Wednesday, July 26, 2017

APHIS USDA Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan July 2017

Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Veterinary Services

July 2017

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Table of Contents

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Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this plan is to provide strategic direction for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) to detect and respond to emerging animal diseases and define the processes by which VS will identify, evaluate, and respond to emerging diseases in animal populations. Rapid detection and response to emerging diseases are critical to animal agriculture because these diseases can threaten the livelihood of producers and limit their access to important markets. Rapid and effective response can also prevent or limit negative impacts on animal health, the economy, food security, and public health. In 2014, the framework for this plan was outlined in the APHIS concept paper, “VS Proposed Framework for Response to Emerging Animal Diseases in the United States.” 

Under the authority of the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq., the Risk Identification (RI) team, which is part of the Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health’s (CEAH) Risk Identification and Risk Assessment (RIRA) unit, will conduct evaluations to assess risks of emerging diseases and will prepare briefs with participation of staff from the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL); Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services; and National Import and Export Services. VS Unit Directors will review information, determine the need for and assign cross-unit Emerging Disease Teams to determine communication and response options, and make recommendations to the VS Executive Team (VSET) for decision-making and resource allocation. VS will follow standard program, regulatory, and budgetary business practices when responding to an emerging animal disease and will include, as needed, the use of VS Guidance 12001.2.

VS will work with Federal, State, tribal, academic, and industry partners to collect and evaluate information regarding an emerging disease and determine communication and response options. Subject matter experts from Federal agencies, the National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials (NASAHO), American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians (AAVLD), industry associations, and academic institutions will participate in cross-unit Emerging Disease Teams, as needed, to prevent and minimize the impact of emerging diseases. We will coordinate with APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs to develop USDA communications around specific response activities using current protocols. 

VS’ response to an emerging disease will depend on the specific event and be scaled to the level of risk posed to animal or public health. This plan outlines several options, including development of case definitions, conduct of on-farm investigations, development and distribution of communication materials, increase in diagnostic capacity, and establishment of regulations for a new program or policy. Because of the unknown nature of emerging diseases, VS cannot define one specific response plan, and there may be responses not identified in this document relevant to a particular emerging disease incident. 

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS 

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re-APHIS USDA Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan July 2017


BSE, CWD, Scrapie, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, aka mad cow type disease Prion?


USDA Detects a Case of Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Alabama 

Last Modified: Jul 18, 2017 Print Contacts:

Donna Karlsons, Donna.L.Karlsons@aphis.usda.gov Lyndsay Cole, Lyndsay.M.Cole@aphis.usda.gov Washington, D.C., July 18, 2017 – The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced an atypical case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), a neurologic disease of cattle, in an eleven-year old cow in Alabama. This animal never entered slaughter channels and at no time presented a risk to the food supply, or to human health in the United States.

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS) National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) have determined that this cow was positive for atypical (L-type) BSE. The animal was showing clinical signs and was found through routine surveillance at an Alabama livestock market. APHIS and Alabama veterinary officials are gathering more information on the case.

BSE is not contagious and exists in two types - classical and atypical. Classical BSE is the form that occurred primarily in the United Kingdom, beginning in the late 1980’s, and it has been linked to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in people. The primary source of infection for classical BSE is feed contaminated with the infectious prion agent, such as meat-and-bone meal containing protein derived from rendered infected cattle. Regulations from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have prohibited the inclusion of mammalian protein in feed for cattle and other ruminants since 1997 and have also prohibited high risk tissue materials in all animal feed since 2009. 

Atypical BSE is different, and it generally occurs in older cattle, usually 8 years of age or greater. It seems to arise rarely and spontaneously in all cattle populations.

This is the nation’s 5th detection of BSE. Of the four previous U.S. cases, the first was a case of classical BSE that was imported from Canada; the rest have been atypical (H- or L-type) BSE.

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) has recognized the United States as negligible risk for BSE. As noted in the OIE guidelines for determining this status, atypical BSE cases do not impact official BSE risk status recognition as this form of the disease is believed to occur spontaneously in all cattle populations at a very low rate. Therefore, this finding of an atypical case will not change the negligible risk status of the United States, and should not lead to any trade issues. 

The United States has a longstanding system of interlocking safeguards against BSE that protects public and animal health in the United States, the most important of which is the removal of specified risk materials - or the parts of an animal that would contain BSE should an animal have the disease - from all animals presented for slaughter. The second safeguard is a strong feed ban that protects cattle from the disease. Another important component of our system - which led to this detection - is our ongoing BSE surveillance program that allows USDA to detect the disease if it exists at very low levels in the U.S. cattle population.


TUESDAY, JULY 18, 2017 

USDA announces Alabama case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Alabama


THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2017 

USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE animal feeds for ruminants rule, 21 CFR 589.200


SUNDAY, JULY 23, 2017

atypical L-type BASE Bovine Amyloidotic Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE PRION


SUNDAY, JULY 23, 2017

Experimental Infection of Cattle With a Novel Prion Derived From Atypical H-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy


THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2017 

EFSA BSE Sixty cases of mad cow disease since 2001 breached feed ban likely the cause 

Scientists investigate origin of isolated BSE cases



*** First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress ***

Stefanie Czub1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Christiane Stahl-Hennig3, Michael Beekes4, Hermann Schaetzl5 and Dirk Motzkus6 1 

University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine/Canadian Food Inspection Agency; 2Universitatsklinikum des Saarlandes und Medizinische Fakultat der Universitat des Saarlandes; 3 Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen; 4 Robert-Koch-Institut Berlin; 5 University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine; 6 presently: Boehringer Ingelheim Veterinary Research Center; previously: Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen 

This is a progress report of a project which started in 2009. 21 cynomolgus macaques were challenged with characterized CWD material from white-tailed deer (WTD) or elk by intracerebral (ic), oral, and skin exposure routes. Additional blood transfusion experiments are supposed to assess the CWD contamination risk of human blood product. Challenge materials originated from symptomatic cervids for ic, skin scarification and partially per oral routes (WTD brain). Challenge material for feeding of muscle derived from preclinical WTD and from preclinical macaques for blood transfusion experiments. We have confirmed that the CWD challenge material contained at least two different CWD agents (brain material) as well as CWD prions in muscle-associated nerves. 

Here we present first data on a group of animals either challenged ic with steel wires or per orally and sacrificed with incubation times ranging from 4.5 to 6.9 years at postmortem. Three animals displayed signs of mild clinical disease, including anxiety, apathy, ataxia and/or tremor. In four animals wasting was observed, two of those had confirmed diabetes. All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals. Protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuiC) and PET-blot assays to further substantiate these findings are on the way, as well as bioassays in bank voles and transgenic mice. 

At present, a total of 10 animals are sacrificed and read-outs are ongoing. Preclinical incubation of the remaining macaques covers a range from 6.4 to 7.10 years. Based on the species barrier and an incubation time of > 5 years for BSE in macaques and about 10 years for scrapie in macaques, we expected an onset of clinical disease beyond 6 years post inoculation. 

PRION 2017 DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS 

 Subject: PRION 2017 CONFERENCE DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS VIDEO

PRION 2017 CONFERENCE DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS

PRION 2017 CONFERENCE VIDEO



Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion to Humans, who makes that final call, when, or, has it already happened?

TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2017

PRION 2017 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress


TUESDAY, JULY 04, 2017

*** PRION 2017 CONFERENCE ABSTRACTS ON CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION ***


TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 2017

PRION 2017 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT Chronic Wasting Disease in European moose is associated with PrPSc features different from North American CWD


URINE

SUNDAY, JULY 16, 2017

*** Temporal patterns of chronic wasting disease prion excretion in three cervid species ***


WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 2017

Chronic wasting disease continues to spread Disease of cervids causing local population declines


TUESDAY, JULY 18, 2017 

MINK FARMING USA TRANSMISSIBLE MINK ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING



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Transmission Studies 
 
Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and compared with natural cases resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with repeated episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became affected, it is believed through contamination of inoculam (?saline). 
 
Further CWD transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and squirrel monkey. Transmission occurred in all of these species with the shortest incubation period in the ferret. 
 
 
LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$
 
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
 
 
Molecular Barriers to Zoonotic Transmission of Prions
 
 *** chronic wasting disease, there was no absolute barrier to conversion of the human prion protein.
 
 *** Furthermore, the form of human PrPres produced in this in vitro assay when seeded with CWD, resembles that found in the most common human prion disease, namely sCJD of the MM1 subtype.
 
 
 
*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). ***
 
*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). ***
 
*** The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04). ***
 
There is some evidence that risk of CJD INCREASES WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY OF LAMB EATING (p = 0.02).
 
The evidence for such an association between beef eating and CJD is weaker (p = 0.14). When only controls for whom a relative was interviewed are included, this evidence becomes a little STRONGER (p = 0.08).
 
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It was found that when veal was included in the model with another exposure, the association between veal and CJD remained statistically significant (p = < 0.05 for all exposures), while the other exposures ceased to be statistically significant (p = > 0.05).
 
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In conclusion, an analysis of dietary histories revealed statistical associations between various meats/animal products and INCREASED RISK OF CJD. When some account was taken of possible confounding, the association between VEAL EATING AND RISK OF CJD EMERGED AS THE STRONGEST OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS STATISTICALLY. ...
 
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In the study in the USA, a range of foodstuffs were associated with an increased risk of CJD, including liver consumption which was associated with an apparent SIX-FOLD INCREASE IN THE RISK OF CJD. By comparing the data from 3 studies in relation to this particular dietary factor, the risk of liver consumption became non-significant with an odds ratio of 1.2 (PERSONAL COMMUNICATION, PROFESSOR A. HOFMAN. ERASMUS UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM). (???...TSS)
 
snip...see full report ;
 
 
you can see more evidence here ;
 
 
*** WDA 2016 NEW YORK *** 
 
We found that CWD adapts to a new host more readily than BSE and that human PrP was unexpectedly prone to misfolding by CWD prions. 
 
In addition, we investigated the role of specific regions of the bovine, deer and human PrP protein in resistance to conversion by prions from another species. 
 
We have concluded that the human protein has a region that confers unusual susceptibility to conversion by CWD prions. 
 
Student Presentations Session 2 
 
The species barriers and public health threat of CWD and BSE prions 
 
Ms. Kristen Davenport1, Dr. Davin Henderson1, Dr. Candace Mathiason1, Dr. Edward Hoover1 1Colorado State University 
 
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is spreading rapidly through cervid populations in the USA. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, mad cow disease) arose in the 1980s because cattle were fed recycled animal protein. These and other prion diseases are caused by abnormal folding of the normal prion protein (PrP) into a disease causing form (PrPd), which is pathogenic to nervous system cells and can cause subsequent PrP to misfold. CWD spreads among cervids very efficiently, but it has not yet infected humans. On the other hand, BSE was spread only when cattle consumed infected bovine or ovine tissue, but did infect humans and other species. The objective of this research is to understand the role of PrP structure in cross-species infection by CWD and BSE. To study the propensity of each species’ PrP to be induced to misfold by the presence of PrPd from verious species, we have used an in vitro system that permits detection of PrPd in real-time. We measured the conversion efficiency of various combinations of PrPd seeds and PrP substrate combinations. We observed the cross-species behavior of CWD and BSE, in addition to feline-adapted CWD and BSE. We found that CWD adapts to a new host more readily than BSE and that human PrP was unexpectedly prone to misfolding by CWD prions. In addition, we investigated the role of specific regions of the bovine, deer and human PrP protein in resistance to conversion by prions from another species. 
 
