23 0 0

2013 416 258 223 34 1 0

2014 355 208 185 21 1 1⁵

2015 401 263 243 20 0 0

2016 396 277 248 29 0 0

2017 375 266 247 19 0 0

2018 309 223 204 18 1 0

2019 416 270 240 21 0 0

2020 84 56 21 2 0 0

TOTAL 73566 45037 40108 4349 13 4

1Listed based on the year of death or, if not available, on the year of referral; 

2Cases with suspected prion disease for which brain tissue was submitted; 

3Disease acquired in the United Kingdom; 

4Disease acquired in the United Kingdom in one case and in Saudi Arabia in the other; 

5Disease possibly acquired in a Middle Eastern or Eastern European country; 

6Includes 14 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 19 inconclusive cases; 

7Includes 42 (9 from 2019, 33 from 2020) cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded. 

8The sporadic cases include 3906 cases of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD), 69 cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr) and 35 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI). 

9Total does not include 272 Familial cases diagnosed by blood test only.


Monday, February 3, 2020 

Informing Patient Contacts About Iatrogenic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease


Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD 


 SUNDAY, DECEMBER 29, 2019 

Variant CJD 18 years of research and surveillance Variant CJD

18 years of research and surveillance


FRIDAY, MAY 22, 2020 

No Adaptation of the Prion Strain in a Heterozygous Case of Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Volume 26, Number 6—June 2020 


BSE INQUIRY

Volume 2: Science 

4. The link between BSE and vCJD 

Summary 

4.29 The evidence discussed above that vCJD is caused by BSE seems overwhelming. Uncertainties exist about the cause of CJD in farmers, their wives and in several abattoir workers. It seems that farmers at least might be at higher risk than others in the general population. 1 Increased ascertainment (ie, increased identification of cases as a result of greater awareness of the condition) seems unlikely, as other groups exposed to risk, such as butchers and veterinarians, do not appear to have been affected. The CJD in farmers seems to be similar to other sporadic CJD in age of onset, in respect to glycosylation patterns, and in strain-typing in experimental mice. Some farmers are heterozygous for the methionine/valine variant at codon 129, and their lymphoreticular system (LRS) does not contain the high levels of PrPSc found in vCJD. It remains a remote possibility that when older people contract CJD from BSE the resulting phenotype is like sporadic CJD and is distinct from the vCJD phenotype in younger people...END..TSS

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. 

JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally. 

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex 1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. 


MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 2020 

National List of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRAD) proposed rule CWD, Scrapie, BSE, TSE, Prion Disease Singeltary Submission Docket APHIS-2017-0002


MONDAY, JULY 27, 2020 

BSE Inquiry DFA's a review


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 2020 

1996-12-04: BBC - Horizon BSE1 - BSE2 The Invisible Enemy, The British Disease, CWD, sporadic CJD


friendly fire from all of the above

Volume 26, Number 8—August 2020 

Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease among Physicians, Germany, 1993–2018 high proportion of physicians with sCJD were surgeons


THURSDAY, JULY 02, 2020 

Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease Diagnosed 7.5 Years after Occupational Exposure


SUNDAY, MAY 26, 2019 

Arguments for Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases caused by prions Stanley B. Prusiner 

''From a large array of bioassays, we conclude that AD, PD, MSA, and the frontotemporal dementias, including PSP and CBD, are all prion diseases''

snip...

P132 Aged cattle brain displays Alzheimer’s-like pathology that can be propagated in a prionlike manner

Ines Moreno-Gonzalez (1), George Edwards III (1), Rodrigo Morales (1), Claudia Duran-Aniotz (1), Mercedes Marquez (2), Marti Pumarola (2), Claudio Soto (1) 

snip...

These results may contribute to uncover a previously unsuspected etiology surrounding some cases of sporadic AD. However, the early and controversial stage of the field of prion-like transmission in non-prion diseases added to the artificial nature of the animal models utilized for these studies, indicate that extrapolation of the results to humans should not be done without further experiments. 