***We have concluded that the human protein has a region that confers unusual susceptibility to conversion by CWD prions. 
 
CWD is unique among prion diseases in its rapid spread in natural populations. BSE prions are essentially unaltered upon passage to a new species, while CWD adapts to the new species. This adaptation has consequences for surveillance of humans exposed to CWD. 
 
Wildlife Disease Risk Communication Research Contributes to Wildlife Trust Administration Exploring perceptions about chronic wasting disease risks among wildlife and agriculture professionals and stakeholders 
 
 
PRION 2016 TOKYO 
 
Zoonotic Potential of CWD Prions: An Update 
 
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a widespread and highly transmissible prion disease in free-ranging and captive cervid species in North America. The zoonotic potential of CWD prions is a serious public health concern, but the susceptibility of human CNS and peripheral organs to CWD prions remains largely unresolved. We reported earlier that peripheral and CNS infections were detected in transgenic mice expressing human PrP129M or PrP129V. Here we will present an update on this project, including evidence for strain dependence and influence of cervid PrP polymorphisms on CWD zoonosis as well as the characteristics of experimental human CWD prions. 
 
PRION 2016 TOKYO In Conjunction with Asia Pacific Prion Symposium 2016 PRION 2016 Tokyo Prion 2016 
 
 
Cervid to human prion transmission 
 
Kong, Qingzhong 
 
Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States 
 
Abstract 
 
Prion disease is transmissible and invariably fatal. Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the prion disease affecting deer, elk and moose, and it is a widespread and expanding epidemic affecting 22 US States and 2 Canadian provinces so far. CWD poses the most serious zoonotic prion transmission risks in North America because of huge venison consumption (>6 million deer/elk hunted and consumed annually in the USA alone), significant prion infectivity in muscles and other tissues/fluids from CWD-affected cervids, and usually high levels of individual exposure to CWD resulting from consumption of the affected animal among often just family and friends. However, we still do not know whether CWD prions can infect humans in the brain or peripheral tissues or whether clinical/asymptomatic CWD zoonosis has already occurred, and we have no essays to reliably detect CWD infection in humans. We hypothesize that: 
 
(1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues; 
 
(2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence; 
 
(3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans; and 
 
(4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches. 
 
Aim 1 will prove that the classical CWD strain may infect humans in brain or peripheral lymphoid tissues at low levels by conducting systemic bioassays in a set of "humanized" Tg mouse lines expressing common human PrP variants using a number of CWD isolates at varying doses and routes. Experimental "human CWD" samples will also be generated for Aim 3. 
 
Aim 2 will test the hypothesis that the cervid-to-human prion transmission barrier is dependent on prion strain and influenced by the host (human) PrP sequence by examining and comparing the transmission efficiency and phenotypes of several atypical/unusual CWD isolates/strains as well as a few prion strains from other species that have adapted to cervid PrP sequence, utilizing the same panel of humanized Tg mouse lines as in Aim 1. 
 
Aim 3 will establish reliable essays for detection and surveillance of CWD infection in humans by examining in details the clinical, pathological, biochemical and in vitro seeding properties of existing and future experimental "human CWD" samples generated from Aims 1-2 and compare them with those of common sporadic human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) prions. 
 
Aim 4 will attempt to detect clinical CWD-affected human cases by examining a significant number of brain samples from prion-affected human subjects in the USA and Canada who have consumed venison from CWD-endemic areas utilizing the criteria and essays established in Aim 3. The findings from this proposal will greatly advance our understandings on the potential and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for CWD zoonosis and potentially discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans. 
 
Public Health Relevance There are significant and increasing human exposure to cervid prions because chronic wasting disease (CWD, a widespread and highly infectious prion disease among deer and elk in North America) continues spreading and consumption of venison remains popular, but our understanding on cervid-to-human prion transmission is still very limited, raising public health concerns. This proposal aims to define the zoonotic risks of cervid prions and set up and apply essays to detect CWD zoonosis using mouse models and in vitro methods. The findings will greatly expand our knowledge on the potentials and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for such infections and may discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans. 
 
 
Key Molecular Mechanisms of TSEs 
 
Zabel, Mark D. 
 
Colorado State University-Fort Collins, Fort Collins, CO, United States 
 
Abstract Prion diseases, or transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), are fatal neurodegenerative diseases affecting humans, cervids, bovids, and ovids. The absolute requirement of PrPC expression to generate prion diseases and the lack of instructional nucleic acid define prions as unique infectious agents. Prions exhibit species-specific tropism, inferring that unique prion strains exist that preferentially infct certain host species and confront transmission barriers to heterologous host species. However, transmission barriers are not absolute. Scientific consensus agrees that the sheep TSE scrapie probably breached the transmission barrier to cattle causing bovine spongiform encephalopathy that subsequently breached the human transmission barrier and likely caused several hundred deaths by a new-variant form of the human TSE Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the UK and Europe. The impact to human health, emotion and economies can still be felt in areas like farming, blood and organ donations and the threat of a latent TSE epidemic. This precedent raises the real possibility of other TSEs, like chronic wasting disease of cervids, overcoming similar human transmission barriers. A groundbreaking discovery made last year revealed that mice infected with heterologous prion strains facing significant transmission barriers replicated prions far more readily in spleens than brains6. Furthermore, these splenic prions exhibited weakened transmission barriers and expanded host ranges compared to neurogenic prions. These data question conventional wisdom of avoiding neural tissue to avoid prion xenotransmission, when more promiscuous prions may lurk in extraneural tissues. Data derived from work previously funded by NIH demonstrate that Complement receptors CD21/35 bind prions and high density PrPC and differentially impact prion disease depending on the prion isolate or strain used. Recent advances in live animal and whole organ imaging have led us to generate preliminary data to support novel, innovative approaches to assessing prion capture and transport. We plan to test our unifying hypothesis for this proposal that CD21/35 control the processes of peripheral prion capture, transport, strain selection and xenotransmission in the following specific aims. 
 
1. Assess the role of CD21/35 in splenic prion strain selection and host range expansion. 
 
2. Determine whether CD21/35 and C1q differentially bind distinct prion strains 
 
3. Monitor the effects of CD21/35 on prion trafficking in real time and space 
 
4. Assess the role of CD21/35 in incunabular prion trafficking 
 
Public Health Relevance Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, or prion diseases, are devastating illnesses that greatly impact public health, agriculture and wildlife in North America and around the world. The impact to human health, emotion and economies can still be felt in areas like farming, blood and organ donations and the threat of a latent TSE epidemic. This precedent raises the real possibility of other TSEs, like chronic wasting disease (CWD) of cervids, overcoming similar human transmission barriers. Early this year Canada reported its first case of BSE in over a decade audits first case of CWD in farmed elk in three years, underscoring the need for continued vigilance and research. Identifying mechanisms of transmission and zoonoses remains an extremely important and intense area of research that will benefit human and other animal populations. 
 
 
PMCA Detection of CWD Infection in Cervid and Non-Cervid Species 
 
Hoover, Edward Arthur 
 
Colorado State University-Fort Collins, Fort Collins, CO, United States 
 
 
LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$ 
 
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).*** 
 
 
 
Molecular Barriers to Zoonotic Transmission of Prions
 
 *** chronic wasting disease, there was no absolute barrier to conversion of the human prion protein.
 
 *** Furthermore, the form of human PrPres produced in this in vitro assay when seeded with CWD, resembles that found in the most common human prion disease, namely sCJD of the MM1 subtype.
 
 
 
SPONTANEOUS ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
 
***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***
 
 
Envt.07: 
 
Pathological Prion Protein (PrPTSE) in Skeletal Muscles of Farmed and Free Ranging White-Tailed Deer Infected with Chronic Wasting Disease 
 
***The presence and seeding activity of PrPTSE in skeletal muscle from CWD-infected cervids suggests prevention of such tissue in the human diet as a precautionary measure for food safety, pending on further clarification of whether CWD may be transmissible to humans. 
 
Yet, it has to be noted that our assessments of PrPTSE levels in skeletal muscles were based on findings in presumably pre- or subclinically infected animals. Therefore, the concentration of PrPTSE in skeletal muscles of WTD with clinically manifest CWD may possibly exceed our estimate which refers to clinically inconspicuous animals that are more likely to enter the human food chain. Our tissue blot findings in skeletal muscles from CWD-infected WTD would be consistent with an anterograde spread of CWD prions via motor nerve fibres to muscle tissue (figure 4A). Similar neural spreading pathways of muscle infection were previously found in hamsters orally challenged with scrapie [28] and suggested by the detection of PrPTSE in muscle fibres and muscle-associated nerve fascicles of clinically-ill non-human primates challenged with BSE prions [29]. Whether the absence of detectable PrPTSE in myofibers observed in our study is a specific feature of CWD in WTD, or was due to a pre- or subclinical stage of infection in the examined animals, remains to be established. In any case, our observations support previous findings suggesting the precautionary prevention of muscle tissue from CWD-infected WTD in the human diet, and highlight the need to comprehensively elucidate of whether CWD may be transmissible to humans. While the understanding of TSEs in cervids has made substantial progress during the past few years, the assessment and management of risks possibly emanating from prions in skeletal muscles of CWD-infected cervids requires further research. 
 
 
 
Prions in Skeletal Muscles of Deer with Chronic Wasting Disease 
 
Rachel C. Angers1,*, Shawn R. Browning1,*,†, Tanya S. Seward2, Christina J. Sigurdson4,‡, Michael W. Miller5, Edward A. Hoover4, Glenn C. Telling1,2,3,§ + Author Affiliations
 
1 Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Molecular Genetics, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40536, USA. 2 Sanders Brown Center on Aging, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40536, USA. 3 Department of Neurology, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40536, USA. 4 Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523, USA. 5 Colorado Division of Wildlife, Wildlife Research Center, Fort Collins, CO 80526, USA. § To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: gtell2@uky.edu * These authors contributed equally to this work. 
 
† Present address: Department of Infectology, Scripps Research Institute, 5353 Parkside Drive, RF-2, Jupiter, FL 33458, USA. 
 
‡ Present address: Institute of Neuropathology, University of Zurich, Schmelzbergstrasse 12, 8091 Zurich, Switzerland. 
 
Abstract The emergence of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in deer and elk in an increasingly wide geographic area, as well as the interspecies transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy to humans in the form of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease, have raised concerns about the zoonotic potential of CWD. Because meat consumption is the most likely means of exposure, it is important to determine whether skeletal muscle of diseased cervids contains prion infectivity. Here bioassays in transgenic mice expressing cervid prion protein revealed the presence of infectious prions in skeletal muscles of CWD-infected deer, demonstrating that humans consuming or handling meat from CWD-infected deer are at risk to prion exposure. 
 
 
Exotic Meats USA Announces Urgent Statewide Recall of Elk Tenderloin Because It May Contain Meat Derived From An Elk Confirmed To Have Chronic Wasting Disease 
 
Contact: Exotic Meats USA 1-800-680-4375
 
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE -- February 9, 2009 -- Exotic Meats USA of San Antonio, TX is initiating a voluntary recall of Elk Tenderloin because it may contain meat derived from an elk confirmed to have Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD). The meat with production dates of December 29, 30 and 31, 2008 was purchased from Sierra Meat Company in Reno, NV. The infected elk came from Elk Farm LLC in Pine Island, MN and was among animals slaughtered and processed at USDA facility Noah’s Ark Processors LLC.
 
Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) is a fatal brain and nervous system disease found in elk and deer. The disease is caused by an abnormally shaped protein called a prion, which can damage the brain and nerves of animals in the deer family. Currently, it is believed that the prion responsible for causing CWD in deer and elk is not capable of infecting humans who eat deer or elk contaminated with the prion, but the observation of animal-to-human transmission of other prion-mediated diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), has raised a theoretical concern regarding the transmission of CWD from deer or elk to humans. At the present time, FDA believes the risk of becoming ill from eating CWD-positive elk or deer meat is remote. However, FDA strongly advises consumers to return the product to the place of purchase, rather than disposing of it themselves, due to environmental concerns.
 
Exotic Meats USA purchased 1 case of Elk Tenderloins weighing 16.9 lbs. The Elk Tenderloin was sold from January 16 – 27, 2009. The Elk Tenderloins was packaged in individual vacuum packs weighing approximately 3 pounds each. A total of six packs of the Elk Tenderloins were sold to the public at the Exotic Meats USA retail store. Consumers who still have the Elk Tenderloins should return the product to Exotic Meats USA at 1003 NE Loop 410, San Antonio, TX 78209. Customers with concerns or questions about the Voluntary Elk Recall can call 1-800-680-4375. The safety of our customer has always been and always will be our number one priority.
 
Exotic Meats USA requests that for those customers who have products with the production dates in question, do not consume or sell them and return them to the point of purchase. Customers should return the product to the vendor. The vendor should return it to the distributor and the distributor should work with the state to decide upon how best to dispose. If the consumer is disposing of the product he/she should consult with the local state EPA office.
 
#
 
 
COLORADO: Farmer's market meat recalled after testing positive for CWD
 
24.dec.08 9News.com Jeffrey Wolf
 
Elk meat that was sold at a farmer's market is being recalled because tests show it was infected with chronic wasting disease. The Boulder County Health Department and Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment issued the recall Wednesday after the meat was sold at the Boulder County Fairgrounds on Dec. 13. Although there isn't any human health risk connected with CWD, the recalled was issued as a precaution. About 15 elk were bought from a commercial ranch in Colorado in early December and processed at a licensed plant. All 15 were tested for CWD and one came up positive. The labeling on the product would have the following information: *Seller: High Wire Ranch *The type of cut: "chuck roast," "arm roast," "flat iron," "ribeye steak," "New York steak," "tenderloin," "sirloin tip roast," "medallions" or "ground meat." *Processor: Cedaredge Processing *The USDA triangle containing the number "34645" People with questions about this meat can contact John Pape, epidemiologist at the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment at 303-692-2628. 
 
 
COULD NOT FIND any warning or recalls on these two sites confirming their recall of CWD infected meat. ...TSS 
 
 
 
Wednesday, April 06, 2011 
 
Presence and Seeding Activity of Pathological Prion Protein (PrPTSE) in Skeletal Muscles of White-Tailed Deer Infected with Chronic Wasting Disease 
 
 
Prion Infectivity in Fat of Deer with Chronic Wasting Disease
 
Brent Race,# Kimberly Meade-White,# Richard Race, and Bruce Chesebro* Rocky Mountain Laboratories, 903 South 4th Street, Hamilton, Montana 59840
 
Received 2 June 2009/ Accepted 24 June 2009
 
ABSTRACT Top ABSTRACT TEXT REFERENCES
 
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a neurodegenerative prion disease of cervids. Some animal prion diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, can infect humans; however, human susceptibility to CWD is unknown. In ruminants, prion infectivity is found in central nervous system and lymphoid tissues, with smaller amounts in intestine and muscle. In mice, prion infectivity was recently detected in fat. Since ruminant fat is consumed by humans and fed to animals, we determined infectivity titers in fat from two CWD-infected deer. Deer fat devoid of muscle contained low levels of CWD infectivity and might be a risk factor for prion infection of other species.
 
snip...
 
The highest risk of human contact with CWD might be through exposure to high-titer CNS tissue through accidental skin cuts or corneal contact at the time of harvest and butchering. However, the likelihood of a human consuming fat infected with a low titer of the CWD agent is much higher. It is impossible to remove all the fat present within muscle tissue, and fat consumption is inevitable when eating meat. Of additional concern is the fact that meat from an individual deer harvested by a hunter is typically consumed over multiple meals by the same group of people. These individuals would thus have multiple exposures to the CWD agent over time, which might increase the chance for transfer of infection.
 
In the Rocky Mountain region of North America, wild deer are subject to predation by wolves, coyotes, bears, and mountain lions. Although canines such as wolves and coyotes are not known to be susceptible to prion diseases, felines definitely are susceptible to BSE (9) and might also be infected by the CWD agent. Deer infected with the CWD agent are more likely to be killed by predators such as mountain lions (11). Peripheral tissues, including lymph nodes, muscle, and fat, which harbor prion infectivity are more accessible for consumption than CNS tissue, which has the highest level of infectivity late in disease. Therefore, infectivity in these peripheral tissues may be important in potential cross-species CWD transmissions in the wild.
 
The present finding of CWD infectivity in deer fat tissue raises the possibility that prion infectivity might also be found in fat tissue of other infected ruminants, such as sheep and cattle, whose fat and muscle tissues are more widely distributed in both the human and domestic-animal food chains. Although the infectivity in fat tissues is low compared to that in the CNS, there may be significant differences among species and between prion strains. Two fat samples from BSE agent-infected cattle were reported to be negative by bioassay in nontransgenic RIII mice (3, 6). However, RIII mice are 10,000-fold-less sensitive to BSE agent infection than transgenic mice expressing bovine PrP (4). It would be prudent to carry out additional infectivity assays on fat from BSE agent-infected cattle and scrapie agent-infected sheep using appropriate transgenic mice or homologous species to determine the risk from these sources.
 
 
*** now, let’s see what the authors said about this casual link, personal communications years ago, and then the latest on the zoonotic potential from CWD to humans from the TOKYO PRION 2016 CONFERENCE.
 
see where it is stated NO STRONG evidence. so, does this mean there IS casual evidence ???? “Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans”
 
From: TSS (216-119-163-189.ipset45.wt.net)
 
Subject: CWD aka MAD DEER/ELK TO HUMANS ???
 
Date: September 30, 2002 at 7:06 am PST
 
From: "Belay, Ermias"
 
To: Cc: "Race, Richard (NIH)" ; ; "Belay, Ermias"
 
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 9:22 AM
 
Subject: RE: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
 
Dear Sir/Madam,
 
In the Archives of Neurology you quoted (the abstract of which was attached to your email), we did not say CWD in humans will present like variant CJD. That assumption would be wrong. I encourage you to read the whole article and call me if you have questions or need more clarification (phone: 404-639-3091). Also, we do not claim that "no-one has ever been infected with prion disease from eating venison." Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans in the article you quoted or in any other forum is limited to the patients we investigated.
 
Ermias Belay, M.D. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
 
-----Original Message-----
 
From: Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2002 10:15 AM
 
 
Subject: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS
 
Sunday, November 10, 2002 6:26 PM ......snip........end..............TSS
 
Thursday, April 03, 2008
 
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008 1: Vet Res. 2008 Apr 3;39(4):41 A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease Sigurdson CJ.
 
snip...
 
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,
 
snip... full text ;
 
 
In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells
 
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...
 
 
snip...see full text ;
 
 
Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. snip... The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle... 
 
 
 
 
In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells 3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ... 
 
 
The occurrence of CWD must be viewed against the contest of the locations in which it occurred. It was an incidental and unwelcome complication of the respective wildlife research programmes. Despite it’s subsequent recognition as a new disease of cervids, therefore justifying direct investigation, no specific research funding was forthcoming. The USDA veiwed it as a wildlife problem and consequently not their province! ...page 26. 
 
 
*** Spraker suggested an interesting explanation for the occurrence of CWD. The deer pens at the Foot Hills Campus were built some 30-40 years ago by a Dr. Bob Davis. At or abut that time, allegedly, some scrapie work was conducted at this site. When deer were introduced to the pens they occupied ground that had previously been occupied by sheep. 
 
 
Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES
 
Location: Virus and Prion Research
 
Title: Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease
 
Author item Moore, Sarah item Kunkle, Robert item Kondru, Naveen item Manne, Sireesha item Smith, Jodi item Kanthasamy, Anumantha item West Greenlee, M item Greenlee, Justin
 
Submitted to: Prion Publication Type: Abstract Only Publication Acceptance Date: 3/15/2017 Publication Date: N/A Citation: N/A Interpretive Summary:
 
Technical Abstract: Aims: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a naturally-occurring, fatal neurodegenerative disease of cervids. We previously demonstrated that disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) can be detected in the brain and retina from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent. In that study, neurological signs consistent with prion disease were observed only in one pig: an intracranially challenged pig that was euthanized at 64 months post-challenge. The purpose of this study was to use an antigen-capture immunoassay (EIA) and real-time quaking-induced conversion (QuIC) to determine whether PrPSc is present in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the CWD agent.
 
Methods: At two months of age, crossbred pigs were challenged by the intracranial route (n=20), oral route (n=19), or were left unchallenged (n=9). At approximately 6 months of age, the time at which commercial pigs reach market weight, half of the pigs in each group were culled (<6 challenge="" groups="" month="" pigs="" remaining="" the="">6 month challenge groups) were allowed to incubate for up to 73 months post challenge (mpc). The retropharyngeal lymph node (RPLN) was screened for the presence of PrPSc by EIA and immunohistochemistry (IHC). The RPLN, palatine tonsil, and mesenteric lymph node (MLN) from 6-7 pigs per challenge group were also tested using EIA and QuIC.
 
Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 5="" 6="" at="" by="" detected="" eia.="" examined="" group="" in="" intracranial="" least="" lymphoid="" month="" months="" of="" one="" pigs="" positive="" prpsc="" quic="" the="" tissues="" was="">6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 4="" and="" group="" months="" oral="">6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). Conclusions:
 
This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge.
 
CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease.
 
Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
 
 
CONFIDENTIAL
 
EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
 
While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...
 
 
we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.
 
 
 Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....
 
 
 snip...see much more here ;
 
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 05, 2017
 
Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease
 
 
TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017 
 
*** EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP ***
 
 
TUESDAY, MARCH 28, 2017 
 
*** Passage of scrapie to deer results in a new phenotype upon return passage to sheep ***
 
 
MONDAY, MARCH 13, 2017
 
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION UDATE March 13, 2017
 
 
SATURDAY, JANUARY 14, 2017 
 
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION GLOBAL UPDATE JANUARY 14, 2017
 
 
 
In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible. For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.
 
snip...
 
Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.
 
snip...
 
What is the risk of chronic wasting disease being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012
 
 
Thursday, April 07, 2016
 
What is the risk of chronic wasting disease being introduced into Great Britain? An updated Qualitative Risk Assessment March 2016
 
 
Subject: DEFRA What is the risk of a cervid TSE being introduced from Norway into Great Britain? Qualitative Risk Assessment September 2016
 
Friday, September 30, 2016
 
DEFRA What is the risk of a cervid TSE being introduced from Norway into Great Britain? Qualitative Risk Assessment September 2016
 
 
 
Scientific Opinion
 
Chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids
 
Authors
 
EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ),
 
First published: 18 January 2017Full publication history
DOI: 10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4667View/save citation
 
 
 
TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 2017
 
Norway Confirms 6th Case of Skrantesjuke CWD TSE Prion Disease
 
 
Tuesday, December 13, 2016
 
Norway Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion disease Skrantesjuke December 2016 Update
 
 
Thursday, September 22, 2016
 
NORWAY DETECTS 5TH CASE OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION Skrantesjuke
 
 
Saturday, September 03, 2016
 
NORWAY Regulation concerning temporary measures to reduce the spread of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) as 4th case of skrantesjuke confirmed in Sogn og Fjordane
 
 
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
 
*** NORWAY CONFIRMS 4TH CASE OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION IN SECOND CARIBOU
 
 
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
 
NORWAY CONFIRMS 4TH CASE OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION IN SECOND CARIBOU
 
 
Tuesday, August 02, 2016
 
Chronic wasting disease of deer – is the battle to keep Europe free already lost?
 