P75 Determining transmissibility and proteome changes associated with abnormal bovine prionopathy 

Dudas S (1,2), Seuberlich T (3), Czub S (1,2) 

In prion diseases, it is believed that altered protein conformation encodes for different pathogenic strains. Currently 3 different strains of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) are confirmed. Diagnostic tests for BSE are able to identify animals infected with all 3 strains, however, several diagnostic laboratories have reported samples with inconclusive results which are challenging to classify. It was suggested that these may be novel strains of BSE; to determine transmissibility, brain material from index cases were inoculated into cattle. 

In the first passage, cattle were intra-cranially challenged with brain homogenate from 2 Swiss animals with abnormal prionopathy. The challenged cattle incubated for 3 years and were euthanized with no clinical signs of neurologic disease. Animals were negative when tested on validated diagnostic tests but several research methods demonstrated changes in the prion conformation in these cattle, including density gradient centrifugation and immunohistochemistry. Currently, samples from the P1 animals are being tested for changes in protein levels using 2-D Fluorescence Difference Gel Electrophoresis (2D DIGE) and mass spectrometry. It is anticipated that, if a prionopathy is present, this approach should identify pathways and targets to decipher the source of altered protein conformation. In addition, a second set of cattle have been challenged with brain material from the first passage. Ideally, these cattle will be given a sufficient incubation period to provide a definitive answer to the question of transmissibility. 

=====prion 2018=== 



***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts 

S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.

***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.

*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***

Posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT


P.9.21

Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

Jianmin Yang 1 , Sandor Dudas 2 , Catherine Graham 2 , Markus Czub 3 , Tim McAllister 1 , Stefanie Czub 1 1 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2 National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3 University of Calgary, Canada

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle. Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres.

Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal-specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan.

*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.

*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***

see page 176 of 201 pages...tss



*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply;




snip...

Re-Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-β pathology and cerebral amyloid angiopathy 

>>> The only tenable public line will be that "more research is required’’ <<< 

>>> possibility on a transmissible prion remains open<<< 

O.K., so it’s about 23 years later, so somebody please tell me, when is "more research is required’’ enough time for evaluation ? 

Re-Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-β pathology and cerebral amyloid angiopathy 

Nature 525, 247?250 (10 September 2015) doi:10.1038/nature15369 Received 26 April 2015 Accepted 14 August 2015 Published online 09 September 2015 Updated online 11 September 2015 Erratum (October, 2015) 

snip...see full Singeltary Nature comment here; 

Alzheimer's disease

let's not forget the elephant in the room. curing Alzheimer's would be a great and wonderful thing, but for starters, why not start with the obvious, lets prove the cause or causes, and then start to stop that. think iatrogenic, friendly fire, or the pass it forward mode of transmission. think medical, surgical, dental, tissue, blood, related transmission. think transmissible spongiform encephalopathy aka tse prion disease aka mad cow type disease... 

Commentary: Evidence for human transmission of amyloid-β pathology and cerebral amyloid angiopathy





Self-Propagative Replication of Ab Oligomers Suggests Potential Transmissibility in Alzheimer Disease 

*** Singeltary comment PLoS *** 

Alzheimer’s disease and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy prion disease, Iatrogenic, what if ? 

Posted by flounder on 05 Nov 2014 at 21:27 GMT 


IN CONFIDENCE

5 NOVEMBER 1992

TRANSMISSION OF ALZHEIMER TYPE PLAQUES TO PRIMATES

[9. Whilst this matter is not at the moment directly concerned with the iatrogenic CJD cases from hgH, there remains a possibility of litigation here, and this presents an added complication. 

There are also results to be made available shortly 

(1) concerning a farmer with CJD who had BSE animals, 

(2) on the possible transmissibility of Alzheimer’s and 

(3) a CMO letter on prevention of iatrogenic CJD transmission in neurosurgery, all of which will serve to increase media interest.]




snip...see full text


TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, 2020 

Sheep Scrapie, Bovine BSE, Cervid CWD, ZOONOSIS, TSE Prion Roundup August 18, 2020

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.