 
Tuesday, June 14, 2016
 
*** Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in a moose from Selbu in Sør-Trøndelag Norway ***
 
 
Thursday, July 07, 2016
 
Norway reports a third case Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion in 2nd Norwegian moose
 
14/06/2016 - Norway reports a third case
 
 
Saturday, July 16, 2016
 
Chronic wasting Disease in Deer (CWD or Spongiform Encephalopathy) The British Deer Society 07/04/2016
 
Red Deer Ataxia or Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE PRION?
 
could this have been cwd in the UK back in 1970’S ???
 
 
 
 
 
SEE FULL TEXT ;
 
 
Using in vitro prion replication for high sensitive detection of prions and prionlike proteins and for understanding mechanisms of transmission. 
 
Claudio Soto Mitchell Center for Alzheimer's diseases and related Brain disorders, Department of Neurology, University of Texas Medical School at Houston. 
 
***Recently, we have been using PMCA to study the role of environmental prion contamination on the horizontal spreading of TSEs. These experiments have focused on the study of the interaction of prions with plants and environmentally relevant surfaces. Our results show that plants (both leaves and roots) bind tightly to prions present in brain extracts and excreta (urine and feces) and retain even small quantities of PrPSc for long periods of time. Strikingly, ingestion of prioncontaminated leaves and roots produced disease with a 100% attack rate and an incubation period not substantially longer than feeding animals directly with scrapie brain homogenate. Furthermore, plants can uptake prions from contaminated soil and transport them to different parts of the plant tissue (stem and leaves). Similarly, prions bind tightly to a variety of environmentally relevant surfaces, including stones, wood, metals, plastic, glass, cement, etc. Prion contaminated surfaces efficiently transmit prion disease when these materials were directly injected into the brain of animals and strikingly when the contaminated surfaces were just placed in the animal cage. These findings demonstrate that environmental materials can efficiently bind infectious prions and act as carriers of infectivity, suggesting that they may play an important role in the horizontal transmission of the disease. 
 
======================== 
 
Since its invention 13 years ago, PMCA has helped to answer fundamental questions of prion propagation and has broad applications in research areas including the food industry, blood bank safety and human and veterinary disease diagnosis. 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the results in the current study indicate that removal of furniture that had been in contact with scrapie-infected animals should be recommended, particularly since cleaning and decontamination may not effectively remove scrapie infectivity (31), even though infectivity declines considerably if the pasture and the field furniture have not been in contact with scrapie-infected sheep for several months. As sPMCA failed to detect PrPSc in furniture that was subjected to weathering, even though exposure led to infection in sheep, this method may not always be reliable in predicting the risk of scrapie infection through environmental contamination. These results suggest that the VRQ/VRQ sheep model may be more sensitive than sPMCA for the detection of environmentally associated scrapie, and suggest that extremely low levels of scrapie contamination are able to cause infection in susceptible sheep genotypes. 
 
Keywords: classical scrapie, prion, transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, sheep, field furniture, reservoir, serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification 
 
 
Wednesday, December 16, 2015 
 
*** Objects in contact with classical scrapie sheep act as a reservoir for scrapie transmission *** 
 
 
*** Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years *** 
 
Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3 
 
 
with CWD TSE Prions, I am not sure there is any absolute yet, other than what we know with transmission studies, and we know tse prion kill, and tse prion are bad. science shows to date, that indeed soil, dirt, some better than others, can act as a carrier. same with objects, farm furniture. take it with how ever many grains of salt you wish, or not. if load factor plays a role in the end formula, then everything should be on the table, in my opinion...tss
 
 
 Oral Transmissibility of Prion Disease Is Enhanced by Binding to Soil Particles
 
Author Summary
 
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are a group of incurable neurological diseases likely caused by a misfolded form of the prion protein. TSEs include scrapie in sheep, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (‘‘mad cow’’ disease) in cattle, chronic wasting disease in deer and elk, and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. Scrapie and chronic wasting disease are unique among TSEs because they can be transmitted between animals, and the disease agents appear to persist in environments previously inhabited by infected animals. Soil has been hypothesized to act as a reservoir of infectivity and to bind the infectious agent. In the current study, we orally dosed experimental animals with a common clay mineral, montmorillonite, or whole soils laden with infectious prions, and compared the transmissibility to unbound agent. We found that prions bound to montmorillonite and whole soils remained orally infectious, and, in most cases, increased the oral transmission of disease compared to the unbound agent. The results presented in this study suggest that soil may contribute to environmental spread of TSEs by increasing the transmissibility of small amounts of infectious agent in the environment.
 
 
tse prion soil
 
 
 
 
 
Wednesday, December 16, 2015
 
Objects in contact with classical scrapie sheep act as a reservoir for scrapie transmission
 
 
The sources of dust borne prions are unknown but it seems reasonable to assume that faecal, urine, skin, parturient material and saliva-derived prions may contribute to this mobile environmental reservoir of infectivity. This work highlights a possible transmission route for scrapie within the farm environment, and this is likely to be paralleled in CWD which shows strong similarities with scrapie in terms of prion dissemination and disease transmission. The data indicate that the presence of scrapie prions in dust is likely to make the control of these diseases a considerable challenge.
 
 
>>>Particle-associated PrPTSE molecules may migrate from locations of deposition via transport processes affecting soil particles, including entrainment in and movement with air and overland flow. <<<
 
Fate of Prions in Soil: A Review
 
Christen B. Smith, Clarissa J. Booth, and Joel A. Pedersen*
 
Several reports have shown that prions can persist in soil for several years. Significant interest remains in developing methods that could be applied to degrade PrPTSE in naturally contaminated soils. Preliminary research suggests that serine proteases and the microbial consortia in stimulated soils and compost may partially degrade PrPTSE. Transition metal oxides in soil (viz. manganese oxide) may also mediate prion inactivation. Overall, the effect of prion attachment to soil particles on its persistence in the environment is not well understood, and additional study is needed to determine its implications on the environmental transmission of scrapie and CWD.
 
 
P.161: Prion soil binding may explain efficient horizontal CWD transmission
 
Conclusion. Silty clay loam exhibits highly efficient prion binding, inferring a durable environmental reservoir, and an efficient mechanism for indirect horizontal CWD transmission.
 
 
>>>Another alternative would be an absolute prohibition on the movement of deer within the state for any purpose. While this alternative would significantly reduce the potential spread of CWD, it would also have the simultaneous effect of preventing landowners and land managers from implementing popular management strategies involving the movement of deer, and would deprive deer breeders of the ability to engage in the business of buying and selling breeder deer. Therefore, this alternative was rejected because the department determined that it placed an avoidable burden on the regulated community.<<<
 
Wednesday, December 16, 2015
 
Objects in contact with classical scrapie sheep act as a reservoir for scrapie transmission
 
Timm Konold1*, Stephen A. C. Hawkins2, Lisa C. Thurston3, Ben C. Maddison4, Kevin C. Gough5, Anthony Duarte1 and Hugh A. Simmons1
 
1 Animal Sciences Unit, Animal and Plant Health Agency Weybridge, Addlestone, UK, 2 Pathology Department, Animal and Plant Health Agency Weybridge, Addlestone, UK, 3 Surveillance and Laboratory Services, Animal and Plant Health Agency Penrith, Penrith, UK, 4 ADAS UK, School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, UK, 5 School of Veterinary Medicine and Science, University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington, UK
 
Classical scrapie is an environmentally transmissible prion disease of sheep and goats. Prions can persist and remain potentially infectious in the environment for many years and thus pose a risk of infecting animals after re-stocking. In vitro studies using serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification (sPMCA) have suggested that objects on a scrapie affected sheep farm could contribute to disease transmission. This in vivo study aimed to determine the role of field furniture (water troughs, feeding troughs, fencing, and other objects that sheep may rub against) used by a scrapie-infected sheep flock as a vector for disease transmission to scrapie-free lambs with the prion protein genotype VRQ/VRQ, which is associated with high susceptibility to classical scrapie. When the field furniture was placed in clean accommodation, sheep became infected when exposed to either a water trough (four out of five) or to objects used for rubbing (four out of seven). This field furniture had been used by the scrapie-infected flock 8 weeks earlier and had previously been shown to harbor scrapie prions by sPMCA. Sheep also became infected (20 out of 23) through exposure to contaminated field furniture placed within pasture not used by scrapie-infected sheep for 40 months, even though swabs from this furniture tested negative by PMCA. This infection rate decreased (1 out of 12) on the same paddock after replacement with clean field furniture. Twelve grazing sheep exposed to field furniture not in contact with scrapie-infected sheep for 18 months remained scrapie free. The findings of this study highlight the role of field furniture used by scrapie-infected sheep to act as a reservoir for disease re-introduction although infectivity declines considerably if the field furniture has not been in contact with scrapie-infected sheep for several months. PMCA may not be as sensitive as VRQ/VRQ sheep to test for environmental contamination.
 
snip...
 
Discussion
 
Classical scrapie is an environmentally transmissible disease because it has been reported in naïve, supposedly previously unexposed sheep placed in pastures formerly occupied by scrapie-infected sheep (4, 19, 20). Although the vector for disease transmission is not known, soil is likely to be an important reservoir for prions (2) where – based on studies in rodents – prions can adhere to minerals as a biologically active form (21) and remain infectious for more than 2 years (22). Similarly, chronic wasting disease (CWD) has re-occurred in mule deer housed in paddocks used by infected deer 2 years earlier, which was assumed to be through foraging and soil consumption (23).
 
Our study suggested that the risk of acquiring scrapie infection was greater through exposure to contaminated wooden, plastic, and metal surfaces via water or food troughs, fencing, and hurdles than through grazing. Drinking from a water trough used by the scrapie flock was sufficient to cause infection in sheep in a clean building. Exposure to fences and other objects used for rubbing also led to infection, which supported the hypothesis that skin may be a vector for disease transmission (9). The risk of these objects to cause infection was further demonstrated when 87% of 23 sheep presented with PrPSc in lymphoid tissue after grazing on one of the paddocks, which contained metal hurdles, a metal lamb creep and a water trough in contact with the scrapie flock up to 8 weeks earlier, whereas no infection had been demonstrated previously in sheep grazing on this paddock, when equipped with new fencing and field furniture. When the contaminated furniture and fencing were removed, the infection rate dropped significantly to 8% of 12 sheep, with soil of the paddock as the most likely source of infection caused by shedding of prions from the scrapie-infected sheep in this paddock up to a week earlier.
 
This study also indicated that the level of contamination of field furniture sufficient to cause infection was dependent on two factors: stage of incubation period and time of last use by scrapie-infected sheep. Drinking from a water trough that had been used by scrapie sheep in the predominantly pre-clinical phase did not appear to cause infection, whereas infection was shown in sheep drinking from the water trough used by scrapie sheep in the later stage of the disease. It is possible that contamination occurred through shedding of prions in saliva, which may have contaminated the surface of the water trough and subsequently the water when it was refilled. Contamination appeared to be sufficient to cause infection only if the trough was in contact with sheep that included clinical cases. Indeed, there is an increased risk of bodily fluid infectivity with disease progression in scrapie (24) and CWD (25) based on PrPSc detection by sPMCA. Although ultraviolet light and heat under natural conditions do not inactivate prions (26), furniture in contact with the scrapie flock, which was assumed to be sufficiently contaminated to cause infection, did not act as vector for disease if not used for 18 months, which suggest that the weathering process alone was sufficient to inactivate prions.
 
PrPSc detection by sPMCA is increasingly used as a surrogate for infectivity measurements by bioassay in sheep or mice. In this reported study, however, the levels of PrPSc present in the environment were below the limit of detection of the sPMCA method, yet were still sufficient to cause infection of in-contact animals. In the present study, the outdoor objects were removed from the infected flock 8 weeks prior to sampling and were positive by sPMCA at very low levels (2 out of 37 reactions). As this sPMCA assay also yielded 2 positive reactions out of 139 in samples from the scrapie-free farm, the sPMCA assay could not detect PrPSc on any of the objects above the background of the assay. False positive reactions with sPMCA at a low frequency associated with de novo formation of infectious prions have been reported (27, 28). This is in contrast to our previous study where we demonstrated that outdoor objects that had been in contact with the scrapie-infected flock up to 20 days prior to sampling harbored PrPSc that was detectable by sPMCA analysis [4 out of 15 reactions (12)] and was significantly more positive by the assay compared to analogous samples from the scrapie-free farm. This discrepancy could be due to the use of a different sPMCA substrate between the studies that may alter the efficiency of amplification of the environmental PrPSc. In addition, the present study had a longer timeframe between the objects being in contact with the infected flock and sampling, which may affect the levels of extractable PrPSc. Alternatively, there may be potentially patchy contamination of this furniture with PrPSc, which may have been missed by swabbing. The failure of sPMCA to detect CWD-associated PrP in saliva from clinically affected deer despite confirmation of infectivity in saliva-inoculated transgenic mice was associated with as yet unidentified inhibitors in saliva (29), and it is possible that the sensitivity of sPMCA is affected by other substances in the tested material. In addition, sampling of amplifiable PrPSc and subsequent detection by sPMCA may be more difficult from furniture exposed to weather, which is supported by the observation that PrPSc was detected by sPMCA more frequently in indoor than outdoor furniture (12). A recent experimental study has demonstrated that repeated cycles of drying and wetting of prion-contaminated soil, equivalent to what is expected under natural weathering conditions, could reduce PMCA amplification efficiency and extend the incubation period in hamsters inoculated with soil samples (30). This seems to apply also to this study even though the reduction in infectivity was more dramatic in the sPMCA assays than in the sheep model. Sheep were not kept until clinical end-point, which would have enabled us to compare incubation periods, but the lack of infection in sheep exposed to furniture that had not been in contact with scrapie sheep for a longer time period supports the hypothesis that prion degradation and subsequent loss of infectivity occurs even under natural conditions.
 
In conclusion, the results in the current study indicate that removal of furniture that had been in contact with scrapie-infected animals should be recommended, particularly since cleaning and decontamination may not effectively remove scrapie infectivity (31), even though infectivity declines considerably if the pasture and the field furniture have not been in contact with scrapie-infected sheep for several months. As sPMCA failed to detect PrPSc in furniture that was subjected to weathering, even though exposure led to infection in sheep, this method may not always be reliable in predicting the risk of scrapie infection through environmental contamination. These results suggest that the VRQ/VRQ sheep model may be more sensitive than sPMCA for the detection of environmentally associated scrapie, and suggest that extremely low levels of scrapie contamination are able to cause infection in susceptible sheep genotypes.
 
Keywords: classical scrapie, prion, transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, sheep, field furniture, reservoir, serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification
 
 
Wednesday, December 16, 2015
 
*** Objects in contact with classical scrapie sheep act as a reservoir for scrapie transmission ***
 
 
*** Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 years ***
 
Gudmundur Georgsson1, Sigurdur Sigurdarson2 and Paul Brown3
 
 
MONDAY, JUNE 12, 2017
 
Rethinking Major grain organizations opposition to CFIA's control zone approach to Chronic Wasting CWD TSE Prion Mad Deer Type Disease 2017?
 
 
WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2017
 
*** Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion aka Mad Deer Disease and the Real Estate Market Land Values ***
 
 
Tuesday, April 12, 2016
 
The first detection of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in Europe free-ranging reindeer from the Nordfjella population in South-Norway.
 
 
Saturday, April 9, 2016
 
The Norwegian Veterinary Institute (NVI, 2016) has reported a case of prion disease Cervid Spongiform Encephalopathy detected in free ranging wild reindeer (Rangifer tarandus tarandus)
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
 
 
Wednesday, September 28, 2016
 
Norway sides with OIE, decides to expose millions of consumers to the ATYPICAL BSE SRM TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease
 
 
Thursday, January 29, 2015
 
Atypical H-TYPE BSE Case Confirmed in Norway
 
 
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016 
 
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online 
 
 
 
 
*** O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
 
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
 
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
 
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
 
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
 
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
 
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
 
===============
 
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
 
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals. 
 
 
 -------- Original Message -------- 
 
Subject: re-BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD 
 
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2002 10:23:43 -0000 From: "Asante, Emmanuel A" e.asante@ic.ac.uk 
 
 
Dear Terry, 
 
I have been asked by Professor Collinge to respond to your request. I am a Senior Scientist in the MRC Prion Unit and the lead author on the paper. I have attached a pdf copy of the paper for your attention. 
 
Thank you for your interest in the paper. In respect of your first question, the simple answer is, ***yes. 
 
As you will find in the paper, we have managed to associate the alternate phenotype to type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. 
 
It is too early to be able to claim any further sub-classification in respect of Heidenhain variant CJD or Vicky Rimmer's version. 
 
It will take further studies, which are on-going, to establish if there are sub-types to our initial finding which we are now reporting. 
 
The main point of the paper is that, as well as leading to the expected new variant CJD phenotype, BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype which is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc. 
 
I hope reading the paper will enlighten you more on the subject. If I can be of any further assistance please to not hesitate to ask. 
 
Best wishes. Emmanuel Asante <> 
 
____________________________________ 
 
Dr. Emmanuel A Asante MRC Prion Unit & Neurogenetics Dept. Imperial College School of Medicine (St. Mary's) Norfolk Place, LONDON W2 1PG Tel: +44 (0)20 7594 3794 Fax: +44 (0)20 7706 3272 email: e.asante@ic.ac.uk (until 9/12/02) New e-mail: e.asante@prion.ucl.ac.uk (active from now) 
 
________
 
end...TSS
 
________
 
 
***********OCTOBER 2015*************
 
*** PRION 2015 ORAL AND POSTER CONGRESSIONAL ABSTRACTS ***
 
THANK YOU PRION 2015 TAYLOR & FRANCIS, Professor Chernoff, and Professor Aguzzi et al, for making these PRION 2015 Congressional Poster and Oral Abstracts available freely to the public. ...Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
 
P.108: Successful oral challenge of adult cattle with classical BSE
 
Sandor Dudas1,*, Kristina Santiago-Mateo1, Tammy Pickles1, Catherine Graham2, and Stefanie Czub1 1Canadian Food Inspection Agency; NCAD Lethbridge; Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada; 2Nova Scotia Department of Agriculture; Pathology Laboratory; Truro, Nova Scotia, Canada
 
Classical Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-type BSE) is a feed- and food-borne fatal neurological disease which can be orally transmitted to cattle and humans. Due to the presence of contaminated milk replacer, it is generally assumed that cattle become infected early in life as calves and then succumb to disease as adults. Here we challenged three 14 months old cattle per-orally with 100 grams of C-type BSE brain to investigate age-related susceptibility or resistance. During incubation, the animals were sampled monthly for blood and feces and subjected to standardized testing to identify changes related to neurological disease. At 53 months post exposure, progressive signs of central nervous system disease were observed in these 3 animals, and they were euthanized. Two of the C-BSE animals tested strongly positive using standard BSE rapid tests, however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE. Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only. 
 
***Our study demonstrates susceptibility of adult cattle to oral transmission of classical BSE. 
 
We are further examining explanations for the unusual disease presentation in the third challenged animal.
 
 
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
 
P.86: Estimating the risk of transmission of BSE and scrapie to ruminants and humans by protein misfolding cyclic amplification
 
Morikazu Imamura, Naoko Tabeta, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, and Yuichi Murayama National Institute of Animal Health; Tsukuba, Japan
 
To assess the risk of the transmission of ruminant prions to ruminants and humans at the molecular level, we investigated the ability of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) of typical and atypical BSEs (L-type and H-type) and typical scrapie to convert normal prion protein (PrPC) from bovine, ovine, and human to proteinase K-resistant PrPSc-like form (PrPres) using serial protein misfolding cyclic amplifi- cation (PMCA).
 
Six rounds of serial PMCA was performed using 10% brain homogenates from transgenic mice expressing bovine, ovine or human PrPC in combination with PrPSc seed from typical and atypical BSE- or typical scrapie-infected brain homogenates from native host species. In the conventional PMCA, the conversion of PrPC to PrPres was observed only when the species of PrPC source and PrPSc seed matched. However, in the PMCA with supplements (digitonin, synthetic polyA and heparin), both bovine and ovine PrPC were converted by PrPSc from all tested prion strains. On the other hand, human PrPC was converted by PrPSc from typical and H-type BSE in this PMCA condition.
 
Although these results were not compatible with the previous reports describing the lack of transmissibility of H-type BSE to ovine and human transgenic mice, our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
 
 
P.170: Potential detection of oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle using in vitro conversion
 
***P.170: Potential detection of oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle using in vitro conversion
 
Sandor Dudas, John G Gray, Renee Clark, and Stefanie Czub Canadian Food Inspection Agency; Lethbridge, AB Canada
 
Keywords: Atypical BSE, oral transmission, RT-QuIC
 
The detection of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has had a significant negative impact on the cattle industry worldwide. In response, governments took actions to prevent transmission and additional threats to animal health and food safety. While these measures seem to be effective for controlling classical BSE, the more recently discovered atypical BSE has presented a new challenge. To generate data for risk assessment and control measures, we have challenged cattle orally with atypical BSE to determine transmissibility and mis-folded prion (PrPSc) tissue distribution. Upon presentation of clinical symptoms, animals were euthanized and tested for characteristic histopathological changes as well as PrPSc deposition.
 
The H-type challenged animal displayed vacuolation exclusively in rostral brain areas but the L-type challenged animal showed no evidence thereof. To our surprise, neither of the animals euthanized, which were displaying clinical signs indicative of BSE, showed conclusive mis-folded prion accumulation in the brain or gut using standard molecular or immunohistochemical assays. To confirm presence or absence of prion infectivity, we employed an optimized real-time quaking induced conversion (RT-QuIC) assay developed at the Rocky Mountain Laboratory, Hamilton, USA.
 
Detection of PrPSc was unsuccessful for brain samples tests from the orally inoculated L type animal using the RT-QuIC. It is possible that these negative results were related to the tissue sampling locations or that type specific optimization is needed to detect PrPSc in this animal. We were however able to consistently detect the presence of mis-folded prions in the brain of the H-type inoculated animal. Considering the negative and inconclusive results with other PrPSc detection methods, positive results using the optimized RT-QuIC suggests the method is extremely sensitive for H-type BSE detection. This may be evidence of the first successful oral transmission of H type atypical BSE in cattle and additional investigation of samples from these animals are ongoing.
 
 
 
 
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. 
 
*** This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.
 
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries. ***
 
P.9.21
 
Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada
 
Jianmin Yang 1 , Sandor Dudas 2 , Catherine Graham 2 , Markus Czub 3 , Tim McAllister 1 , Stefanie Czub 1 1 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2 National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3 University of Calgary, Canada
 
Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle. Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres.
 
Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.
 
Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal-specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.
 
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
 
see page 176 of 201 pages...tss
 
 
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply;
 
 
***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE. 
 
***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only. 
 
IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure 
 
Posted by flounder on 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT 
 
 
2014 
 
***Moreover, L-BSE has been transmitted more easily to transgenic mice overexpressing a human PrP [13,14] or to primates [15,16] than C-BSE. 
 
***It has been suggested that some sporadic CJD subtypes in humans may result from an exposure to the L-BSE agent. 
 
*** Lending support to this hypothesis, pathological and biochemical similarities have been observed between L-BSE and an sCJD subtype (MV genotype at codon 129 of PRNP) [17], and between L-BSE infected non-human primate and another sCJD subtype (MM genotype) [15]. 
 
snip... 
 
 
Saturday, April 23, 2016
 
PRION 2016 TOKYO
 
Saturday, April 23, 2016
 
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
 
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
 
Taylor & Francis
 
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
 
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
 
Juan Maria Torres a, Olivier Andreoletti b, Juan-Carlos Espinosa a. Vincent Beringue c. Patricia Aguilar a,
 
Natalia Fernandez-Borges a. and Alba Marin-Moreno a
 
"Centro de Investigacion en Sanidad Animal ( CISA-INIA ). Valdeolmos, Madrid. Spain; b UMR INRA -ENVT 1225 Interactions Holes Agents Pathogenes. ENVT. Toulouse. France: "UR892. Virologie lmmunologie MolécuIaires, Jouy-en-Josas. France
 
Dietary exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) contaminated bovine tissues is considered as the origin of variant Creutzfeldt Jakob (vCJD) disease in human. To date, BSE agent is the only recognized zoonotic prion. Despite the variety of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) agents that have been circulating for centuries in farmed ruminants there is no apparent epidemiological link between exposure to ruminant products and the occurrence of other form of TSE in human like sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (sCJD). However, the zoonotic potential of the diversity of circulating TSE agents has never been systematically assessed. The major issue in experimental assessment of TSEs zoonotic potential lies in the modeling of the ‘species barrier‘, the biological phenomenon that limits TSE agents’ propagation from a species to another. In the last decade, mice genetically engineered to express normal forms of the human prion protein has proved essential in studying human prions pathogenesis and modeling the capacity of TSEs to cross the human species barrier.
 
To assess the zoonotic potential of prions circulating in farmed ruminants, we study their transmission ability in transgenic mice expressing human PrPC (HuPrP-Tg). Two lines of mice expressing different forms of the human PrPC (129Met or 129Val) are used to determine the role of the Met129Val dimorphism in susceptibility/resistance to the different agents.
 
These transmission experiments confirm the ability of BSE prions to propagate in 129M- HuPrP-Tg mice and demonstrate that Met129 homozygotes may be susceptible to BSE in sheep or goat to a greater degree than the BSE agent in cattle and that these agents can convey molecular properties and neuropathological indistinguishable from vCJD. However homozygous 129V mice are resistant to all tested BSE derived prions independently of the originating species suggesting a higher transmission barrier for 129V-PrP variant.
 
Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 
 
 
SPONTANEOUS ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
 
***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***
 
 
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
 
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.
 
snip...
 
R. BRADLEY
 
 
Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period) 
 
*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS. 
 
*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated. 
 
*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains. 
 
 
VPSPr
 
Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr), a recently identified and seemingly sporadic human prion disease, is distinct from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) but shares features of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease (GSS). However, contrary to exclusively inherited GSS, no prion protein (PrP) gene variations have been detected in VPSPr, suggesting that VPSPr might be the long-sought sporadic form of GSS.
snip...

In conclusion, we propose that VPSPr is transmissible and, therefore, is an authentic prion disease. However, transmissibility cannot be sustained through serial passages presumably because human PrPC (or the mouse brain environment) cannot efficiently convert and propagate the VPSPr PrPSc species. If this is the case, uncovering the properties of human PrP that are required to replicate more efficiently the prion strains associated with VPSPr may help clarify the PrPSc mode of formation in this intriguing disease.
 
 
 
Friday, January 10, 2014
 
vpspr, sgss, sffi, TSE, an iatrogenic by-product of gss, ffi, familial type prion disease, what it ???
 
 
THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2017 
 
TEXAS CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE CJD TSE PRION
 
 
National Prion Center could lose all funding just as concern about CWD jumping to humans rises
 
SATURDAY, JULY 15, 2017 
 
*** National Prion Center could lose all funding just as concern about CWD jumping to humans rises
 
 
SATURDAY, JULY 22, 2017 
 
Why the U.S. Needs to Continue Prion Disease Surveillance, instead of reducing funding to zero
 
 
SPONTANEOUS ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
 
***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***
 

MONDAY, JULY 17, 2017 

National Scrapie Eradication Program May 2017 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2017


Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency Because of an Atypical Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (Prion Disease) of Foreign Origin

A Notice by the Agriculture Department on 07/20/2000


MONDAY, APRIL 11, 2016

DECLARATION OF EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY DUE TO A FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD IN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AMERICA

DECLARATION OF EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY DUE TO A FOREIGN ANIMAL DISEASE TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD IN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH AMERICA

I thought that might get some attention, but this is the very thing the OIE should do, if they were not so in bed with the USDA and the industry as a whole. but they want do it, and it’s too late already, because the OIE has failed us terribly around the globe when it comes to the TSE Prion disease.

the OIE must be dissolved and abandoned as a failed entity.

IT is the fault of the OIE and the USDA that this has happened, the global spreading of all TSE prion disease via the BSE MRR policy, and the ignorance of corporate science, trade at all cost mentality. that’s why BSE spread to hell and back, and that’s why CWD or Cervid Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion will do the same thing, if it has not already. This first case of wild CWD or Cervid Spongiform Encephalopathy in Norway pretty much proves this, well, actually, it should have been done after North America shipped CWD TSE Prion to Korea.

I am afraid we have missed the big elephant in the room here, but first.

Confucius is confused again.

WHY is it, that around the year 2000, the United States of America Declared EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY BECAUSE OF AN ATYPICAL T.S.E. (PRION DISEASE) OF FOREIGN ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES [Docket No. 00-072-1]. 

This was the case of the Mad Sheep of Mad River Valley, about some sheep from Belgium that were imported to the USA after an atypical BSE case was discovered in Belgium. USDA et al knew that they should have never allowed those sheep into the USA, so the USDA et al did what they do best, they attempted to cover this up with a colossal ‘FALSE FLAG’ operation of sorts. 

you can see the complete decade of FOIA request and my final report on this attempted cover up by the USDA here ;

DECLARATION OF EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY BECAUSE OF AN ATYPICAL T.S.E (PRION DISEASE) OF FOREIGN ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES


FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2015 

APHIS Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Appeal Mouse Bio-Assays 2007-00030-A Sheep Imported From Belgium and the Presence of TSE Prion Disease Kevin Shea to Singeltary 2015

APHIS Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Appeal Mouse Bio-Assays 2007-00030-A Sheep Imported From Belgium and the Presence of TSE Prion Disease Kevin Shea to Singeltary 2015

 
Greetings BSE-L Members et al,

you can’t believe what I got in the US Postal mail today. the wife would not pick it up yesterday, because there was a $6.00 charge for a certified letter from USDA Kevin Shea for about 5 pages. I went to the PO today, told the girls in the back that if it’s an affidavit, a warrant, summons, I don’t want it, send it back. but it was certified. scared me. but the curiosity got to me, so i coughed up 6 bucks, and took a chance. low and behold, after my last appeal to this decade plus old quest was turned down, even though I already had the answer from another source, APHIS et al finally stumbled across those old mouse bio-assays. they had them all along.

what the industry sent me first was better, because it had some of the good stuff i.e. redacted.

this all started way back around the year 2,000, when in my opinion, the USDA et al let these sheep in the USA from Belgium, when they should not have because of atypical BSE in Belgium. I started asking for the these mouse bio-assays back in or around 2003 or before, then I had to get official with FOIA, because no one would answer my questions.

well, it’s February 20, 2015, over a decade later, and I don’t know how many denials, here’s what was in the mail yesterday, February 19, 2015 ;

United States Department of Agriculture

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Marketing and Regulatory Programs Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Legislative and Public Affairs Freedom of Information 4700 River Road Unit 50 Riverdale, MD. 20737-1232

FEB 10 2015

Terry S. Singletary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas 77518

Re: FOIA Appeal # 2007-00030-A

Dear Mr. Singletary:

This letter is in response to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) appeal that you submitted regarding FOIA request 07-566. Your appeal challenged the APHIS FOIA Office's search for the "Mouse Bio-Assays" on the sheep imported from Belgium. We apologize for the delayed response.

The APHIS FOIA Office received your appeal, on July 7, 2007 and assigned it FOIA case number 2007-00030-A.

In response to your appeal, the APHIS FOIA Office performed a second search of records responsive to your initial request. The Agency has since found four (4) pages of responsive records for the "Mouse Bio-Assays" dated October 22,2009. Although these records postdate both your initial request and subsequent appeal by approximately two years; we enclose them in the interest of responsiveness to your request.

We now consider this appeal closed and will take no further action. If you are dissatisfied with this decision, you have the right to judicial review in an appropriate United States District Court in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552, (2)(4)(B).

Prior to seeking judicial review, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGlS). OGIS was created within the National Archives and Records Administration when the Open Government Act of 2007 amended the FOIA. OGIS provides mediation of FOIA disputes between appellants and federal agencies. Participation in mediation does not affect your right to judicial review. Contact information for OGIS can be found at http:/www.archives.gov/ogis.

Sincerely,
 
Kevin Shea Administrator Enclosure
 
snip...


NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE 5 cases documented in USA in 5 different states USA 007

Statement of Gov. Rick Perry on BSE Announcement

Thursday, June 30, 2005 • Press Release

AUSTIN – Gov. Rick Perry issued the following statement today on the announcement by the U.S. Department of Agriculture that a cow recently tested for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy – commonly known as mad cow disease – is from a Texas herd.

“I want to urge calm and reassure the public that they can have the highest confidence in our beef supply, and the safeguards we have in place to protect the public from the spread of BSE. There is not, nor has there ever been, a known instance of BSE contaminating the food supply in Texas or anywhere else in the United States.

The animal in question was not processed into food or any other product. Texans can be sure that the beef they buy at their local supermarkets or restaurants is as safe today as it was yesterday, and I encourage Texans to continue to enjoy Texas beef products.”

http://governor.state.tx.us/news/press-release/3287/



Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls

In November 2004, USDA announced that its rapid screening test, Bio-Rad Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA), produced an inconclusive BSE test result as part of its enhanced BSE surveillance program. The ELISA rapid screening test performed at a BSE contract laboratory produced three high positive reactive results.40 As required,41 the contract laboratory forwarded the inconclusive sample to the APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for confirmatory testing. NVSL repeated the ELISA testing and again produced three high positive reactive results.42 In accordance with its established protocol, NVSL ran its confirmatory test, an immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, which was interpreted as negative for BSE. In addition, NVSL performed a histological43 examination of the tissue and did not detect lesions44 consistent with BSE.

Faced with conflicting results, NVSL scientists recommended additional testing to resolve the discrepancy but APHIS headquarters officials concluded no further testing was necessary because testing protocols were followed. In our discussions with APHIS officials, they justified their decision not to do additional testing because the IHC is internationally recognized as the "gold standard." Also, they believed that conducting additional tests would undermine confidence in USDA’s established testing protocols.

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf



USDA orders silence on mad cow in Texas

Susan Combs by no means has public and consumer health at heart while she is protecting the cattle industry. She is oblivious to mad cow disease. Her soul purpose is to protect the cattle industry at all cost, including my mothers life (DOD 12/14/97), or maybe one of your family members from any strain of mad cow disease in TEXAS. SHE helped cover-up mad cow disease in TEXAS both on that inconclusive that was positive so many times it will make your head spin. PLUS, the other mad cow in TEXAS they rendered without testing at all, that came from the top out of Austin. THEY should be tried for murder. corporate homicide is what i call it. they knew for years, but kept on keeping on.

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html


Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)

Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf


Texas BSE Investigation Final Epidemiology Report August 2005

Executive Summary

In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.

Background of the Investigation

On June 10, 2005, USDA announced that the November 2004 inconclusive BSE sample tested positive on SAF immunoblot. The SAF immunoblot was run at USDA’s National Animal Disease Center (NADC) upon the recommendation of USDA’s Office of the Inspector General. Samples were sent to a World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) reference laboratory for BSE in Weybridge, England, for confirmatory tests. Farm A, located in Texas, was the suspected farm of origin for the index cow and was placed under hold order on June 20, 2005 pending confirmation of the positive results and DNA analysis of the herd. Weybridge confirmed the BSE positive on June 24, 2005. The carcass of the index cow had been disposed of by incineration in November 2004.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf


News Release

Texas Animal Health Commission

Box l2966 * Austin, Texas 78711 * (800) 550-8242 * FAX (512) 719-0719

Bob Hillman, DVM * Executive Director

For info, contact Carla Everett, information officer, at 1-800-550-8242, ext. 710, or mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000388/!x-usc:mailto:ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us

For immediate release---

State-Federal Team Responds to Texas BSE Case

The US Department of Agriculture announced June 29 that genetic testing has verified that an aged cow that tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy or BSE originated from a Texas beef cattle herd. Tissues for laboratory testing were initially collected from the animal in November 2004, and the carcass was incinerated and did not enter the human food, animal feed or fertilizer supply system. While tests in November indicated the animal did not have BSE, retesting in England in June confirmed the animal had the disease. The Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), the state’s livestock and poultry health regulatory agency, and USDA have jointly assigned a state-federal team to conduct the epidemiological investigation and response.

“The TAHC and US Department of Agriculture’s Veterinary Services are working with a complement of experts from federal and state animal health, food safety, public health and feed regulatory agencies to ensure the continued safety and wholesomeness of our meat supply,” said Dr. Bob Hillman, Texas state veterinarian and executive director of the TAHC, the state’s livestock and poultry health regulatory agency. “Epidemiological investigations are thorough and focus on verifying the herd of origin, and when, where and how the animal and potentially, any herd mates, were exposed to the abnormal prion, or disease agent, that causes BSE. Additionally, epidemiology investigations trace the infected animal’s movement and herd mates. Animals potentially exposed to the disease will be depopulated, with proper disposal. The animals will not be introduced into the human or animal food chain.”

The USDA’s BSE testing protocol requires testing of emaciated or injured cattle, cattle that exhibit central nervous system disorder, cattle unable to rise or to walk normally, and cattle that die of unknown causes. Since June 1, 2004, brain tissue samples from more than 394,000 cattle have been tested in the U.S. and were negative for BSE. Of those, 38,320 were tested in Texas, Dr. Hillman noted. BSE surveillance has been conducted in the U.S. since l990.

The U.S. has taken preventive measures against the introduction of BSE since l989, when prohibitions were placed on cattle and other ruminants from BSE-affected countries, noted Dr. Hillman. In 1997, the importation ban was extended to all of Europe.

Dr. Hillman said the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1997 banned the use of ruminant-derived protein (from animals such as cattle and sheep) in feed for cattle and other ruminants. There is no evidence that BSE spreads from live animal to animal in the herd, but cattle can be exposed by eating feed that contains rendered protein from infected animals. “These measures taken by the USDA and the FDA are safeguards that work to protect livestock, and ultimately, our meat supply,” he said.

--30--

http://www.tahc.state.tx.us/news/pr/2005/2005Jun30_BSE_Positive_Results.pdf


Second BSE case occurred in Texas, USDA says Jun 30, 2005 (CIDRAP News) – The United States' second case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was in a 12-year-old cow that came from a Texas herd and would have been made into pet food if it hadn't been flagged for BSE testing, federal officials announced yesterday evening.

US Department of Agriculture (USDA) officials said the cow was to be processed at a pet food plant in Waco, Tex., when it was diverted for testing because it couldn't walk. Officials didn't name the plant or say exactly where the cow came from. But an Associated Press (AP) report today identified the plant as Champion Pet Food in Waco and said the cow was already dead when brought there last November.

"The source herd is now under a hold order as we identify animals of interest within the herd," USDA Chief Veterinarian John Clifford said in a prepared statement. Investigators will look for cattle born within a year before or after the BSE-infected cow and any of the cow's offspring born within the past 2 years, he explained.

"If the age of the animal cannot be pinpointed, then we may expand our inquiry to include all animals in this herd before the feed ban went into place in 1997," Clifford said. To prevent BSE, the government banned putting cattle protein into cattle feed in August 1997.

The infected cow was incinerated, and no parts were used in human food or animal feed, according to the USDA. "The safety of our food supply is not in question," Clifford stated.

Because of the cow's age, the USDA suspects it became infected by eating contaminated feed before the government ban began in 1997. The USDA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will try to trace the source herd's feed history, officials said.

The FDA will also check whether firms that may have processed meat-and-bone meal from animals from that herd have complied with the 1997 feed ban, Dr. Steve Sundlof, director of the FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine, said at a news conference last night.

The Texas case is the first US BSE case in a native-born animal; Clifford said the cow lived on one farm all its life. The previous US case, found in December 2003, involved a Canadian-born dairy cow in Washington state.

An initial screening test on the Texas cow last November was inconclusive, and two confirmatory immunohistochemistry tests were negative. But early this month the USDA's inspector general ordered a Western blot test, which came back positive. Further confirmatory tests at an international reference lab in Britain were also positive, prompting the USDA to announce the findings last week.

The USDA waited for the results of DNA tests before announcing that the infected cow came from Texas. The step was necessary because parts of the infected cow were stored with those of four other cattle, causing some uncertainty, officials said.

"We felt that we had the correct herd; we wanted to identify that appropriately with DNA," Clifford said at the news conference. Investigators analyzed DNA from the infected animal and then looked for relatives in the presumed source herd by analyzing DNA from members of the herd, he said. The investigation turned up two cattle that are related to the infected cow, he added.

The AP report said Champion Pet Food is under contract to take samples from animals in poor health. The company's owner, Benjy Bauer, told the AP that his workers took samples from the cow and sent them to the Texas Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory at Texas A&M University. The lab is one of several the USDA uses to screen cattle for BSE, the story said.

See also:

USDA news release http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/BSE_statement6-29-05.pdf


USDA fact sheet on BSE epidemiologic investiation

http://www.usda.gov/documents/FactSheetbse062905.pdf


USDA press conference transcript

https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/other/bse/news/june3005bse.html


THE USDA JUNE 2004 ENHANCED BSE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM WAS TERRIBLY FLAWED ;

CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006

In an article today for United Press International, science reporter Steve Mitchell writes:

Analysis: What that mad cow means

By STEVE MITCHELL UPI Senior Medical Correspondent

WASHINGTON, March 15 (UPI) -- The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.

The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.

These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."

Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.

USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.

Despite this, Brown said the U.S. prevalence of mad cow, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE, did not significantly threaten human or cattle health.

"Overall, my view is BSE is highly unlikely to pose any important risk either in cattle feed or human feed," he said.

However, Jean Halloran of Consumers Union in Yonkers, N.Y., said consumers should be troubled by the USDA's secrecy and its apparent plan to dramatically cut back the number of mad cow tests it conducts.

"Consumers should be very concerned about how little we know about the USDA's surveillance program and the failure of the USDA to reveal really important details," Halloran told UPI. "Consumers have to be really concerned if they're going to cut back the program," she added.

Last year the USDA tested more than 300,000 animals for the disease, but it has proposed, even in light of a third case, scaling back the program to 40,000 tests annually.

"They seem to be, in terms of actions and policies, taking a lot more seriously the concerns of the cattle industry than the concerns of consumers," Halloran said. "It's really hard to know what it takes to get this administration to take action to protect the public."

The USDA has insisted that the safeguards of a ban on incorporating cow tissue into cattle feed (which is thought to spread the disease) and removal of the most infectious parts of cows, such as the brain and spinal cord, protect consumers. But the agency glosses over the fact that both of these systems have been revealed to be inadequately implemented.

The feed ban, which is enforced by the Food and Drug Administration, has been criticized by the Government Accountability Office in two reports, the most recent coming just last year. The GAO said the FDA's enforcement of the ban continues to have weaknesses that "undermine the nation's firewall against BSE."

USDA documents released last year showed more than 1,000 violations of the regulations requiring the removal of brains and spinal cords in at least 35 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, with some plants being cited repeatedly for infractions. In addition, a violation of similar regulations that apply to beef exported to Japan is the reason why Japan closed its borders to U.S. beef in January six weeks after reopening them.

Other experts also question the adequacy of the USDA's surveillance system. The USDA insists the prevalence of mad cow disease is low, but the agency has provided few details of its surveillance program, making it difficult for outside experts to know if the agency's monitoring plan is sufficient.

"It's impossible to judge the adequacy of the surveillance system without having a breakdown of the tested population by age and risk status," Elizabeth Mumford, a veterinarian and BSE expert at Safe Food Solutions in Bern, Switzerland, a company that provides advice on reducing mad cow risk to industry and governments, told UPI.

"Everybody would be happier and more confident and in a sense it might be able to go away a little bit for (the USDA) if they would just publish a breakdown on the tests," Mumford added.

UPI requested detailed records about animals tested under the USDA's surveillance plan via the Freedom of Information Act in May 2004 but nearly two years later has not received any corresponding documents from the agency, despite a federal law requiring agencies to comply within 30 days. This leaves open the question of whether the USDA is withholding the information, does not have the information or is so haphazardly organized that it cannot locate it.

Mumford said the prevalence of the disease in U.S. herds is probably quite low, but there have probably been other cases that have so far gone undetected. "They're only finding a very small fraction of that low prevalence," she said.

Mumford expressed surprise at the lack of concern about the deadly disease from American consumers. "I would expect the U.S. public to be more concerned," she said.

Markus Moser, a molecular biologist and chief executive officer of Prionics, a Swiss firm that manufactures BSE test kits, told UPI one concern is that if people are infected, the mad cow pathogen could become "humanized" or more easily transmitted from person to person.

"Transmission would be much easier, through all kinds of medical procedures" and even through the blood supply, Moser said.

© Copyright 2006 United Press International, Inc. All Rights Reserved

http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r


http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2003/12/30/Mad-Cow-Linked-to-thousands-of-CJD-cases/UPI-47861072816318/


CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm


PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency." ........TSS

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/mad-cow-cover-up-usa-masked-as-sporadic.html


OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;

Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program ­ Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf



FDA STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms 

On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

#

http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108292.htm


SEE FULL TEXT OF ALL THIS HERE ;

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html


ALABAMA MAD COW CASE

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf


http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/bse/news/alabama_cow_031506.htm


Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY


(see COPIOUS AMOUNTS OF mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)


http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html


Texas BSE Investigation Final Epidemiology Report August 2005

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf


State-Federal Team Responds to Texas BSE Case


JUNE 30, 2005

(please note 7+ month delay in final confirmation so the BSE MRR policy could be set in stone first. $$$...tss)

http://www.tahc.state.tx.us/news/pr/2005/2005Jun30_BSE_Positive_Results.pdf


https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/other/bse/news/june3005bse.html


SEE ATTEMPTED COVER-UP BEFORE THE END AROUND BY FONG ET AL OF THE O.I.G


The U.S. Department of Agriculture confirmed June 29 that genetic testing had verified bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease) in a 12-year-old cow that was born and raised in a Texas beef cattle herd.

Subsequent epidemiological investigations resulted in the culling and testing of 67 adult animals from the index herd. Bio-Rad tests for BSE were conducted on all 67 animals by the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa. All tests were negative.

On July 12, Texas officials lifted the quarantine on the source herd. At press time, USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service was tracing animals of the same age that had left the ranch.

Timeline

The BSE-positive animal was a Brahman-cross cow born and raised in a single Texas herd. The location of the ranch was not disclosed.

On Nov. 11, 2004, the 12-year-old cow was taken to a Texas auction market. Because of its condition, the cow was sent to Champion Pet Foods in Waco, Texas. The company produces several blends of dog food, primarily for the greyhound industry.

On Nov. 15, the animal arrived dead at Champion. Under procedures established by USDA's intensive surveillance program, a sample was sent to the USDA-approved Texas Veterinary Medical Diagnostic Testing Laboratory (TVMDL) at Texas A&M University.

Between June 1, 2004, and June 1, 2005, TVMDL tested nearly 34,000 samples from Texas, New Mexico, Arkansas and Louisiana. They tested the sample from Champion on Nov. 19 using a Bio-Rad ELISA rapid test for BSE. Initial results were inconclusive.

Because of the inconclusive results, a representative from USDA took the entire carcass to TVMDL where it was incinerated. USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) began tracing the animal and herd.

The sample was then sent to the National Veterinary Services Laboratory for further testing. Two Immunohistochemistry (IHC) tests were conducted and both were negative for BSE. At that point APHIS stopped their trace.

USDA scientists also ran an additional, experimental IHC "rapid" tissue fixation test for academic purposes. This test has not been approved internationally.

Some abnormalities were noted in the experimental test, but because the two approved tests came back negative, the results were not reported beyond the laboratory.

Monitoring by OIG

USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been monitoring implementation of the BSE expanded surveillance program and evaluating the following:

* Effectiveness of the surveillance program;

* Performance of BSE laboratories in complying with policies and procedures for conducting tests and reporting results;

* Enforcement of the ban on specified risk materials in meat products;

* Controls to prevent central nervous system tissue in advanced meat recovery products;

* Ante mortem condemnation procedures; and

* Procedures for obtaining brain tissue samples from condemned cattle.

While reviewing voluminous records, OIG auditors noticed conflicting test results on one sample-rapid inconclusive, IHC negative, experimental reactive.

Sample retested

At the recommendation of the Inspector General, the sample was retested during the week of June 5 with a second confirmatory test, the Western Blot. The results were reactive.

USDA scientists then conducted an additional IHC confirmatory test, using different antibodies from the November 2004 test. On Friday, June 10, Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns publicly announced the results as a "weak positive."

On June 16 an official with USDA's National Veterinary Services Laboratory hand-carried samples for further testing to the Veterinary Laboratory Agency (VLA) in Weybridge, England. Since 1991, the VLA has been a BSE reference laboratory for the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).

Experts from the Weybridge lab confirmed the accuracy of the results of USDA's November confirmatory IHC test, concurring that the case could not have been confirmed on the basis of this sample. They also examined the November experimental IHC test and interpreted the results to be positive.

Weybridge also conducted additional tests, including IHC, OIE-prescribed Western Blot, NaTTA Western Blot and Prionics Western Blot tests.

To better understand the conflicting results, USDA also conducted Bio-Rad and IDEXX rapid screening tests, IHC and OIE-prescribed Western Blot. USDA also used DNA sequencing to determine the prion protein gene sequence of the animal.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5420/is_200508/ai_n21377094


Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive; experimental IHC test results, because the test was not a validated procedure, and because the two approved IHC tests came back negative, the results were not considered to be of regulatory significance and therefore were not reported beyond the laboratory. . A Western blot test conducted the week of June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.

http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf


48 hr BSE confirmation turnaround took 7+ months to confirm this case, so the BSE MRR policy could be put into place. ...TSS



-------- Original Message --------

Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease

Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us

Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............

snip...

There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...

Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx

Date: June 14, 2005 at 1:46 pm PST

In Reply to:

Re: Transcript Ag. Secretary Mike Johanns and Dr. John Clifford, Regarding further analysis of BSE Inconclusive Test Results

posted by TSS on June 13, 2005 at 7:33 pm:

Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman resigns Nov 15 2004, three days later inclusive Mad Cow is announced. June 7th 2005 Bill Hawks Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs resigns. Three days later same mad cow found in November turns out to be positive. Both resignation are unexpected. just pondering... TSS

MAD COW IN TEXAS NOVEMBER 2004. ...TSS


-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: Carla EverettReferences: [log in to unmask]; [log in to unmask] ;

Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;

Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?

and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for something, but they forgot a url for update?

I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...

can you confirm??? terry

============================================================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600

From: Carla Everett

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References;[log in to unmask];

The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas.

Carla

At 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:

Greetings Carla,

i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from

TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?

thank you,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr

======================================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600

From: Carla Everett

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us><[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]us> <[log in to unmask]>

our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when we hear something.

At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,

you wrote:

why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:

November 22: Press Release title here

star image More BSE information

terry

Carla Everett wrote:

no confirmation on the U.S.'inconclusive test...

no confirmation on location of animal. ;

FROM HERE, IT TOOK 7 MONTHS TO CONFIRM THIS MAD COW, while the BSE MRR policy was being bought and sold...(in my opinion...tss)

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/


Saturday, August 16, 2008

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html



TEXAS OFFICIALS DEAD WRONG ON AMOUNT OF INFECTIVITY TO CAUSE A TSE PRION DISEASE ;


"FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams – approximately a quarter ounce — of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds."


5.5 GRAMS OF INFECTIOUS PROHIBITED MAD COW FEED FOR EACH OF THE 1,222 ANIMALS (5.5 GRAMS X 1,222 ANIMALS) IS ENOUGH INFECTIOUS MAD COW FEED TO KILL A SMALL HERD OF COWS...TSS

U.S. Food and Drug Administration FDA News | Today the Food and Drug Administ…U.S. Food and Drug Administration FDA News

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle — a violation of FDA’s 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams – approximately a quarter ounce — of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA’s Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, “The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE.”

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.

http://www.usmef.org/news-statistics/press-releases/us-food-and-drug-administration-fda-news-today-the-food-and-drug-administ-13375/


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE P01-05 January 30, 2001 Print Media: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA

FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT

Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.

FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.

It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.

According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."

Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.

FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.

This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.

FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.html


PRION 2009 CONGRESS BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

O.4.3

Spread of BSE prions in cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) after oral transmission

Edgar Holznagel1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Barbara Yutzy1, Gerhard Hunsmann3, Johannes Loewer1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Federal Institute for Sera and Vaccines, Germany; 2Department of Neuropathology, Georg-August University, Göttingen, Germany, 3Department of Virology and Immunology, German Primate Centre, Göttingen, Germany

Background: BSE-infected cynomolgus monkeys represent a relevant animal model to study the pathogenesis of variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD).

Objectives: To study the spread of BSE prions during the asymptomatic phase of infection in a simian animal model.

Methods: Orally BSE-dosed macaques (n=10) were sacrificed at defined time points during the incubation period and 7 orally BSE-dosed macaques were sacrificed after the onset of clinical signs. Neuronal and non-neuronal tissues were tested for the presence of proteinase-K-resistant prion protein (PrPres) by western immunoblot and by paraffin-embedded tissue (PET) blot technique.

Results: In clinically diseased macaques (5 years p.i. + 6 mo.), PrPres deposits were widely spread in neuronal tissues (including the peripheral sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system) and in lymphoid tissues including tonsils. In asymptomatic disease carriers, PrPres deposits could be detected in intestinal lymph nodes as early as 1 year p.i., but CNS tissues were negative until 3 – 4 years p.i. Lumbal/sacral segments of the spinal cord and medulla oblongata were PrPres positive as early as 4.1 years p.i., whereas sympathetic trunk and all thoracic/cervical segments of the spinal cord were still negative for PrPres. However, tonsil samples were negative in all asymptomatic cases.

Discussion: There is evidence for an early spread of BSE to the CNS via autonomic fibres of the splanchnic and vagus nerves indicating that trans-synaptical spread may be a time-limiting factor for neuroinvasion. Tonsils were predominantly negative during the main part of the incubation period indicating that epidemiological vCJD screening results based on the detection of PrPres in tonsil biopsies may mostly tend to underestimate the prevalence of vCJD among humans.

http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf

P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

Background:

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

Aims:

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

Methods:

Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

Results:

In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

Conclusions:

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).

http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.

http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf

look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;



Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

snip...

BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was

inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of

bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005

http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa


Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose

It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://web.archive.org/web/20061003022720/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf

6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://web.archive.org/web/20061003022724/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque


"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

snip...

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...


2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

 
National Prion Center could lose all funding just as concern about CWD jumping to humans rises
 
SATURDAY, JULY 15, 2017 
 
*** National Prion Center could lose all funding just as concern about CWD jumping to humans rises
 
 
National Prion Center could lose all funding just as concern about CWD jumping to humans rises

SATURDAY, JULY 15, 2017 

*** National Prion Center could lose all funding just as concern about CWD jumping to humans rises


SATURDAY, JULY 22, 2017 

Why the U.S. Needs to Continue Prion Disease Surveillance, instead of reducing funding to zero


SPONTANEOUS ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***


CWD state by state


2001 FDA CJD TSE Prion Singeltary Submission

THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 2017 

World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) to establish liaison office in College Station, Texas



TUESDAY, JULY 18, 2017 

USDA announces Alabama case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Alabama


THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2017 

USDA OIE Alabama Atypical L-type BASE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE animal feeds for ruminants rule, 21 CFR 589.200


SUNDAY, JULY 23, 2017

atypical L-type BASE Bovine Amyloidotic Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE PRION


SUNDAY, JULY 23, 2017

Experimental Infection of Cattle With a Novel Prion Derived From Atypical H-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy


THURSDAY, JULY 13, 2017 

EFSA BSE Sixty cases of mad cow disease since 2001 breached feed ban likely the cause 

Scientists investigate origin of isolated BSE cases




Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 2017 

APHIS USDA Emerging Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan July 2017



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